(Photo: Vatican Media) Pope Francis greets new recruits of the Swiss Guard on May 6, 2022.
As the smallest army and one the world’s oldest standing armies May 6 is always a special day because the force welcomes in new recruits from Switzerland to serve the Roman Catholic pope.
The date marks when 147 of their predecessors were killed protecting Pope Clement VII during the Sack of Rome, an uprising in 1527.
Francis was in a wheelchair due to a knee injury.
Pope Francis met the President of the Swiss Confederation, Ignazio Cassis, on the commemoration of the sacrifice of the Swiss Guards and the swearing-in of 36 new recruits in the Pontifical Corps.
The ongoing war in Ukraine and its repercussions in Europe, with particular reference to the situation of Ukrainian refugees and displaced people in need of humanitarian assistance, were one of discussion topics during the talks, said Vatican News.
The new recruits swear an oath of allegiance and officially begin their service in the employ of the Pope.
Pope Francis met with the Swiss Guards to celebrate with them what he called “a beautiful occasion,” Vatican News reported.
He addressed the Guards and their families, and Francis extended his special greetings to the new recruits who were sworn in at a ceremony later.
Francis said they are devoting a few years of their lives to “a task which is both fascinating and full of responsibility in the heart of the universal Church.”
“Through a generous and faithful commitment, over the centuries some men have not shirked the hardest trials, going so far as to shed their own blood to defend the Pope and to enable him to carry out his mission in full independence.”
SECURITY OF THE POPE
The Pope added that Swiss Guards serve with “supreme dedication” to ensure the “security of the Pope and of his residence.”
Pope Francis encouraged the new recruits in their decision to embark on an “exquisitely ecclesial task,” which must be lived “as a Christian and communal witness.”
The Swiss Guards serve as a community and not individually, said the Pope, urging them to embrace community life in every moment of their day.
“Living service in a community is a challenge,” he said, “because it involves bringing together individuals with different personalities, temperaments and sensibilities, who find themselves walking a stretch of road together.”
Yet, noted the Pope, the Guards are motivated by the “ideal of serving the Church”, which helps them face moments of difficulty when they arise.
The Swiss Guard was founded in 1506 by Pope Julius II, deposed twice and re-established in 1800. It remains tasked with protecting the pope and his residence.
Entry requirements include being Swiss, Catholic, at least 1.74 meters (5 feet 7 inches) tall, under 30 years old, and male.
The Pontifical Swiss Guard has increased from 110 to 135 men since 2018.
(Photo: Vatican Media)Pope Francis meets Swiss President Ignazio Cassis on May 6, 2022
Scientists report the formation of matter-wave polaritons in an optical lattice, an experimental discovery that enables studies of a central quantum science and technology paradigm through direct quantum simulation using ultracold atoms.
Discovery of Matter-Wave Polaritons Sheds New Light on Photonic Quantum Technologies
Research published in the journal Nature Physics provides a novel platform for the ‘second quantum revolution.’
The development of experimental platforms that advance the field of quantum science and technology (QIST) comes with a unique set of advantages and challenges common to any emergent technology. Researchers at Stony Brook University, led by Dominik Schneble, PhD, report the formation of matter-wave polaritons in an optical lattice, an experimental discovery that permits studies of a central QIST paradigm through direct quantum simulation using ultracold atoms. The scientists project that their novel quasiparticles, which mimic strongly interacting photons in materials and devices but circumvent some of the inherent challenges, will benefit the further development of QIST platforms that are poised to revolutionize computing and communication technology.
The research findings are detailed in a paper published in the journal Nature Physics.
The study sheds light on fundamental polariton properties and related many-body phenomena, and it opens up novel possibilities for studies of polaritonic quantum matter.
An important challenge in working with photon-based QIST platforms is that while photons can be ideal carriers of quantum information they do not normally interact with each other. The absence of such interactions also inhibits the controlled exchange of quantum information between them. Scientists have found a way around this by coupling the photons to heavier excitations in materials, thus forming polaritons, chimera-like hybrids between light and matter. Collisions between these heavier quasiparticles then make it possible for the photons to effectively interact. This can enable the implementation of photon-based quantum gate operations and eventually of an entire QIST infrastructure.
However, a major challenge is the limited lifetime of these photon-based polaritons due to their radiative coupling to the environment, which leads to uncontrolled spontaneous decay and decoherence.
An artistic rendering of the research findings in the polariton study shows the atoms in an optical lattice forming an insulating phase (left); atoms turning into matter-wave polaritons via vacuum coupling mediated by microwave radiation represented by the green color (center); polaritons becoming mobile and forming a superfluid phase for strong vacuum coupling (right). Credit: Alfonso Lanuza/Schneble Lab/Stony Brook University.
According to Schneble and colleagues, their published polariton research circumvents such limitations caused by spontaneous decay completely. The photon aspects of their polaritons are entirely carried by atomic matter waves, for which such unwanted decay processes do not exist. This feature opens access to parameter regimes that are not, or not yet, accessible in photon-based polaritonic systems.
“The development of quantum mechanics has dominated the last century, and a ‘second quantum revolution’ toward the development of QIST and its applications is now well underway around the globe, including at corporations such as IBM, Google and Amazon,” says Schneble, a Professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy in the College of Arts and Sciences. “Our work highlights some fundamental quantum mechanical effects that are of interest for emergent photonic quantum systems in QIST ranging from semiconductor nanophotonics to circuit quantum electrodynamics.”
The Stony Brook researchers conducted their experiments with a platform featuring ultracold atoms in an optical lattice, an egg-crate-like potential landscape formed by standing waves of light. Using a dedicated vacuum apparatus featuring various lasers and control fields and operating at nanokelvin temperature, they implemented a scenario in which the atoms trapped in the lattice “dress’’ themselves with clouds of vacuum excitations made of fragile, evanescent matter waves.
The team found that, as a result, the polaritonic particles become much more mobile. The researchers were able to directly probe their inner structure by gently shaking the lattice, thus accessing the contributions of the matter waves and the atomic lattice excitation. When left alone, the matter-wave polaritons hop through the lattice, interact with each other, and form stable phases of quasiparticle matter.
“With our experiment we performed a quantum simulation of an exciton-polariton system in a novel regime,” explains Schneble. “The quest to perform such analogue’ simulations, which in addition areanalog` in the sense that the relevant parameters can be freely dialed in, by itself constitutes an important direction within QIST.”
Reference: “Formation of matter-wave polaritons in an optical lattice” by Joonhyuk Kwon, Youngshin Kim, Alfonso Lanuza and Dominik Schneble, 31 March 2022, Nature Physics. DOI: 10.1038/s41567-022-01565-4
The Stony Brook research included graduate students Joonhyuk Kwon (currently a postdoc at Sandia National Laboratory), Youngshin Kim, and Alfonso Lanuza.
The work was funded by the National Science Foundation (grant # NSF PHY-1912546) with additional funds from the SUNY Center for Quantum Information Science on Long Island.
Canepari, an Italian diplomat and author, is an acclaimed ambassador for the influence of Italian life, culture, and tradition in the United States and beyond.
ROME, LAZIO, ITALY, May 6, 2022 – On Wednesday, May 25th, The American University of Rome is proud to host Andrea Canepari as he presents his latest publication, “The Italian Legacy in Philadelphia: History, Culture, People, and Ideas” published by Temple University Press to the public and an invited audience at the Centro Studi Americani in Rome.
The Italian Legacy in Philadelphia
An invaluable tribute to what Italians brought to the city as they altered its physical and cultural environment and helped to make Philadelphia what it is today.” — Richard N. Juliani, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Villanova University
Over a long and distinguished career, Andrea Canepari has served as Ambassador of Italy to the Dominican Republic and as Consul General in Philadelphia. In both roles, he has consistently promoted public diplomacy initiatives to foster collaboration between Italy and the wider world. He is also the co-editor of The Italian Legacy in Washington, D.C.: Architecture, Design, Art and Culture published by Skira, and editor of The Italian Legacy in the Dominican Republic: History, Architecture, Economics, and Society published by St Joseph University Press.
Mr. Canepari is co-editor with Dr. Judith Goode (Professor Emerita and former President of the Society for the Anthropology of North America ) of The Italian Legacy in Philadelphia, a book that celebrates the history, impact, and legacy of the vibrant Italian community in Philadelphia, tracing four periods of key transformation in the city’s political, economic, and social structures. The editors and the book’s illustrious contributors chronicle the changing dynamics of the city as Italian immigrants established themselves and as they continue to have lively interactions with people and institutions in Italy.
“This anthology provides elegant testimony to the profound impact of the Italian presence in Philadelphia… it offers an invaluable tribute to what Italians brought to the city as they altered its physical and cultural environment and helped to make Philadelphia what it is today.”
Richard N. Juliani, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Villanova University
The American University of Rome is proud to announce that Mr. Canepari will be honored by the university as the 2022 Honorary Doctorate at their annual commencement ceremony on the evening of 26th May at Villa Aurelia. The honorary degree will be presented in recognition for Mr. Canepari’s significant contribution to Italian-American cooperation and for his tireless promotion of Italian life and culture around the world.
The event, Andrea Canepari presents ‘The Italian Legacy in Philadelphia’, is free to attend and open to all. Registration is required. If you wish to attend the event, please register at www.aur.edu/andreacanepari
News Provided By https://www.einpresswire.com/article/571339480/andrea-canepari-presents-his-publication-the-italian-legacy-in-philadelphia-in-rome-on-may-25th
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The Ventus drone ionizes the air to create lift without moving engines.
Florida-based Undefined Technologies has unveiled the next generation of its “silent” commercial drone, which uses an ion engine instead of propellers. Two flight tests have already been carried out. The project received funding of about $2 million.
In the frames below you can see a new prototype in the air. However, the video is edited, so it is impossible to check the exact duration of the flight. At the same time, it cannot be called 100% silent. However, Undefined Technologies says it will be quiet compared to current propeller-driven drones.
The design of the model is very different from previous prototypes.
The last prototype flew for about 25 seconds and produced about 90 decibels of noise. Representatives of Undefined Technologies claim that the new Ventus drone flew for about two and a half minutes, and the noise figure dropped to 85 decibels. The end goal is around 70 decibels, or about the same as the DJI Mavic. But they want to implement the idea in a larger airframe with some carrying capacity.
Silent Ventus is a prime example of our intention to create a sustainable, progressive and less noisy urban environment.
Thomas Prybanik, Founder and CEO of Undefined Technologies
It is not yet clear how the company plans to continue to reduce noise levels on a device that no longer has moving parts in the power plant. At this stage, the company also makes no promises regarding range or endurance. The Ventus drone itself ionizes the air to create lift without moving engines.
Will they never return? Can this be considered another wave of emigration? Demographers Mikhail Denisenko and Yulia Florinskaya explain for the site https://meduza.io/.
After February 24, when Russia launched a full-scale war in Ukraine, many Russians decided to leave the country. For some, this is a temporary solution. Others realize that they may never return to the country. About how many people have left Russia, which of them can be officially considered emigrants, and how all this will affect the country in the future, Meduza spoke with Mikhail Denisenko, director of the HSE Institute of Demography, and Yulia Florinskaya, a leading researcher at the RANEPA Institute for Social Analysis and Forecasting .
The interview with Mikhail Denisenko took place before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Yulia Florinskaya after the start of the war.
– Can you already estimate how many people left Russia after February 24?
Julia Florinskaya: I don’t have any estimates – neither accurate nor inaccurate. It’s more of an order of numbers. My order of numbers is about 150 thousand people.
Why do I say so? All are based on approximately the same figures that were named. The number of departures from Russia to Georgia for the first week [of the war] was 25,000. There was a figure of 30-50 thousand who left for Armenia [from the end of February to the beginning of April]. About 15 thousand, according to the latest data, entered Israel. Based on these figures – since the circle of countries where people left is small – I think that in the first two weeks there were 100,000 people who left. Maybe by the end of March – beginning of April, 150 thousand, including those who were already abroad [at the time the invasion began] and did not return.
Now they are trying to estimate some millions, 500, 300 thousand. I don’t think in those categories – and the way these estimates are made seems questionable to me. For example, a survey conducted by [OK Russians project] Mitya Aleshkovsky: they just took these numbers – 25 thousand went to Georgia in the first week – and decided that in the second week there were also 25 thousand. And since 15% of those interviewed were from Georgia, they counted and said: it means that 300,000 left [from Russia].
But this is not done, because if you have 25 thousand in the first week, no one said that it will be the same in the second. Secondly, if 15% from Georgia answered you, this does not mean that there really are 15% of all those who left Russia during this time. All this is written with a pitchfork on the water.
– The other day, data appeared on the website of state statistics on the crossing of the border by Russians in the first three months of 2022. Do they not give an idea of the number of those who left?
Florinskaya: This data does not show anything. This is simply leaving the country (without data on the number of those who entered Russia back – approx. Meduza) – and for the quarter, that is, including the New Year holidays.
For example, 20,000 more people left for Armenia than in 2020 (before COVID [in Russia]), or 30,000 more than in 2019. To Turkey – in fact, the same number as in 2019. But in 2021, there were 100,000 more [those going there], since all other countries were closed.
In total, 3.9 million people left Russia in the first quarter of 2022, 8.4 million in 2019, and 7.6 million in 2020. Only in 2021, at the height of covid, there were fewer — 2.7 million. But this is logical.
– And when will the exact data on those who have left appear?
Florinskaya: Maybe there will still be some estimates, as Georgia gave on crossing its border (for example, at the end of March, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that 35 thousand citizens of the Russian Federation entered the country in a month, 20.7 thousand left; not reported). But official statistics will not appear this year.
Again, this is a border crossing. This does not mean that people are left. Among those who entered Georgia, there are those who first entered Armenia or, for example, Turkey.
– According to UN estimates, as of 2021, about 11 million immigrants from Russia lived abroad – this is the third figure in the world after India and Mexico. How correct are these data?
Mikhail Denisenko: When we talk about any social phenomenon, statistics must be understood. There are our statistics on migration, there are foreign ones, there are international organizations. When we use numbers and do not know the definitions, this leads to all sorts of incidents.
What are UN assessments? How are international migrants generally defined? A migrant is a person who was born in one country and lives in another (such migration is sometimes called lifelong migration). And the UN statistics are just based on this – they are about people who were born in Russia, but live outside of it.
What in these statistics does not suit me and many experts? Lifelong migration [according to the UN] also includes those who left Russia [for allied countries] during the Soviet period. Therefore, these figures [about emigrants from Russia], as well as the reverse ones (that 12 million migrants live in Russia), must be treated with care. Because there really are people… For example, I was not born in Russia. And in these statistics, I fall into the number of migrants. Nobody cares that I have been living in Russia since I was six years old, and my parents just worked abroad [RF].
Therefore, the figure of 11 million is dangerous. It creates the illusion that a large number of people have emigrated recently.
My colleagues and I have a book entitled “Migrations from the Newly Independent States. 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to our estimates, from the late 1980s to 2017 inclusive, there are about three million people who were born in Russia and live in far abroad countries. That is, not 11 million [as in the UN data], but three. So, if you use UN statistics, you should, if possible, remove the former Soviet republics from it. That will be more correct. For example, many people were born in Russia and moved to Ukraine during the Soviet era. Or take the “punished” peoples: Latvians and Lithuanians returned from exile with children who were born in Russia.
– Where do they get data for compiling statistics on emigration?
Denisenko: There are two concepts in migration statistics: migration flow and migration stock, i.e. flow and number.
UN statistics are just numbers. A census is being carried out, in which there is a question about the place of birth. Further, the UN collects data from all countries where censuses were conducted and makes its own estimates. In countries where there is no census (these are poor countries or, say, North Korea), there are no migrants either. [In the census] there may be other questions: “When did you come to the country?” and “From what country?” They refine information about emigrants and, in principle, give us an idea of the flows.
Nationally representative surveys are also conducted. I will often appeal to the United States, because, from my point of view, migration statistics are well organized there. The American community survey is conducted there every year – and from these data I can get information, say, about how many immigrants from Russia are in the country.
Flow information can be obtained from administrative sources. We have this border service (it gives information about crossing the border, where you are going and for what reason) and the migration service (it collects information about those who came, from which country, at what age).
But you yourself understand what flow statistics are: the same person can travel several times during the year, and the information is collected not about people, but about movements.
Florinskaya: In Russia, [emigrants] are counted by the number of those who left [from among permanent residents]. At the same time, Rosstat considers only those who have been deregistered. And far from all Russians who emigrate are removed from this register. Just like not everyone who leaves the country are emigrants. Therefore, the first step is to identify [in the Rosstat data] Russian citizens who are deregistered and leave for Western countries (where emigration mainly goes), and count their number. Before covid, there were 15-17 thousand of them a year.
However, the majority leave without announcing their departure in any way, so it is customary to count according to the data of the host countries. They are several times different from the Rosstat data. The difference depends on the country, in some years [data of the host country] were three, five and even 20 times greater than the data of Rosstat [on leaving to this country]. On average, you can multiply by five or six figures [Rosstat about 15-17 thousand emigrants per year].
Earlier in Russia, emigrants were considered differently.
BUT AS?
Denisenko: There is a sacred principle in migration studies that it is better to study migration according to the statistics of countries and regions of reception. We need proof that the person left or arrived. Evidence that he left is often not there. You understand: a person leaves Moscow for the United States, receives a green card, and in Moscow he has a house, even a job. And [Russian] statistics do not see this. But in the United States (and other countries), he needs to get registered. Therefore, the reception statistics are more accurate.
And here another problem arises: who can be called a migrant? Any person who came? And if not anyone, then who? In the States, for example, you received a green card – you are a migrant. The same is true in Australia and Canada. In Europe, if you receive a residence permit for a certain period, preferably a long one (the same nine or 12 months), you have the status of a migrant.
In Russia, the system is similar to the European one. We use a temporary criterion: if a person comes to Russia for nine months or more, he falls into the so-called permanent population. And often this number [nine months] is identified with migration, although a person can come for two years and then go back.
Florinskaya: If we take the data of consular records in foreign countries of “classic” emigration, then at the end of 2021, about one and a half million Russian citizens were registered with consular records. As a rule, not everyone gets on the consular register. But, on the other hand, not everyone is filmed when they go back [to Russia].
You can also look at how many people have notified [Russian law enforcement] of a second citizenship or residence permit since 2014, when it was made mandatory. About a million people from the countries of classical emigration [from Russia] declared themselves over the years. But there are those who left earlier, of course, they did not declare anything.
How and where do they leave Russia
– Is it clear how Russia reached the indicator of three million people who left (according to your estimates)?
Denisenko: Yes, we know when people started leaving, where they left and for what reasons. The statistics speak for it.
You remember, in the Soviet Union, migration was not all clear. Until the end of the 1920s, the USSR was open, then closed. After the war, there was a small “window”, even a “window”, to Germany for a couple of years, then it slammed shut. With Israel, everything was quite difficult. But, as a rule, meetings [of Soviet leaders] with American presidents led to the fact that a “window” was opened to Israel, no, no, and thirty thousand [left]. In the 1980s, when the Afghan crisis began, migration [from the USSR] practically stopped.
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who is often criticized, opened not a window, but really a window. Soviet legislation became more loyal – at least [to the departure of] certain peoples. Since 1987, the outflow began. At first, the window was open to ethnic migrants – Jews, Germans, Greeks, Hungarians, Armenians. At first, the outflow was small, but then it began to increase sharply.
The crisis of the 1990s, of course, began to push people out. Of the more than three million [emigrants], more than half left in the late 1980s-1990s. Almost 95% – to Germany, the United States and Israel. For a significant part of the people who left for Germany and Israel, the channel of emigration was repatriation. In the United States, the main channel then was refugees.
Then there was a turning point, and these repatriation resources were reduced [since most of the representatives of national minorities left]. In Germany, they began to limit the influx of repatriates. If at the beginning of the 1990s 75% [of those entering from Russia] were Germans, by the mid-1990s only 25% of them were Germans. And the rest – members of their families – were Russians, Kazakhs, anyone, but not Germans. Naturally, [this could lead to] problems with integration, with the language – and restrictions began to be introduced [for those wishing to leave], primarily in the German language. Not everyone could pass it: after all, German is not English.
In the 1990s, the biggest difficulty in leaving, I think, was standing in line at the embassy. There were still few consulates, it was necessary to stand for a very long time – not a day or two, but a week or two. But the countries were open enough [to accept people from the former USSR]. Everyone knew that there was a flow of mostly qualified people from the Soviet Union. There were really many different kinds of programs, grants – for students, scientists.
And in the early 2000s, all these privileges were closed. The country [Russia] became democratic [compared to the USSR], and, say, the status of a refugee had to be seriously proved, to compete with others who wanted to leave. On the one hand, the flow has decreased, selection systems have appeared. On the other hand, these selection systems, in fact, began to shape the flow of migrants: who leaves, why and where.
What did we end up with? Earned the channel “relatives”. Now 40-50% of migrants from Russia leave through the channel of family reunification, that is, moving to relatives.
Another category is highly qualified specialists: scientists, engineers, programmers, athletes, ballet dancers, and so on. In the 1990s, prominent people left [Russia], in the 2000s and 2010s, as a rule, young talented people. Another, third, category is wealthy people. For example, Spain was one of the first countries in Europe to allow the sale of real estate to foreigners. We have huge communities there.
What is called a wave of emigration? What waves of emigration from Russia are distinguished?
Denisenko: Imagine a graph in which the lower axis, the abscissa, is time. We [in Russia] have statistics on emigration in 1828, now 2022. And on this chart we plot the number of migrants. When the number increases, a kind of wave is formed. Actually, this is what we call a wave. Waves are something fundamental that lasts more than one year.
We actually had several such rises. The first wave – the end of the 1890s – the beginning of the century. This is Jewish-Polish migration, so it is usually not singled out as a wave. But it was a powerful wave, the most massive [emigration in the history of the country], we fought with the Italians for the first place in the number of emigrants to the United States. Then this wave began to be fueled by Russian and Ukrainian migrants. The First World War ended all this.
The second wave in chronology and the first, if we take the Soviet period, is white emigration. Then the military and post-war emigration in the 1940s-1950s. The migration of the period 1960-1980 is also sometimes called a wave, although this is incorrect. [On the chart] it’s a straight line, but from time to time there are bursts, stages. But the 1990s were a wave.
— And what happened to emigration from Russia in the last 20 years?
Denisenko: Were there any stages? It’s a good question, but it’s hard for me to answer it, because I don’t see any clear stages [during this period].
— According to my feelings, many politicians, activists and journalists began to leave the country in 2021. What does the statistics say about this?
Denisenko: I will disappoint you, but the statistics do not see this. But she may not see for various reasons.
Statistics, on the contrary, sees a reduction in flows – not only from Russia. Of course, covid, restrictive measures were taken [on movement between countries]. For example, American statistics – the United States occupies one of the top three places in the direction of emigration from Russia – for 2020 shows a halving in the number of entries. Except for those traveling on work visas. If we take the recipients of green cards, then there are also slightly fewer of them. The fact is that you apply for a green card a year or two [before moving]. The situation is similar in Europe: the reduction occurred almost everywhere, except for one category – those who go to work.
– You said that statistics do not see an increase in departures from Russia in 2021. As far as I know, many left for the same Georgia, where one can stay up to a year without a visa and any status. Can such people just not get into the statistics?
Denisenko: Yes, exactly. You can go to another country for a certain period, for example, on a grant, and not be among the permanent residents. Here again there is a problem of definition. A person considers himself a migrant, but the country does not consider him a migrant. Another category is people with two passports. They came to Russia, then something didn’t work out for them, they went back. They are not included in the statistics either.
After Bolotnaya Square, many also said that they had the feeling that everyone had left. And it was just, perhaps, those who left who had the opportunity – a residence permit or something else in another country. Then, by the way, there was a small surge, but literally for a year.
• Remember crying Putin? And rallies for a hundred thousand people in 20-degree frost? Ten years ago, the streets of Moscow became the scene of a real political struggle (it’s hard to believe now). That’s how it was
– Can the departure of people from Russia after February 24 be called a wave?
Florinskaya: Probably, if most of these people do not return. Because so many left to wait out the moment of panic. Still, most of them left in order to work remotely. How possible will this be? I think that soon it will not be very possible. Must watch.
In terms of the number [of those who left], yes, this is a lot in a month. [The level of emigration from Russia in the 1990s] has not yet been reached, but if the year continues as it began, then we will fit in perfectly and, perhaps, even overlap some years of the 1990s. But only if the departure will take place at the same speed as it is now – and, to be honest, I’m not sure about this. Simply because, in addition to desire and push factors, there are also the conditions of the host countries. It seems to me that now they have become very complicated for everyone.
Even if we don’t talk about wariness towards people with a Russian passport, but objectively, it’s difficult to leave: planes don’t fly, it’s impossible to get visas to many countries. At the same time, there are difficulties with obtaining offers, the inability to receive scholarships for education. After all, many of them studied with the support of scholarship funds. Now these opportunities are narrowing, because many scholarship funds will redistribute [funds] towards Ukrainian refugees. This is logical.
Who is leaving Russia. And who is coming
– Emigration can occur for various reasons – for example, economic, political, personal. In what case are we talking about forced emigration?
Denisenko: Forced emigration is when you are, shall we say, pushed out of the country. The war has begun – people are forced to leave. Ecological catastrophe – Chernobyl, floods, droughts – is also an example of forced emigration. Discrimination. One way or another, this is all that is connected with the concept of “refugee”.
There are clear criteria for identifying refugees and asylum seekers. If you take statistics, the contingent from Russia is not small. Traditionally, people from the North Caucasus, the Chechen diaspora, and sexual minorities fall into it.
– Is the mass exodus of people from Russia now a forced emigration?
Florinskaya: Of course. Although among those who left, there are people who planned to emigrate, but in the future, in calm conditions. They were also forced to flee, because they were afraid that the country would close, that they would announce mobilization, and so on.
When we talk about forced emigration, there is no time for reasons. People just think they are saving their lives. Gradually, when the direct danger has passed, it turns out that most of them left for economic reasons and will not return for them. Because they are well aware of what will happen to the Russian economy, that they will not be able to work, to maintain the standard of living that they had.
Some part – and quite a large part in this flow – will not return for political reasons. Because they are not ready to live in an unfree society. Moreover, they are afraid of direct criminal prosecution.
I think those who decide to leave permanently, rather than wait [abroad], will no longer choose the best offer. They will go at least somewhere where you can get settled and somehow survive these difficult times.
— How does emigration affect Russia in terms of human capital and economy?
Denisenko (answered a question before the start of the war, — approx. Meduza): You know, I want to say right away that it affects badly. We have an outflow of highly skilled and educated people, whom we identify with human capital. What is the contradiction here? There is a problem within the country – the mismatch of qualifications with the workplace. A person graduated, for example, from the Faculty of Engineering, and works as a manager in a store – this is also, to a certain extent, a loss of human capital. If we take this problem into account, then, probably, these losses are slightly reduced in terms of volume.
On the other hand, those who leave, to what extent could they be realized here [in Russia]? They probably cannot fully realize themselves, as they do there [abroad], in our country. If people, specialists leave and keep in touch with their homeland, be it money transfers, an influx of innovations, and so on, this is a normal process.
Florinskaya (answering a question after the start of the war, – approx. Meduza): For Russia, it’s bad. The flow of qualified emigrants, that is, people with higher education, will be higher this year than in previous years.
It seems to be all the same [insignificantly] in relation to our vast homeland, nevertheless it can affect. Because there is a mass departure of citizens, people of different specialties, but with higher education – journalists, IT specialists, scientists, doctors, and so on. This may well be damage, but it’s too early to talk about it. It can be assumed that this will be one of the most negative aspects of this forced emigration, even more than just the number [of people who left].
In this emigration, the proportion of people with higher education will change dramatically. It was already rather big – 40-50%, according to my estimates, but it will be 80-90%.
– Who comes to the place of people who left in Russia? Is the loss replenished at the expense of other segments of the population and migrants?
Denisenko: In the 1990s and 2000s, there was a replacement. A lot of highly qualified people came from the Union republics. Now there is no such replacement. Young people leave, the potential is lost to some extent. This is true loss.
Florinskaya: Whom to replace? We understood about journalists – [the authorities] do not need them. Highly qualified IT specialists, I think, will be problematic to replace. When the researchers start to leave, nothing can be done either. Doctors from the capital who left, as usual, will be replaced by doctors from the provinces. In the places of retired employees of large firms, I think, they will also be drawn from the regions. Who will remain in the regions, I do not know. Even 10 years ago, they said that Moscow is a transit point between the province and London. This is a joke, but this is how emigration always went: people first came to Moscow, and then from there they went further to foreign countries.
Most of the migration [to Russia] is still unskilled, so this is not the case [when migrants can replace the departed specialists]. The most talented and qualified from the CIS also prefer not to stay in Russia, but to leave for other countries. It used to be necessary to attract them, but then we turned up our noses. And now why should they go to a country under sanctions, if you can work in other countries? It is hard to imagine that someone will go here in these conditions.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE LABOR MARKET IN RUSSIA
• Are we going back to the 1990s? How many people will soon become unemployed? Well, at least the salaries will be paid? Or not?.. Answers labor market researcher Vladimir Gimpelson
— Are there already noticeable changes in relation to labor migrants who worked in Russia until recently? Do they continue to work or are they also leaving?
Florinskaya: There were no changes at the beginning of March. We launched a small pilot survey, just got the data. Some part says that yes, it is necessary to leave [from Russia], but so far there are very few of them. The rest say: “We have it even worse.”
I think that the influx [of labor migrants to Russia] will be less than before covid. And due to the fact that the opportunity to come was again difficult: tickets cost a lot of money, there are few flights. But those who are here will wait to leave. Maybe by the summer it will be so bad here that jobs will be cut, and this will hit the migrants. But so far this is not happening.
– In general, the country should be concerned about emigration? How much attention should the authorities pay to it? Trying to prevent?
Denisenko: Naturally, attention should be paid to emigration. Why? Because emigration is a strong social and economic indicator. There is an expression: “People vote with their feet.” It is true for all countries. If the flow [of emigration] increases, it means that something is wrong in the state. When scientists leave, it means that something is wrong in the organization of science. Doctors are leaving – something is wrong in the healthcare organization. Graduate students leave – the same thing. Let’s go electricians – something is wrong here. This needs to be analyzed and taken into account.
Government policy should be open to those who leave. There should be no restrictions or obstacles. This evil practice does not lead to anything good. Take the same Soviet Union. There were defectors – Nureyev, Baryshnikov and so on. These are irreparable losses: we did not see Baryshnikov on stage, we did not see Nureyev, but they would have come if everything was normal.
How emigrants live and why they sometimes return to their homeland
Do you study people who have left? How often do those who leave manage to assimilate and begin to associate themselves with a new country?
Denisenko (answered a question before the start of the war, – approx. Meduza): I can express the opinions of my colleagues. Andrey Korobkov, a professor at the University of Tennessee, deals with the Russian-American topic and specifically with those [Russians] who live there [in the US]. Among them, the tendency to assimilate is very strong. If the Greeks are united by religion, the Germans by the historical past, then ours, who left in the 1990s and 2000s, tried to assimilate and dissolve as much as possible. Do you even know what it was? In limiting communication with compatriots. It was one of the indicators. Like now? It seems to me that this trend continues.
In European countries, for example in Germany, the situation is different: there are many Russian speakers there. These are not highly qualified specialists – once – but former villagers, Russian Germans who honor traditions. Many keep in touch.
Secondly, distance also plays a big role here: Germany is close to Russia. Many maintain very close relations with the country, so assimilation is slower. There is also the specifics of the country: Germany is smaller [than the US], there are regions of compact residence, there are many former Soviet military men left.
In France and Italy, the problem of assimilation is posed differently. We have Italian migration – 80% of women. French – 70%. There are many “marriage” migrants, that is, those who marry.
Great Britain, it seems to me, is following the same path as the States: after all, people are trying to at least make their children “English”. The migrants themselves do not break the connection with the country, it is difficult for them to do this: many of them still have business, real estate, friends in Russia. But their children are absolutely not interested in their country, and if they are interested, then it is weak.
– According to my observations, many of those who left Russia from 2020 to 2021 categorically refuse to call themselves emigrants, although they fit this definition. How common is this?
Denisenko: An emigrant is a migrant, a person has left for permanent residence (permanent residence, — approx. Meduza), roughly speaking. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin did not consider himself an emigrant, although he wandered around Europe for a long time – but he hoped to return. Here, apparently, they want to emphasize that under changed conditions they will return to the country.
It seems to me that this is the only explanation here: they retain their identity while abroad, do not try to blur or hide it in any way, but emphasize: “I am Russian/Ukrainian/Georgian, I will definitely return to my homeland, maybe 20 years later, but still.”
It’s like in their time with Nansen passports. Most of the countries where the white emigration was located were allowed to accept their citizenship. But [some] remained with Nansen passports. They did not consider themselves emigrants in white emigration and hoped that they would return.
– Most of those who left find what they want? Are there any studies on the level of happiness among those who have left?
Denisenko: Research on the level of happiness is being carried out. But I would give other parameters as the level of happiness.
Israel is a good country to study the consequences of migration for us. Because in Israel statistics on migrants from the Soviet Union are kept separately. What do we see from these statistics? Since the 1990s, Jews who have emigrated to Israel have begun to live longer. That is, their life expectancy is much higher than that of those Jews who are here [in Russia]. They have increased their birth rate. And in the Soviet Union and Russia, Jews are the group with the lowest birth rate.
There are no such statistics in the States, but there are other statistics – for example, the same incidence in older people. I will never forget when I was standing in line for tickets to the Metropolitan Opera in New York, two women were standing behind me. They spoke Russian, and we got to know them. These women were emigrants from Leningrad. At some point they cried. Do you know why? They say: “You know, we are so uncomfortable. We moved here and we are happy here. We are treated, we receive a large allowance, we can go to the Metropolitan, but our friends and colleagues who remained in Leningrad are deprived of all this. Some of them have already died while we are here, although they are our peers.”
Such indicators are very revealing. Career, income, education, employment are also indicators. We see that in the States and Canada, the Russians eventually occupy good positions. Europe is the same.
— How often does re-emigration occur? When and why do people usually return?
Florinskaya: Re-emigration took place, but how often quantitatively it is very difficult to estimate. The more international business developed in the country, the more international companies there were, where those who received a Western education were in demand, the more [young specialists] returned. The more international research, international level laboratories, the more researchers returned.
Once it all collapses, there is nowhere to go back. Plus, a certain level of salaries is also important.
Will many of this wave return?
Florinskaya: People who are tied to the Russian labor market, who will not be able to find a job [abroad], will return simply because they “eat up” the reserves, and there will be no other work for them. Not everyone will be able to work remotely for Russia. I know some people working for Russian companies who have already been forced to return. There are companies that have banned working from foreign servers. There are students who were not allowed to take sessions online. Therefore, even if 150 thousand left, this does not mean that some of them did not return.
Again, this does not mean that people now, seeing this whole situation, are not preparing their departure, but just not in such panicky circumstances. If earlier, before the COVID-19 period, 100-120 thousand people left Russia a year, now, it is quite possible that the numbers will reach 250 thousand or 300 thousand. It will depend on the ability to cross the border, the number of flights and the ability to catch on somewhere in other countries.
[Before] people told us in in-depth interviews: “If I am in demand, find a job, then I do not rule out a return for myself.” But as economic and political freedom disappears in the country, the circle of those who can return is potentially shrinking. Now it has shrunk even more.
The Ukrainian fleet seems significantly weaker than the Russian navy
At first glance, Ukraine’s small fleet – only 5,000 active sailors and a handful of small coastal boats – looks significantly weaker than Russia’s navy.
The Kremlin’s Black Sea Fleet consists of more than 40 front-line warships. The Russians appear ready to cut off Ukraine’s access to the sea – essentially recreating the Anaconda strategy used by 19th-century US President Abraham Lincoln to stifle the Confederacy.
But Russia’s success is unlikely to be guaranteed, as Ukrainians are as surprisingly resilient at sea as they are on land, having already carried out several successful attacks on Russia’s navy, James Stavridis, a former commander-in-chief, told Bloomberg. of NATO in Europe.
What does the naval component of the Ukrainian war look like in the coming months?
A little over a decade ago, I visited the Crimean port of Sevastopol and had lunch with the Ukrainian chief of naval operations, Viktor Maximov. We were able to observe the Russian fleet, which was located a little further inland.
This was before the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, but even then the Ukrainian admiral rightly said: “Sooner or later they will come to this port. And their fleet is much stronger than ours. “
At the time, I rejected the idea of a full-scale invasion, but Russian President Vladimir Putin has twice proved me wrong. Sevastopol is in Russian hands and gives them a clear advantage in potential battles at sea.
The Russians have more than three dozen combat-ready warships with direct access to key waterways in the northern Black Sea and at least partial control of 60 percent of Ukraine’s coastline from Crimea through the Sea of Azov to mainland Russia. Ukraine has lost its main warships, which were captured or destroyed in 2014, and must take a guerrilla approach. So far, she is playing her weak cards very well.
Last month’s shocking sinking of Russia’s flagship in the Black Sea, the cruiser Moscow, was a good example of how Ukrainians will approach the war off their shores. They used a locally produced short-range cruise missile, Neptune, and caught the Russians unprepared. A malfunction of the Russian air defense system, combined with poor damage control, led to the loss of the ship, its heavy cruise missile battery and (according to Ukrainians) hundreds of about 500 crew members.
Last week, Ukrainians announced that they had used Turkish drones (which are increasingly appearing on battlefields around the world) to sink two Russian patrol boats.
The result of both the strike on Moscow and the sinking of the two boats is that the Ukrainians intend to fight for control near the coast. Of course, Western hardware will be essential – the UK has promised to supply hundreds of Brimstone anti-ship missiles this month – but real-time reconnaissance and targeting will also be important. In a war at sea, where ships cannot hide behind the characteristics of the terrain, this is crucial. The Battle of Midway during World War II, for example, turned to the United States almost entirely because of the ability of American intelligence to lead Japan’s superior US navy.
The Russians will have to come up with new strategies. This could include using the sea as a “flank zone” to bypass Ukrainian defenders’ lines on land, similar to General Douglas MacArthur’s bold move to land in Incheon on the Korean Peninsula in 1950.
Another option would be to block Ukraine’s most important port, Odessa, in an attempt to detach the Ukrainian economy from global markets. Third, the Russians are likely to try to provide intense support fire from the sea against Ukrainian targets on shore – they have recently demonstrated the ability to launch cruise missiles for a ground attack from a submarine, for example.
To counter, Ukrainians can use the experience of their ground forces, which destroy hundreds of Russian tanks and armored vehicles, using relatively cheap weapons provided by Western allies. Special units of the US Navy have a good set of options for deactivating shipping, and some of these systems must be provided to Ukrainians.
President Joe Biden’s proposed $ 33 billion aid package for Ukraine includes coastal defense hardware. Other NATO members, such as Norway, have very good coastal systems that they could provide.
It is worth considering an escort system for Ukrainian (and other national) merchant ships that want to enter and leave Odessa. This would be similar to the Ernest Will escorts provided to ships in the Persian Gulf during the War Iran and Iraq in the 1980s.
The West could also conduct anti-ship training for the Ukrainian navy outside the country, possibly in nearby Constanta, Romania. (Romanians have recently started providing access to Ukrainian goods from this port.)
At the highest end of the confrontation / risk spectrum, the Allies may consider a humanitarian naval mission to evacuate civilians (or even Ukrainian military forces) from the doomed city of Mariupol. Defining this as a humanitarian effort would make it difficult for Moscow to attack the participating ships, but they must be properly armed and prepared to defend the mission.
The vast Black Sea is predominantly international. NATO warships are free to travel almost anywhere they want, including in Ukraine’s territorial waters and its 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Giving up these waters to Russia does not make sense. Instead, they are likely to become the next major front in the war in Ukraine.
Photo: Graffiti in Sevastopol after the annexation of Crimea, depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin / Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg TV Bulgaria
Note: James Stavridis is a columnist for the Bloomberg Opinion. He is a retired admiral of the US Navy and a former Supreme Allied Commander and Honorary Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also Chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation and Vice President of Global Affairs at the Carlyle Group.
Bioarchaeologists have re-examined the Paleo diet of people whose remains were discovered at early Neolithic sites in Greece, and found that their diet consisted mainly of plant foods, the proportion of which ranged from 58.7 to 70.1 percent. This is noticeably lower than that of people from the older Anatolian site of Neval-Chori, where animal products accounted for only about ten percent of the diet. Scientists noted that the economy of the Neolithic population of Greece was flexible: the gradual growth of animal husbandry was accompanied by the preservation of hunting. This is reported in an article published in the Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports.
The process of transition from an appropriating to a productive economy (the Neolithic Revolution) is one of the turning points in the history of mankind. The domestication of cereal crops began no later than the 10th millennium BC in several centers of the Fertile Crescent, from where this type of farming spread to the rest of the Middle East and Europe. Soon there, people began the process of domestication of the Asian mouflon (Ovis gmelini), the bezoar goat (Capra aegagrus) and the primitive tur (Bos primigenius). Agriculture was brought to Europe by immigrants from Anatolia, who displaced most of the local population. Thus, the neolithization of Greece began around 6800 BC, and about 5000 years ago this process was completed on almost the entire continent.
Gisela Grupe, together with colleagues from the University of Munich, re-examined the results of the analysis of stable isotopes of carbon and nitrogen in bone collagen, which were obtained during the study of the remains of Neolithic adults. These data refer to five early Neolithic Greek sites: Mavropigi (6600-6000 BC), Theopetra (6500-4000 BC), Xirolimni (6100 BC), Alepotripa (6000-3200 BC) and Franhti (6000-3000 BC). Paleobotanical and paleozoological studies of these sites suggested that the diet of the local inhabitants was based on C3 plants. An additional source of food was the meat of domestic animals, less often – wild ones. In addition, at the last two sites, the diet also included marine molluscs and fish. For comparison, scientists drew on data from the Anatolian site of Nevaly-Chori, one of the oldest settlements of the pre-ceramic Neolithic (about 8420–7470 BC).
Bioarchaeologists reported that the inhabitants of Nevala-Chori mainly obtained protein through the consumption of C3 plants (87 percent). Other protein sources were wild (gazelles: 0–9.5 percent, red deer: 1.5–3 percent) and domesticated (0–11.1 percent). On average, the diet of these people consisted of ten percent meat food. Only five people, judging by the values of nitrogen isotopes, consumed more animal protein. The people from the sites of Mavropegy and Theopetra lived on fairly similar diets, which, according to scientists, is not surprising due to the location of these monuments and the time of existence. Thus, the inhabitants of Mavropegy mainly consumed C3 plants (69.4 percent), meat of roe deer (14.6 percent), sheep and goats (8.4 percent) and cattle (7.5 percent). People from Theopetra consumed slightly less C3 plants (61.1 percent), but more meat food, mainly due to an increase in the proportion of domesticated animals (31.6 percent). Scientists failed to build a model for the Xirolimni monument.
The study of coastal monuments has led to different results. Thus, people from Alepotripa also ate mainly C3 plants (58.7 percent), meat of domesticated animals (29.2 percent) and deer (12 percent). Although fish and seafood may have been included in the diet, the contribution from this food source was low, ranging from 0 to 2.5 percent. On the other hand, the consumption of sea fish (tuna) was clearly visible at the Franhti monument (6 percent). However, even there, the main source of food was plants (70.1 percent), as well as sheep and goat meat (11.9 percent) and deer (12.2 percent).
Bioarchaeologists concluded that in all studied populations, the daily diet consisted mainly of C3 plants – wild and domesticated cereals. Only one individual from Anatolia consumed a significant amount of C4 plants and, apparently, was a migrant. Evidence from the oldest monuments shows that early Neolithic populations lived on a largely vegetarian diet. The subsistence economy of these people changed gradually due to the increase in the contribution of meat food, and game meat was gradually replaced by products of domestic animal husbandry. Scholars have emphasized that an important aspect of the economy of the early Neolithic communities was flexibility. So, people did not completely abandon hunting, which guaranteed the supply of meat even at times when domestic animals died, for example, during epidemics.
Photo: Sidney Sebald et al. / Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports, 2022
American explorers studied the mummy of a bird, which was considered the remains of a hawk. It turned out that under the “cocoon” are the remains of a sacred ibis, which even partially preserved soft tissues and feathers. According to scientists, this find, which was kept in an educational institution for a long time, is about 1500–2000 years old. This was reported in a press release from Cornell University.
The ancient Egyptians mummified many types of animals, such as cats, dogs, hamadryas, and even beetles. If the main goal of mummifying people was so that they could exist in the afterlife (therefore, they put food, money, furniture and other items with them), then animals are believed to have been mummified for other reasons. Pets could be buried along with the owner, some animals and birds – as a supply of food for the afterlife, others – because people worshiped them. Some of the most famous mummies belonged to the sacred ibis (Threskiornis aethiopicus) – large birds that the ancient Egyptians identified with the god of wisdom, Thoth. So, only during excavations in the Sakkara necropolis, archaeologists discovered about 1.75 million of these birds.
In recent years, interest in ancient Egyptian animal mummies has increased. Moreover, it became possible to make three-dimensional reconstructions of their internal structure, without violating their integrity, using X-ray computed tomography. Human mummies are also actively studied by this method, for example, recently Egyptologists for the first time examined the mummy of Amenhotep I and found out that his remains were badly damaged by tomb robbers, and also enlightened two ancient Egyptian mummies from the “Valley of the Kings” (you can learn more about this monument in our material “Cache of royal mummies”).
Graduate student Carol Anne Barsody of Cornell University examined a supposed bird mummy that was in her school’s collection labeled as a hawk mummy. The exact origin of this artifact remains unknown, as there is no record of its arrival at the university. Initially, it was believed that this find could have ended up in the United States in 1884 along with the mummy of a man named Penpi, who was a Theban scribe during the Third Intermediate Period (c. 828–625 BC). However, Barsodi did not find any evidence for this, but suggested that perhaps the mummy of the bird was part of a collection from the Saqqara necropolis, which entered the university in 1930.
To make sure that the mummy was not a fake, Barsodi, together with the collection’s curator Frederic Gleach, decided to do an X-ray computed tomography. As a result of the study, they discovered that under the “cocoon” there are indeed the remains of a bird, which even has preserved some soft tissues and feathers. It turned out that one of the legs of this bird was broken even before it was mummified. In addition, after death (possibly during transportation), her beak was broken.
Ornithologist Vanya Rohwer examined the images and concluded that the mummy belongs to a male sacred ibis. In order for the remains of this bird to be folded in its current form, its thorax was removed and its head turned, which was not a common practice. The weight of the mummy turned out to be 942 grams, and its age, according to researchers, is about 1500-2000 years. Perhaps, if in the future it is possible to extract DNA from the soft tissues of this sacred ibis, then scientists will be able to determine the place where it comes from.
Photo: Explorer Frederik Glich with the mummy of the sacred ibis. Ryan Young / Cornell University
An Egyptian archeological expedition at Gabal al-Haridi in the southern Suhaj region has found a checkpoint from the time of King Ptolemy III, who ruled from 246 BC. to 222 BC, according to the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism and Cultural Monuments.
The discovery was made during excavations to search for the remains of a Ptolemaic temple.
The point is a brick building, similar to a tower, explained the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Antiquities Mustafa Waziri. It was designed to check and control traffic when crossing the border between two areas, collect taxes and ensure the protection of navigation on the Nile.
The nearby temple is dedicated to the ancient Egyptian goddess Isis. The length of the building is 33 meters and the width is 14 meters, and its axis is located from north to south.
Archaeologists have found the remains of documents with the names, positions and salaries of workers, as well as the house of one of their leaders. Tombs from different periods have also been found, from the end of the Old Kingdom to the end of the Ptolemaic dynasty.
Ptolemy III was one of the most powerful rulers of Egypt of this dynasty. Under his rule, the state expanded its territories and controlled major trade routes, and the capital, Alexandria, was one of the main cultural and commercial centers of Hellenism.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Bujar Osmanihe said the dialogue with Bulgaria, as well as with the French Presidency, continues. We hope that in the next period there will be concrete steps, but one thing is clear and we tell everyone – first, that it is no longer about Skopje, I have already said that the ball is in the field of Bulgaria and the EU, and second that perhaps this is the only and last chance to save our relations with Bulgaria.
I think that in the future there will be less and less political energy in the government, and the whole society, to dedicate itself to solving this issue, which consumes so much political but also civic energy in the constant processes of hope and disappointment. let us no longer subject the citizens to such endless disappointments, and at one point a line must be drawn to say: enough. As a government, we can no longer deal only with this issue, we will have to focus inside, to continue with the reforms, BTA writes.
He said that until the summer, the government of the Republic of Northern Macedonia will continue to make every effort “until the possibilities are exhausted” in the process of negotiations with Bulgaria, and the opposition must understand this.
Whether we will succeed will depend on what Sofia decides and what the EU decides, he said, adding that he still cannot draw a parallel between the EU and Sofia because “there are countries that know how important it is to be fair to those who have fulfilled the conditions “. According to him, if Bulgaria does not lift its veto in June, relations between the two countries will not be frozen, but the government will no longer focus on this issue, and the ambassador to Bulgaria will continue to work on the issue.
Regarding the guarantees demanded by the opposition from VMRO-DPMNE that after the inclusion of the Bulgarians in the preamble of the constitution of the Republic of Northern Macedonia Bulgaria will not ask for anything more, Osmani clarified that his insistence on signing a comprehensive document means a guarantee if the opposition the country also thinks so, so they think the same way.
It is important to have this document so that we know where this process begins and ends, Osmani stressed, adding that daily communication with Bulgaria continues and there are still serious chances for success. According to him, in recent months the positions have become so close that “it will be a historical damage” if this moment is not used, because “there will be no more appropriate”.
According to Osmani, there was an idea to hold the second joint meeting of the governments of the two countries at the end of May, but “this will also depend on the other political process” (negotiations). Hate speech will not be reduced during the process of provocation and blocking. The cure for this is not in the symptoms, but in the reason for the hate speech, and this is the veto, said Osmani.
The press conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Macedonia today was dedicated to the beginning of the process of strategic dialogue with the United States on June 2 in Washington. such as cybersecurity and a concrete initiative in the field of culture and education.
