The World Health Organization’s representative to the DRC, Dr Boureima Hama Sambo, warned that in six eastern provinces, health facilities have been set alight, health workers killed and others face constant physical and psychological threats, while supplies have been looted. Heavy rain, flooding and landslides have also compromised aid access.
Dr Sambo said that the DRC is facing its worst cholera outbreak since 2017, with the eastern provinces accounting for 80 per cent of the cases. The country is also battling a major measles epidemic and the combination of measles and malnutrition was particularly deadly for children under five.
The UN health agency official said that WHO has deployed experts to the affected areas to support the authorities in investigating and responding to these outbreaks, delivered medical supplies for cholera treatment, supported transportation of samples to labs for testing, and built cholera treatment centres.
The World Health Organization recently completed a vaccination campaign in Ituri province reaching over one million of children under five, with more campaigns to follow in Kasaï and Mai-Ndombe.
WHO was also providing health services, including access to mental health and psychosocial support, to victims of gender-based violence. Some 23,000 cases were reported in the six provinces from January to August 2023 and Dr Sambo said that the real figures were “probably much higher”.
For a “more sustainable and resilient health response” in eastern DRC, Dr Sambo called for stronger donor support, as the UN health agency’s response in the region was only 14 per cent funded so far.
Women and girls in Iran are required by law to follow a dress code outside their homes.
Iran: new hijab bill must be shelved: Türk
High Commissioner for human rights Volker Türk, said on Friday that Iran’s “draconian” Chastity and Hijab Bill “flagrantly flies in the face of international law” and must be shelved.
The bill vastly increases jail terms for offenders and provides for crushing fines on women and girls who do not obey the compulsory dress code.
According to the UN rights office (OHCHR), under the new, “even stricter” bill, now in its final stage of consideration before Iran’s constitutional court, those who do not comply with country’s strict Islamic dress code on head coverings and modest clothing risk up to 10 years in jail.
Those found in breach could also be flogged, as well as fined up to an equivalent of $8,500, subjected to travel restrictions and deprived of online access.
OHCHR called the decree “repressive and demeaning”, insisting that “women and girls must not be treated as second class citizens”.
Russia expert says mandate provides ‘bridge to the Russian people’
The independent UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia, Mariana Katzarova, underscored on Friday the importance of her mandate to give a voice to victims of alleged violations in the country.
“Why is my mandate important? Because it’s also the bridge to the Russian people, to the victims, to the civil society, to those who dare speak against the war on Ukraine”, she told reporters in Geneva.
“It’s a voice for the people of the Russian Federation, this mandate.”
The independent Human Rights Council-appointed expert presented her first report to the Council on Thursday, sounding the alarm about what she says is a pattern of suppression of civil and political rights in Russia.
‘Persistent use of torture’
She voiced grave concerns over mass arbitrary arrests and the “persistent use of torture and ill-treatment.”
Citing almost 200 sources from inside and outside the country, the independent expert expressed concern about a lack of judicial independence and right to a fair trial.
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Russia was created by the Human Rights Council in October last year, for a period of one year.
Ms. Katzarova told reporters that she thought a continuation of the mandate would be important, especially amid what she called “dark times for human rights” in Russia.
This is the first time in its history that the Council has authorised a rights expert to investigate rights violations within the borders of one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the so-called “P5”.
Ms. Katzarova stressed that the P5 had a special responsibility to set an example for the rest of the world.
India: UN rights chief welcomes new bill to boost women in parliament
Rights chief Volker Türk welcomed on Friday the passage of a landmark bill in India which will reserve one third of seats in national and state parliaments for women.
The UN rights office (OHCHR) said that the Women’s Reservation Bill will constitutionally entrench women’s representation in parliament and be a “transformative move” for gender equality in India.
Citing India’s example, Mr. Türk called on parliamentarians around the world to adopt legislative measures – including, where necessary, gender quotas – to ensure women’s equal participation in the political discourse.
The new Bill requires ratification by at least 50 per cent of India’s states to enter into force and the UN rights office called for their “swift support” and rapid implementation of the new system.
The previous part of this analysis, entitled “Sahel – Conflicts, Coups and Migration Bombs”, addressed the issue of the rise of terrorist activity in West Africa and the inability to end the guerrilla war waged by Islamic radicals against government troops in Mali, Burkina Faso , Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The issue of the ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic was also discussed.
One of the important conclusions is that the intensification of the conflict is fraught with the high risk of a “migration bomb” that would lead to unprecedented migration pressure along the entire southern border of the European Union. An important circumstance is also the possibilities of Russian foreign policy to manipulate the intensity of conflicts in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and the Central African Republic. [39] With its hand on the “counter” of a potential migration explosion, Moscow could easily be tempted to use induced migration pressure against EU states that are generally already designated as hostile.
In this risky situation, a special role is played by the Fulani people – an ethnic group of semi-nomads, migratory livestock breeders who inhabit the strip from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea and number 30 to 35 million people according to various data. Being a people who have historically played a very important role in the penetration of Islam into Africa, especially West Africa, the Fulani are a huge temptation for Islamic radicals, despite the fact that they profess the Sufi school of Islam, which is undoubtedly the most tolerant, as and the most mystical.
Unfortunately, as will be seen from the analysis below, the issue is not just about religious opposition. The conflict is not only ethno-religious. It is socio-ethno-religious, and in recent years, the effects of the wealth accumulated through corruption, converted into livestock ownership – the so-called neo-pastoralism – have begun to exert an additional strong influence. This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of Nigeria and will be the subject of the third part of this analysis.
The Fulani and Jihadism in Central Mali: Between Change, Social Rebellion and Radicalization
While Operation Serval succeeded in 2013 in pushing back the jihadists who had taken over northern Mali, and Operation Barhan prevented them from returning to the front line, forcing them into hiding, the attacks not only did not stop, but spread to the central part of Mali (in the area of the bend of the Niger River, also known as Massina). In general, terrorist attacks increased after 2015.
Jihadists are certainly not in control of the region as they were in northern Mali in 2012 and are forced into hiding. They do not have a “monopoly on violence” as militias have been created to fight them, sometimes with the support of the authorities. However, targeted attacks and killings are increasing, and insecurity has reached such a level that the region is no longer under real government control. Many civil servants have left their posts, a significant number of schools have been closed, and the recent presidential elections could not be held in a number of municipalities.
To some extent, this situation is the result of “contagion” from the North. Pushed out of the northern cities, which they held under control for several months after failing to create an independent state, forced to “behave more discreetly”, the jihadist armed groups, looking for new strategies and new ways of operating, were able to take advantage of the factors of instability in the Central region to gain new influence.
Some of these factors are common to both the central and northern regions. However, it would be wrong to believe that the serious incidents that have regularly occurred in the central part of Mali for years after 2015 are just a continuation of the northern conflict.
In fact, other weaknesses are more specific to the central regions. The targets of local communities exploited by jihadists are very different. While the Tuareg in the north claimed the independence of Azaouad (a region which is actually mythical – it never corresponded to any political entity of the past, but which separates for the Tuareg all the regions in the north of Mali), the communities represented in the central regions , do not make comparable political claims, insofar as they make any claims at all.
The significance of the difference between the role of the Fulani in northern events and in the central regions, which is emphasized by all observers, is telling. Indeed, the founder of the Masina Liberation Front, the most important of the armed groups involved, Hamadoun Kufa, who was killed on November 28, 2018, was ethnically Fulani, as were the vast majority of his fighters. [38]
Few in the north, the Fulani are numerous in the central regions and concerned like most other communities by the increased competition between migratory herders and settled farmers that is occurring in the region, they suffer more from it due to historical and cultural circumstances.
The defining trends in the region and the Sahel as a whole, which make it difficult for nomads and settled people to live together, are essentially two:
• climate change, already underway in the Sahel region (rainfall has decreased by 20% in the last 40 years), forces nomads to seek new grazing areas;
• population growth, which forces farmers to seek new land, has a particular impact in this already densely populated region. [38]
If the Fulani, as migratory herders, are particularly troubled by the inter-communal competition these developments bring about, it is on the one hand because this competition pits them against almost all other communities (the region is home to the Fulani, Tamashek, Songhai, Bozo, Bambara and the Dogon), and on the other hand, because the Fulani are particularly affected by other developments related more to state policies:
• even if the Malian authorities, unlike what has happened in other countries, have never theorized on the issue of the interest or necessity of settlement, the fact is that development projects are more aimed at settled people. Most often this is due to donor pressure, usually in favor of abandoning nomadism, considered less compatible with modern state building and limiting access to education;
• the introduction in 1999 of decentralization and municipal elections, which, although they gave the Fulani people the opportunity to bring the community’s demands to the political stage, mainly contributed to the emergence of new elites and thereby to the questioning of traditional structures, based on customs, history and religion. The people of the Fulani people felt these transformations particularly strongly, inasmuch as the social relations in their community are ancient. These changes were also initiated by the state, which they had always considered “imported” from the outside, a product of a Western culture far removed from their own. [38]
This effect is, of course, limited within the vicissitudes of decentralization policy. However, it is a fact in a number of municipalities. And undoubtedly the “feeling” of such transformations is stronger than their real impact, especially among the Fulani who tend to consider themselves “victims” of this policy.
Finally, historical reminiscences should not be neglected, although they should not be overestimated either. In the imagination of the Fulani, the Masina Empire (of which Mopti is the capital) represents the golden age of the central regions of Mali. The legacy of this empire includes, in addition to social structures specific to the community and a certain attitude to religion: the Fulani live and perceive themselves as supporters of pure Islam, in the air of the Sufi brotherhood of the Quadriyya, sensitive to the strict application of the injunctions of the Koran.
The jihad preached by leading figures in the Masina empire was different from that preached by the terrorists currently operating in Mali (who had directed their message to other Muslims whose practices were not considered to conform to the founding text). Kufa’s attitude towards the leading figures in the Masina empire was ambiguous. He often referred to them, but again he desecrated the mausoleum of Sekou Amadou. However, the Islam practiced by the Fulani appears to be potentially compatible with some aspects of Salafism that jihadist groups regularly claim as their own. [2]
A new trend seems to be emerging in the central regions of Mali in 2019: gradually the initial motivations for joining purely local jihadist groups appear to be more ideological, a trend that is reflected in the questioning of the Malian state and modernity in general. Jihadi propaganda, which proclaims the rejection of state control (imposed by the West, which is complicit in it) and emancipation from the social hierarchies produced by colonization and the modern state, finds a more “natural” echo among the Fulani than among other ethnic groups . [38]
The regionalization of the Fulani question in the Sahel region
Expansion of the conflict towards Burkina Faso
The Fulani are the majority in the Sahelian part of Burkina Faso, which borders Mali (in particular the provinces of Soum (Jibo), Seeno (Dori) and Ouadlan (Gorom-Goom), which border the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao) of Mali). and also with Niger – with the Tera and Tillaberi regions. A strong Fulani community also lives in Ouagadougou, where it occupies much of the Dapoya and Hamdalaye neighbourhoods.
At the end of 2016, a new armed group appeared in Burkina Faso that claimed to belong to the Islamic State – Ansarul Al Islamia or Ansarul Islam, whose main leader was Malam Ibrahim Dicko, a Fulani preacher who, like Hamadoun Koufa in Central Mali, made himself known through numerous attacks against Burkina Faso’s defense and security forces and against schools in the provinces of Sum, Seeno and Deleted. [38] During the restoration of government forces’ control over northern Mali in 2013, the Malian armed forces captured Ibrahim Mallam Diko. But he was released after the insistence of the leaders of the Fulani people in Bamako, including the former Speaker of the National Assembly – Aly Nouhoum Diallo.
The leaders of Ansarul Al Islamia are former fighters of MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – Movement for unity and jihad in West Africa, by “unity” should be understood as “monotheism” – Islamic radicals are extreme monotheists) from central Mali. Malam Ibrahim Dicko is now presumed dead and his brother Jafar Dicko succeeded him as the head of Ansarul Islam. [38]
However, the action of this group remains geographically limited for now.
But, as in central Mali, the entire Fulani community is seen as complicit with the jihadists, who are targeting settled communities. In response to terrorist attacks, settled communities formed their own militias to defend themselves.
Thus, in early January 2019, in response to an armed attack by unidentified persons, residents of Yirgou attacked Fulani-populated areas for two days (January 1 and 2), killing 48 people. A police force was dispatched to restore calm. At the same time, a few miles away, in Bankass Cercle (an administrative subdivision of the Mopti region of Mali), 41 Fulani were killed by Dogons. [14], [42]
The situation in Niger
Unlike Burkina Faso, Niger has no terrorist groups operating from its territory, despite Boko Haram’s attempts to establish itself in the border regions, especially on the Diffa side, winning over young Nigeriens who feel that the economic situation in the country deprives them of a future. So far, Niger has been able to counter these attempts.
These relative successes are explained in particular by the importance that the Nigerien authorities attach to security issues. They allocate a very large part of the national budget to them. The Nigerien authorities have allocated significant funds to strengthen the army and police. This assessment is made taking into account the available opportunities in Niger. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world (in last place according to the human development index in the ranking of the United Nations Development Program – UNDP) and it is very difficult to combine efforts in favor of security with the policy of initiating a development process.
The Nigerian authorities are very active in regional cooperation (in particular with Nigeria and Cameroon against Boko Haram) and very willingly accept on their territory foreign forces provided by Western countries (France, USA, Germany, Italy).
Moreover, the authorities in Niger, just as they were able to take measures that largely quelled the Tuareg problem, more successfully than their Malian counterparts, also showed greater attention to the Fulani issue than they do in Mali.
However, Niger could not completely avoid the contagion of terror coming from neighboring countries. The country is regularly the target of terrorist attacks, carried out both in the southeast, in the border regions with Nigeria, and in the west, in the regions near Mali. These are attacks from the outside – operations led by Boko Haram in the southeast and operations coming from the Ménaka region in the west, which is a “privileged breeding ground” for the Tuareg insurgency in Mali.
Attackers from Mali are often Fulani. They do not have the same power as Boko Haram, but it is even more difficult to prevent their attacks because the porosity of the border is high. Many of the Fulani involved in the attacks are Nigerien or of Nigerien descent – many Fulani migratory herders were forced to leave Niger and settle in neighboring Mali when irrigated land development in the Tillaberi region reduced their grazing land in the 1990s. [38]
Since then, they have been involved in the conflicts between the Malian Fulani and the Tuareg (Imahad and Dausaki). Since the last Tuareg uprising in Mali, the balance of power between the two groups has shifted. By then, the Tuareg, who had already rebelled several times since 1963, already had many weapons at their disposal.
The Fulani of Niger were “militarized” when the Ganda Izo militia was formed in 2009. (The creation of this armed militia was the result of the ongoing split in a historically older militia – “Ganda Koi”, with which “Ganda Izo” is basically in a tactical alliance. Since “Ganda Izo” aimed to fighting the Tuareg, the Fulani people joined it (both Malian Fulani and Niger Fulani), after which many of them were integrated into MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – Movement for Unity (monotheism) and jihad in West Africa) and then in ISGS (Islamic State in the Great Sahara). [38]
The balance of power between the Tuareg and Dausaki, on the one hand, and the Fulani, on the other, is changing accordingly, and by 2019 it is already much more balanced. As a result, new clashes occur, often leading to the death of dozens of people on both sides. In these skirmishes, international counter-terrorist forces (particularly during Operation Barhan) in some cases created ad hoc alliances with the Tuareg and Dausak (particularly with the MSA), who, following the conclusion of the peace agreement with the Malian government, engaged in the fight against terrorism.
The Fulani of Guinea
Guinea with its capital Conakry is the only country where the Fulani are the largest ethnic group, but not the majority – they are about 38% of the population. Although they originate from Central Guinea, the central part of the country that includes cities such as Mamu, Pita, Labe and Gaual, they are present in every other region where they have migrated in search of better living conditions.
The region is not affected by jihadism and the Fulani are not and have not been particularly involved in violent clashes, except for traditional conflicts between migratory herders and settled people.
In Guinea, the Fulani control most of the country’s economic power and largely the intellectual and religious forces. They are the most educated. They become literate very early, first in Arabic and then in French through the French schools. Imams, teachers of the Holy Qur’an, senior officials from the interior of the country and from the diaspora are in their majority Fulani. [38]
However, we can wonder about the future as the Fulani have always been victims of [political] discrimination since independence to be kept away from political power. The other ethnic groups feel encroached upon by these traditional nomads who come to tear up their best lands to build the most prosperous businesses and the glitziest residential neighborhoods. According to the other ethnic groups in Guinea, if the Fulani come to power, they will have all the power and given the mentality attributed to them, they will be able to keep it and keep it forever. This perception was reinforced by the fiercely hostile speech of Guinea’s first president, Sekou Toure, against the Fulani community.
From the earliest days of the independence struggle in 1958, Sekou Toure who is from the Malinke people and his supporters have been facing the Fulani of Bari Diawandu. After coming to power, Sekou Toure assigned all important positions to people from the Malinke people. The exposure of alleged Fulani conspiracies in 1960 and especially in 1976 provided him with a pretext for the elimination of important Fulani figures (notably in 1976, Telly Diallo, who was the first Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, a highly respected and prominent figure, is imprisoned and deprived of food until he dies in his dungeon). This alleged plot was an opportunity for Sekou Toure to deliver three speeches denouncing the Fulani with extreme malice, calling them “traitors” who “only think of money…”. [38]
In the first democratic elections in 2010, Fulani candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo came out on top in the first round, but all ethnic groups joined forces in the second round to prevent him from becoming president, handing power to Alpha Conde , whose origin is from the Malinke people.
This situation is increasingly unfavorable to the Fulani people and generates frustration and disappointment which the recent democratization (2010 elections) has allowed to be publicly expressed.
The next presidential election in 2020, in which Alpha Condé will not be able to run for re-election (the constitution prohibits a president from serving more than two terms), will be an important deadline for the development of relations between the Fulani and other ethnic communities in Guinea.
Some interim conclusions:
It would be extremely tendentious to speak of any pronounced propensity among the Fulani for “jihadism”, much less of such a propensity that was induced by the history of the former theocratic empires of this ethnic group.
When analyzing the risk of the Fulani siding with radical Islamists, the complexity of Fulani society is often overlooked. So far, we have not gone into the depth of the social structure of the Fulani, but in Mali, for example, it is very complex and hierarchical. It is logical to expect that the interests of the constituent parts of Fulani society may differ and become the cause of conflicting behavior or even division within the community.
As for central Mali, the tendency to challenge the established order, which is said to drive many Fulani to join the jihadist ranks, is sometimes the result of young people in the community acting against the will of the more the adults. Likewise, young Fulani people have sometimes tried to take advantage of municipal elections, which, as explained, have often been seen as an opportunity to produce leaders who are not traditional notables) – these young people sometimes consider more the adults as participants in these traditional “notabilities”. This creates opportunities for internal conflicts – including armed conflicts – between people of the Fulani people. [38]
There is no doubt that the Fulani are predisposed to ally themselves with opponents of the established order – something fundamentally inherent to nomads. Furthermore, in consequence of their geographical dispersion, they are doomed to always remain in the minority and subsequently to be unable to influence decisively the fate of the countries in which they live, even when exceptionally they seem to have such an opportunity and believe that it is legitimate, as is the case in Guinea.
The subjective perceptions arising from this state of affairs fuel the opportunism that the Fulani have learned to cultivate when they are in trouble – when they are faced with detractors who see them as threatening foreign bodies while they themselves live as victims, discriminated against and doomed of marginalization.
Part three follows
Sources used:
The complete list of the literature used in the first and the current second part of the analysis is given at the end of the first part of the analysis published under the title “Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs”. Only those sources cited in the second part of the analysis – “The Fulani and “Jihadism” in West Africa” are given here.
[2] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, “Double bottom” or “schizophrenic bifurcation”? The interaction between ethno-nationalist and religious-extremist motives in the activities of some terrorist groups, Sp. Politics and Security; Year I; no. 2; 2017; pp. 34 – 51, ISSN 2535-0358(in Bulgarian).
[14] Cline, Lawrence E., Jihadist Movements in the Sahel: Rise of the Fulani?, March 2021, Terrorism and Political Violence, 35 (1), pp. 1-17
[38] Sangare, Boukary, Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries, February 8, 2019, Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)
[39] The Soufan Center Special Report, Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army, Jason Blazakis, Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sean Steinberg, The Soufan Center, June 2023
[42] Waicanjo, Charles, Transnational Herder-Farmer Conflicts and Social Instability in the Sahel, May 21, 2020, African Liberty.
Photo by Kureng Workx: https://www.pexels.com/photo/a-man-in-red-traditional-clothing-taking-photo-of-a-man-13033077/
The Bulgarian authorities expelled the head of the Russian Church in the country – Vasian Zmeev. This was reported to TASS by the Russian Embassy in Bulgaria.
“Bulgarian authorities consider Father Vasian to be a threat to national security,” the Russian diplomats said.
According to Russian ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova, the priests from the Russian Orthodox Church were called to the migration service, where they were told that they were a threat to national security. Then they were taken to their homes in an arresting car to collect their belongings. Then they will be taken to the church and from there to the border with Serbia, the ambassador announced.
“This is an unprecedented case, the church is separated from the state, and it is incomprehensible how priests can threaten national security. Many parishioners go to the Russian Church in Sofia. Such an event is a fall into the abyss, says Mitrofanova.
“They simply spat in the face of our church,” the Russian ambassador to our country also notes.
The Russian Embassy in our country published a position on the case. It reads:
On September 21 of this year, the Bulgarian authorities took harsh, blatant actions to expel the abbot of the Russian Orthodox Church in Sofia, Archimandrite Vasian, and two employees of the Church of “St. Nicholas of Myra, the Wonderworker”.
We are outraged by the fact and form of the decision taken by the Bulgarian side. It is obvious that the current leadership of Bulgaria has set itself the task of destroying not only the socio-political, cultural and humanitarian ties between our countries, but also to break the relations between the sister Russian and Bulgarian Orthodox churches and to embitter the Russian and Bulgarian peoples against each other .
It is especially telling that this step was taken on the feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary – a holy and pure day for the believers of the Russian Orthodox Church.
We emphasize that the responsibility for the rapid degradation of bilateral interaction rests entirely on the Bulgarian side.
The State Agency “National Security” (DANS) later confirmed that coercive administrative measures of “expulsion”, “deprivation of the right of residence” and “ban on entry into the Republic of Bulgaria” were imposed on three foreign citizens for a period of five years.
The measures are in relation to N. Z. – a citizen of the Russian Federation, E. P. – a citizen of Belarus, V. B. – a citizen of Belarus.
The measures were imposed in connection with their activities directed against the national security and interests of the Republic of Bulgaria, according to the DANS.
Data were obtained on the actions of the mentioned persons related to the implementation of various elements of the Russian Federation’s hybrid strategy for purposefully influencing the socio-political processes in the Republic of Bulgaria in favor of Russian geopolitical interests.
The measures taken are in fulfillment of the powers of the Chairman of the National Security Agency, in accordance with the Law on Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria and in fulfillment of the Agency’s functions in accordance with the Law on State Agency “National Security”.
As for the service, there are two other foreign priests currently serving in the Russian Church besides Vasian Zmeev. Archpriest Yevgeny is from Belarus and has been here for 5 years as the titular Zmeev. Archpriest Alexii is quite new in Sofia – for a few months. Liturgies are only in Russian, although Bulgarians also come to the church.
Vassian Zmeev is among the Russian diplomats expelled from North Macedonia last week. He is also a senior cleric of the Moscow Patriarchate who has been living and working in Sofia for several years. Since the end of November last year, he has been unofficially designated by Patriarch Kirill to be in charge of the Macedonian Church, which is obsessed with bishops connected to communism, Titovism and the Yugoslav special services. In addition to I. Khropiachkov, A. Rozhdestvenski, as well as the attache S. Popov, who committed inappropriate diplomatic actions, Vassian Zmeev was also declared persona non grata and was prohibited from entering North Macedonia. The four must leave the country within five days, Religion MK confirms the news.
France has no intention of announcing a restriction on cars with Russian registration, TASS reported.
There is currently no change in French law.
This was done by the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.
They were followed by Finland, and then by Poland, as reported by the Polish news agency PAP, as the words of the Minister of the Interior, Mariusz Kaminski, as the ban is an additional part of the sanctions imposed on Russia and its citizens in connection with the war in Ukraine. The rule applies regardless of whether the owner is a citizen of the country.
Russia rejected these decisions. The government is trying to hold a dialogue for a solution.
France has no intention of introducing such a change.
Female circumcision is the partial or total removal of the external genitalia without the medical need to do so
About 200 million girls and women now living on planet Earth have undergone the extremely painful procedure of female circumcision, also called infibulation.
Female circumcision is the partial or total removal of the external genitalia without the medical need to do so. This operation is commonly called “female genital mutilation” and “Female Genital Mutilation” (FGM).
The essence of the operation is that the labia majora is sutured in such a way that only a tiny hole remains, through which it is difficult for urine and menstrual blood to pass.
In this case, the clitoris and outer labia are often completely amputated, and the inner labia partially. Due to the deep incision made during the operation, a noticeable scar is formed after healing, which actually completely covers the vulva.
Infibulation is said to be the ideal way to preserve a girl’s virginity until marriage, but it requires another operation after marriageable age to allow her to have sex.
Some peoples have a custom according to which on the wedding night the husband takes a knife and cuts his wife’s crotch with it, and only then has intercourse with her. After conception, it is sutured again.
When it is time for the woman to give birth, the vaginal area is cut open again to allow the baby to come out, and after the birth it is stitched back up.
Usually, such interventions are extremely painful for women. Since they are all performed without anesthesia, women in labor lose consciousness from pain.
Death from complications is not uncommon. Instruments are not disinfected, and hence the risk of tetanus and other infections increases. Sometimes this barbarism leads to infertility.
The reasons for performing FGM vary by region, change over time and are a combination of sociocultural factors specific to families and communities.
Usually, this practice is justified by the following most common reasons:
• In areas where such a practice is part of the customs, incentives for its continuation are social pressure and fear of public rejection. In some communities female genital mutilation is almost mandatory and its necessity is not contested
• These surgeries are often considered a necessary part of a girl’s upbringing and a way to prepare her for adulthood and marriage.
• Often the motivations for performing these operations are views on proper sexual behavior. The purpose of the operations is to ensure the preservation of virginity before marriage.
• In many communities, the practice of female genital mutilation is believed to help suppress libido and thus help them resist extramarital sex.
• The practice of female genital mutilation is associated with cultural ideals of femininity and modesty in which girls are clean and beautiful.
• Although religious texts do not speak of such practices, those who perform such operations often believe that religion supports the practice.
In most communities, this practice is considered a cultural tradition, which is often used as an argument for its continuation.
FGM has no health benefits and can lead to serious, long-term complications and even death. Immediate health risks include haemorrhage, shock, infection, HIV transmission, urine retention and severe pain.
Illustrative Photo by Follow Alice: https://www.pexels.com/photo/two-woman-looking-on-persons-bracelet-667203/
The seminar on the “European Media Freedom Act and Digital Services Act: protecting media freedom in a safe online world” is organised in cooperation with the EuropeanNewsRoom.
Sabine Verheyen (EPP, DE), Chair of the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) and rapporteur on the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), will present the Culture Committee’s draft report, due to be confirmed by Parliament during the 2-5 October 2023 plenary session, ahead of talks with Council.
Christel Schaldemose (S&D, DK), member of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and rapporteur on the Digital Services Act (DSA) will explain the new obligations under this legislation that has recently entered into force for large platforms.
The MEPs will also clarify how the two bills complement each other to promote media freedom, democratic participation, and curb disinformation.
WHEN: Tuesday, 26 September at 10:15 CEST
WHERE: Online via Interactio and in person in the European Parliament Anna Politkovskaya press conference room (SPAAK 0A50) in Brussels
Interpretation will be available in EN, DE, FR and DK.
The UN’s Special Rapporteur for Russia, Mariana Katzarova, sounded the alarm on what she says is a pattern of suppression of civil and political rights there.
Addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva, Ms. Katzarova voiced grave concerns over mass arbitrary arrests and the “persistent use of torture and ill-treatment.”
Citing almost 200 sources from both in and outside the country, the UN-appointed expert also highlighted the lack of judicial independence and right to a fair trial.
“The large amount of information shared with me is indicative of the magnitude of the human rights challenges facing Russian society today,” she said.
Ms. Katzarova said that mass arbitrary arrests, detentions and harassment were recorded for “anyone speaking out against Russia’s war on Ukraine or daring to criticize the government’s actions.”
But the fraying of basic rights did not begin in February last year, rather, “the roots of this repression go back much further.”
‘Incremental and calculated’
“The incremental and calculated restrictions on human rights in Russia over the past two decades have culminated in the current state policy of criminalising any actual or perceived dissent.”
Over 20,000 people were detained between February 2022 and June 2023 for participating in ‘largely peaceful’ anti-war protests.
Additionally, Ms. Katzarova received reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention, including sexual violence and rape, by law enforcement officials targeting anti-war protesters.
Russian authorities have also used propaganda and rhetoric to incite hatred and violence against Ukrainians, the report claims, with 600 criminal lawsuits were initiated against so-called “anti-war activity.
Ms. Katzarova added that children in schools face threats and serious consequences for “even drawing an anti-war picture.”
Civil society
The situation in Russia has signalled an “effective closure of the civic space, silencing of public dissent and independent media”, Ms. Katzarova emphasised, a thought echoed by many Member States during the Council session.
For example, changes to the law on so-called foreign agents or ‘undesirable organisations’ means that independent voices such as human rights defenders and independent media outlets, are now being heavily restricted.
“The often-violent enforcement of these laws has resulted in a systematic crackdown on civil society organizations,” Ms. Katzarova said, referencing the scrutiny, detention and sometimes persecution of the now “stigmatised”, independent groups – many who are forced into exile or prison.
Russian push back
Joined by many Member States, the UN expert urged Russia to undertake “comprehensive human rights reforms” to address the “damage of the past two decades.”
The Russian Government has not accepted the mandate of the report and denied the independent expert access to the country. Russia’s were represented at the Human Rights council in Geneva during the report’s presentation but did not respond.
Addressing the Geneva forum, Ms. Katzarova called on Russia to “reconsider its approach” towards her mandate – a sentiment echoed by many Member States present.
This is the first time in its history that the Council has authorised a rights expert to investigate human rights violations within the borders of one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Post-traumatic stress and anxiety has become a daily challenge for thousands of Libyans who survived Storm Daniel nearly two weeks ago, UN humanitarians warned on Thursday.
The head of the UN agency that assists Palestine refugees across the Middle East, UNRWA, on Thursday appealed for consistent and sustainable financing to keep its operations running and avert chronic shortfalls.
Despite a significant decrease in fighting since last year’s UN-brokered truce, over 4.3 million people remain displaced across the country. Most do not feel safe enough to return home anytime soon and plan to remain in the areas they have settled in for the foreseeable future.
Many are dispersed across hundreds of displacement camps in underdeveloped areas, mainly along the frontlines. Others have sheltered in urban areas or among host communities where social services are more readily available, yet poverty is rife.
In the long term, concrete, durable solutions for displaced communities who have settled in new areas, likely for the long haul, is crucial, according to the UN International Organization for Migration’s (IOM).
It adds that significant investments must be made to allow them to continue this lifesaving work and to promote a more sustainable future and long-term recovery through revitalizing agriculture, education, water systems, and other infrastructure.
water systems, and other infrastructure.
A migrant rests at a clinic in northern Yemen after a long and exhausting journey.
Trafficking crisis
Migrants remain some of those most vulnerable to the effects of the crisis. The maritime route migrants take from the Horn of Africa to Yemen is the second busiest in the world.
According to the IOM displacement tracking matrix, an estimated 90,000 migrants – mostly Ethiopian – have arrived on Yemen’s shores in 2023 so far, in the hopes of reaching Saudi Arabia.
Tens of thousands have become stranded. They have traveled too far and gone too deep in debt to turn around, but know the journey ahead is too deadly or costly to continue, according to IOM, whose staff hears daily accounts from migrants of exploitation at the hands of traffickers and grave abuse on their journeys.
A young migrant looks out to see after arriving in Yemen from Djibouti.
Slavery, torture, extortion
The migrants are often promised good jobs and decent living conditions and do not anticipate the challenges they will face. Instead, thousands of migrants are sold into sexual slavery, tortured on video while their families are extorted, or forced to work for months without pay on farms, according to IOM.
The situation has become a trafficking crisis of extraordinary proportions, the UN agency warned. Many also struggle to access essential public services, like health care, shelter, sanitation facilities, and food while also experiencing stigma and discrimination.
Humanitarians mobilized along the eastern corridor migration route are striving to ensure assistance is available to people on the move and that those who wish to return home can do so safely and voluntarily. But, the demand for these services continues to outweigh the resources available to respond to all migrants in need.
More meaningful efforts from world leaders to restore the rights of and end violence toward people on the move in Yemen – regardless of background or migration status – must also be made, the UN agency said.
IOM is providing services to patients at a health centre on the west coast of Yemen.
Yemenis welcome newcomers
Confronted with these harsh realities, it is Yemeni community members who often go out of their way to help newcomers. Thousands of Yemenis work for humanitarian agencies in dangerous areas. Some have moved far from their homes to lend a hand to communities in need across the country.
Host communities, still reeling from years of war, have stepped up to support and welcome those in dire need.
Yemeni doctors provide relief to people suffering from ailments on their journeys, engineers build extensive water networks in arid lands, community leaders help mitigate conflict over dwindling resources, and teachers spread knowledge to children whose education has been compromised by war.
The realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) depends on supporting these unsung heroes to make concrete contributions to development and peace in countries in crisis.
