Israel/Gaza: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-president Josep Borrell to the press following the Ministerial meeting on “Implementing the Two-State Solution”
Remarks by EU Vice President Borrell
Thank you for being here, at a somewhat late hour. I wanted to comment to you, from my point of view, as an observer that I was today, at the meeting that took place, convened by the government of Spain.
I was on mission in the Middle East – yesterday I was in Beirut. Also visiting the United Nations mission in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL. Then [visiting] the authorities and [having] different meetings with Lebanese civil society. Earlier I had been in Cairo, at the meeting of the Arab League ministers.
I came to Madrid, but tomorrow I am going back to the Middle East, to the [United Arab] Emirates. After having participated as an observer in this meeting – convened by the Spanish government – and I want to thank the Spanish government for the effort it is making to promote the peace process in the Middle East, based on the two-state solution.
I have been an observer on behalf of the European Union. As you know, the European Union has different positions on this point. Whether or not to recognize Palestine as a state is a national prerogative of the member states. Some have done so, others have not.
Undoubtedly, there is unanimity in the Union on the need to support the solution based on the construction of the Palestinian State. The State of Israel already exists, it is a democratic State, powerful – economically speaking – with a very important military capacity.
Today’s meeting serves to keep alive the prospect of such a solution. But for that to happen, many steps must first be taken. In the first place, the cease-fire, which continues to be negotiated interminably. If not today, it will be tomorrow. And not tomorrow either, [but] the day after. We will see. There is little hope that it can be achieved in the short term, according to the information I have.
But that does not prevent us from continuing to work to achieve, first, to bring aid to the people in Gaza, and to continue to demand the release of the hostages. But to continue also to have a political solution in perspective. Although it is clear and evident that the government – this government of Israel – rejects it.
We have to build as much international consensus as possible. This morning there was a very interesting exchange of views, first with the Prime Minister and then among the ministers.
As I was telling you, tomorrow I will go to the Emirates [United Arab Emirates], which was not present at today’s meeting – neither was I in Cairo, at the Arab League meeting – and then in New York, at the meeting that we are planning together with Norway, in the framework of the United Nations General Assembly.
I think everybody knows: we are living in the Middle East a situation on the edge of a problem, I would not say much more serious, because what there is is already serious enough. The situation in Gaza is already serious enough not to think that someone else can do more, but regional spillover is still a possibility.
We begin by strongly condemning the Hamas terrorist attack. We have to remember that whenever we take the floor to say it again. But then what is happening in Gaza is a horror that is not justified by the horror that Hamas previously provoked; that horror does not justify another.
I have been to a closed border post at Rafah, where we are negotiating the possibility of opening it with a presence of the mission that we have had stationed at the border for more than 20 years.
It’s one thing to be told, it’s another thing to see it. It’s one thing to be told that there are a lot of trucks waiting and it’s another thing to see the endless line of more than 1400 trucks – 1400 trucks on both sides of the road waiting to get in and sometimes waiting for weeks.
It’s one thing to be told that, it’s another thing to see the warehouses full of the products rejected at the border control, among which there is everything. Yes, it is frankly shocking to see mountains of boxes of different kinds of material. Some have come from Singapore, others from Brazil, others from Norway, from European countries. Where there is everything, where there are medical first aid boxes that are rejected because inside there are those little scissors that are used in pharmacies to cut the adhesive tape. Even water purification systems that are rejected because there are carbons inside – and of course, how can water be purified without carbon? Even sleeping bags that are rejected because they are green – green, apparently, can be considered as a material for military use.
You see boxes and boxes of the stuff that is dramatically lacking for those a few miles away. And yet they are held back after a long journey and a long wait.
We have condemned recent attacks in so-called “safe zones.” Which then, at the moment of truth, are not, with an absolutely unjustified number of civilian casualties.
In Lebanon, as in the West Bank, there is today the fear that there will be an even greater pressure that will generate a new emigration of Palestinians – forced migration, of course – both in the West Bank and in the Sinai.
That is the situation. Today’s meeting was, I think, important in preparation for the UN meeting.
Once again, from an observer position, [since] I did not take part, I neither approved nor rejected the final statement of the meeting because, as I tell you, there are different positions within the Union, even if we are all in favor of the two-state solution.
The problem is not being in favor of a solution, but what to do to achieve it. For this, there are different actions that I had the opportunity to discuss with the Arab ministers at their ministerial meeting in Cairo.
I remain at your disposal in case I can answer some of your questions.
Q&A
Q: I don’t know if you think there should be some specific actors participating in this [United Nations] meeting. What international actors do you think should be at the table?A couple of hours ago, the Israeli foreign minister posted a message on social media accusing you that your legacy is going to be anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel.I don’t know how you feel about that, in the framework that we’re in now.And if I may, a third one.I don’t know if on your visit to Madrid you had the intention or the opportunity to meet with Mr. Edmundo Gonzalez or if you have in the future and intention or want to seek the opportunity to meet with him.
Q: I would like to ask you about whether the Maduro regime can be described as a dictatorship following Mrs. Robles’ comment.
Q: I would also like to ask you about Venezuela, what do you think about the proposal of the European People’s Party for the European Parliament to recognize Edmundo Gonzalez as president?
Well, I see that the situation in the Middle East is less topical than the discussion on Venezuela – which is also going to be discussed in the European Parliament next week.
Let’s talk first about the issues of today’s meeting. Actually, I believe that the problem does not affect only Arabs and Europeans. It is a problem that affects the whole world. Although for historical reasons, naturally the Arab neighbors in the Middle East, well, they have been more affected. [Historical and factual reasons because they have received the largest number of Palestinian refugees. I think we must also overcome the fact that the contact groups are between one geographical area and another. It would be good – and this will surely be debated at the United Nations – to incorporate into any contact group actors that represent international concern, [that] there is a problem.
Why not countries like Chile, which has a large colony, or like Canada, which also has a large Palestinian colony – and which have taken important decisions. Canada has banned arms exports and Israel. Chile’s positions – you know them – are, as they have already been very strong from the point of view of respect for human rights. So, yes, I think we have to overcome a little bit [the division between] Europeans and Arabs, and perhaps also the United States. You have to open the contact group to more international actors.
Second, [about] Twitter [and] the Israeli minister. Well, what I would like to say is that we don’t care about Iran, either the Minister is not well informed or he doesn’t care about not being well informed. Just last week we proposed – and it is proposed to the Council – the Council is going to discuss – an additional proposal for sanctions on Iran. In the same way that he regrets that he did not take the initiative – I hope that this press will help him to be a little better informed. I insist, whether he cares about being well informed or he doesn’t care.
Secondly, Kissinger – who had some experience in discussions about the Middle East and who was also a Jew – used to say that as soon as you argued with the Israeli government of the day and you did not agree 90% with its positions, you were immediately accused of anti-Semitism.
That word should not be devalued. There are in history, unfortunately, manifestations of what it means to be anti-Semitic, and I believe that one should not play with big words that have had a tragic dimension in history. To accuse anyone who disagrees with the position of a government of being anti-Semitic makes no sense.
I am repulsed by anti-Semitism. The Jewish people have obviously been subjected to persecutions and sufferings that everyone knows and recognizes. I am the first. Therefore, I am not going to bother to refute these kinds of qualifications that fall under their own weight. I am going to do everything I can to ensure that the Association Council, which is scheduled, is held. I just want to point out that this thing that says I don’t care about Iran also falls apart and you should know that.
The second [question] was already about Venezuela. I will gladly meet with Edmundo González. Unfortunately, I am leaving tomorrow for the Emirates [United Arab Emirates] and I will not have the opportunity, but I have been in permanent contact with Mr. Gonzalez. With the candidate that we believe – in the light of the only information available, which is the one provided by the Venezuelan opposition, but that the United Nations observers themselves recognize its verisimilitude. [They] recognize that, obviously, to the extent that they describe the reality that they have been able to measure the elections, Maduro has not won them. Therefore, I have already said it: we do not recognize Maduro’s democratic legitimacy because we do not recognize that he won the elections.
Q.The first one is about the UN actors.The second one was about the Israeli newspaper and the third one is about the interview with Mr. Edmundo Gonzalez – if it was possible, if there was a future.
I would have no problem finding him. Hours before he left Venezuela I was at the Ambrosetti Forum in Italy, I was talking to him, and he already told me the situation he was in. I have spoken with him and we have invited him to come to the Foreign Affairs Council. Naturally we are going to continue to maintain with him and with the opposition that has remained in Venezuela – we must not forget that there are people in Venezuela who need our support and who are in a complicated situation – to the extent that the Maduro regime – I suppose that tomorrow they will also call me in some way, it does not matter – is engaged in a repressive dynamic that worries us all, and which can only be overcome through international pressure and in particular that which can be done by the Latin American countries that are closest to us.
I have also been asked about the statements made by a minister and other ministers. I am not going to comment on the statements made by the ministers of a country, even if it is my own. I am Spanish and naturally I follow Spanish politics, but I do not think it is my role to comment on the statements of one or the other. What is clear is that these elections have shown that the democratic quality of Venezuela, which we already knew before, has not improved.
The third issue is the question of the Popular Party to recognize Edmundo [Gonzalez]. Look, in international law what is recognized are States. The existence of a State is recognized. For example, Kosovo is not recognized or is recognized. Kosovo, the State of Kosovo. The government in power in Kosovo is not recognized or is not recognized. In international law, a State is recognized. When it was the procés, and Catalonia tried to achieve independence outside the Constitution, the big question was whether this independent Catalonia would be recognized as an independent State. Not whether or not you recognized the president of the Generalitat, but an independent State. The case of Kosovo: some recognize it and others do not recognize it.
Venezuela is a recognized state. It sits in the United Nations. We continue to recognize the State of Venezuela, but we do not recognize the democratic legitimacy of those who say they have won the elections without proving it. In any case, recognition or non-recognition is a national power of the Member States. The European Union neither recognizes nor fails to recognize Kosovo because it does not have the capacity in international law. The Member States have it and some use it in one sense and others use it in another. But even if I wanted to, I could not recognize or not recognize a state. And to recognize or not to recognize a president of the government. What is done is to recognize or not to recognize the democratic legitimacy of the one who holds power, the territorial control of the army, of the police. That, in fact, was Maduro before the elections and continues to be Maduro after the elections. But we do not consider him a person who can claim democratic legitimacy to the power he holds.
Unfortunately I cannot be in Strasbourg because I could not be in two different places at the same time. I believe that at this moment the commitments I had made in the dialogue on the situation in the Middle East could no longer be modified. Surely there will be more occasions to discuss that in the coming days. In any case, unfortunately, there are no magic wands in these matters. As the spokeswoman of the Socialist Party said in a recent debate in Parliament, acknowledgements may have a symbolic value, but unfortunately they do not change reality. I do not know if I have made myself clear. Governments are not recognized, States are recognized. It is the States that can do it. It is the States that recognize other States and we do not recognize them. We, the European Union, do not recognize the democratic legitimacy of Maduro.
Q.I wanted to ask you what plans you have for the reactivation of the mission [EUBAM Rafah], and if you are considering, a new, strengthened mandate.I remember that one of the big problems we had then is that it was a non-executive mandate – we were mere observers.Also, our security forces could not be armed.So, in the hypothetical case/incident we had to get in the armored cars and run away.In this case of a new EUBAM Rafah, what would be a bit of a mandate?Also ask him about the security of the Philadelphi corridor, something Prime Minister Netanyahu is constantly claiming.That they don’t want to somehow delegate the security of the corridor because of the problem of the tunnels and the possibility of new smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosives.The possibility of a multinational military force has been considered and perhaps you could also comment a little on what hypotheses are being considered, if it would be under NATO mandate.There are European countries willing to contribute troops, Arab countries, friends of Israel that also seem to be offering.
Well, if you were there when EUBAM Rafah was created, you know what the rules of the game are. It’s a non-executive mission, like [almost] all of our missions. I think only an executive mission in Kosovo. Sorry, not in Kosovo, it’s in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even the missions in the Sahel didn’t have the executive character. Executive in the sense of UN terminology, which means being able to go into combat. They are not, and [EUBAM] Rafah was not. And it’s going to continue not to be. We’re not going to change the nature of the mission.
On the other hand, unfortunately we are not close, if not far away, from getting an agreement that would allow this mission to be deployed again. It was deployed in its observer and advisory capacity, and we had to withdraw it. I am willing to assume the responsibility of sending my people again, but it has to be with guaranteed security conditions and with acceptable political conditions.
That means an agreement that allows the Palestinian Authority to be our interlocutor on the ground. At the moment, neither of these two things has been achieved. Therefore, the mission cannot be deployed for the time being. It would be a non-executive mission, an observation and support mission, but that means that the Palestinian Authority has to be there. You will remember if you were there, that Egypt said “that goes with you on the Gaza side. On the Egyptian side I don’t need you and you don’t deploy.” That is still the case. It would have to be deployed on the other side, but with what interlocutor and under what security conditions? I don’t think that’s going to be for tomorrow. Which is all the more unfortunate because the border is going to remain closed. When one goes there and sees the line of ambulances from the [International Red Crescent Movement] waiting to evacuate people who cannot cross the border, with seriously wounded, one can only regret it. To consider that the situation of blockade at the border is not admissible, but it is what it is.
You asked me about an international mission. There has been a lot of talk about it. Almost all the news I have heard is unfounded. As far as I know, there is no Arab country that has offered the presence of its troops. [There are] some exceptions, but under conditions that are far from being met. The same goes for the European Union. This does not mean that a solution should not be sought to stabilize the situation in Gaza.
Today at the moment Gaza is a lawless and lawless area with desperate people. One of the reasons why the United Nations is having serious difficulties is because there is no interlocutor and no one to guarantee security internally. First, a cease-fire has to be achieved. As long as there is no ceasefire, everything else is just talk for the sake of talk.
Concern mounts about the increasing purchase of properties by the Russian Orthodox Church near military sites in Norway, which poses security issues.
In recent years, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Norway has acquired properties next to military bases, which has been a source of concern since the beginning of Putin’s war on Ukraine.
More than 700 religious communities receive state grants in Norway, including Orthodox parishes subordinated to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Rus’ who blessed Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Purchase of properties
In 2017-2021, a number of properties were purchased by the ROC in the coastal area of Rogalan.
According to cadastral data, the ROC bought in 2017 a building in the town of Sherrey (Bergen community), located on a hill three kilometers away from Haakonsvern, which offers a view onto the main base of the Royal Norwegian Navy and the largest naval base in the Nordic area. Before the acquisition of this house, the religious community was located in the city center. The Orthodox priest in Bergen, Dimitry Ostanin, is Ukrainian and was appointed by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’ in 2008 when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) was fully subordinated to him. Before that, he had served in Kaliningrad and Smolensk (Russia).
In the town of Stavanger, the former priest of the local community of the Russian Orthodox Church has a property near the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Jatta, according to Dagbladet. It is located just one kilometer away from an important military building, about fifteen minutes’ walk. That NATO Centre celebrated its 20th anniversary during a formal ceremony on 26 October 2023. Over the last two decades, the JWC has planned and delivered more than 100 exercises and training events and ensure that NATO’s commanders and their staffs are well-prepared and ready to respond to any mission, whenever and wherever the call may come.
The Russian Orthodox Church also has a parish in Trondheim. On 21 March 2021, the first Orthodox service in the city was celebrated for almost a thousand years as part of the celebrations of the feast of the Triumph of Orthodoxy at the parish of the Holy Princess Anna of Novgorod, in Russia. News of this important event in the life of Orthodox Christians in Norway was shown on the Russian The Saviour and Unity TV channels.
In 2015, the Russian Orthodox Church also bought a property in Kirkenes (Finnmark county) in the far north-east of Norway, on the border with Russia.
In addition, the Moscow Patriarchate sponsors work in Tromsø in northern Norway and in Svalbard, also known as Spitzbergen.
In 1996, the Moscow Patriarchate established a parish in Oslo. Among all Orthodox Churches in Norway, the parish of St. Olga in Oslo, is currently the largest one; another parish under the Moscow Patriarchate in the capital city is Saint Hallvard.
The presence of Orthodox Churches subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church/ Moscow Patriarchate in EU countries has also raised national security concerns because in a number of cases they were suspected or accused of serving as relays for Putin’s propaganda or Russia’s spying activities. Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden and Ukraine have taken various measures to anticipate or tackle security risks, including with the assistance of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
In Norway, an Orthodox parish dedicated to St. Nicholas under the Patriarchate of Constantinople was founded in Oslo in 1931 by a small group of Russian refugees who fled the Bolshevik Revolution. In light of security threats attributed to the Russian Orthodox Church/ Moscow Patriarchate in several European countries, the ROC in Norway remains registered and surprisingly continues to receive state grants. One can wonder why Norway is so laxist with this security issue. Voluntary blindness or lack of political will or both?
“The Islamic Republic of Iran relies on a system, both in law and in practice, that fundamentally discriminates on the grounds of gender,” the update noted, highlighting the far-reaching impacts on women and girls’ bodily autonomy, freedom of expression and religion, as well as a wide range of economic, social and cultural rights.
The heightened repression comes two years after the unlawful death in custody of 22-year-old Jina Mahasa Amini, arrested by Iran’s “morality police” in Tehran on 13 September 2022 for alleged non-compliance with Iran’s laws on mandatory hijab.
Her death triggered protests across the country demanding accountability and an end to discrimination under the hallmark slogan of “Woman, Life, Freedom.”
Iranian security forces have escalated pre-existing patterns of physical violence, including beating, kicking, and slapping women and girls who are perceived as failing to comply with the mandatory hijab laws and regulations, according to the report from the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran.
State authorities have also increased monitoring of hijab compliance in both the public and private spheres through the increased use of surveillance, including drones.
Meanwhile, over the last two years, the death penalty and other criminal laws have been used to terrorise Iranians and discourage them from protesting and expressing themselves freely, investigators said.
This apparent new pattern of sentencing women activists to death – including some belonging to Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities, following their convictions for national security offences – raised utmost concern in the update.
Amidst such escalation in violence, a “Hijab and Chastity” bill is in the final stages of approval where it is likely to be finalised.
The bill will issue harsher penalties for women who do not wear the mandatory hijab, including exorbitant financial fines, longer prison sentences, restrictions on work and educational opportunities, and bans on travel, the independent rights experts contend.
Women’s plight must remain ‘high on agenda’
The Mission is calling on Iran to immediately stop executing protesters and consider ending the death penalty altogether, to release all people arbitrarily arrested due to the protests and end all repressive policy and institutional measures against women and girls, including the “Hijab and Chastity” bill.
“With no deterrence for the State regarding the increasing violations against women and girls, there is no realistic hope that victims and survivors could fully and meaningfully access the fundamental rights and freedoms to which they are entitled, and which the Islamic Republic of Iran has obligations to respect and ensure,” the update warned.
Given the widespread impunity that prevails across Iran, including for crimes against humanity, the Mission is also calling on UN Member States to scale up efforts to ensure the rights of victims and their families.
“States must continue to place the situation of women and girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran high on the international agenda,” the update said.
The European Commission is getting ready to review citizens’ proposals and one controversial idea on the table is the ‘PsychedeliCare’ initiative that supports the exploration and implementation of psychedelic treatments for mental wellbeing issues. Advocates of this initiative highlight the advantages of using psychedelics in addressing mental health concerns; however it’s crucial to carefully assess the consequences of making these substances mainstream for therapeutic use, it already happened with way too many “pharma products” and end up being dangerous street drugs, as this is what they actually were from the beginning.
Supporters of this “therapies” frequently promote these substances as amazing remedies for profound mental health challenges like depression and anxiety disorders such as PTSD are regularly highlighted by them in support of their claims. However, these early research findings are willfully misinterpreted and exaggerated. The “positive outcomes” observed in limited research studies do not automatically translate to safety and effectiveness across wider and more varied demographic groups, often the contrary. Throughout history the fascination with a quick fix for mental health issues has often resulted in disappointment and harm, if not death.
A Lack of Comprehensive Understanding
The insufficient scientific knowledge about psychedelics raises concerns within the community as the intricate workings of the human brain remain a mystery when influenced by these substances. There are risks such as psychological distress and worsening of preexisting mental health conditions that make it unthinkable to integrate psychedelics into mainstream therapy practices at all. It is crucial to acknowledge the variations in individual experiences and biological compositions to prevent unintended harm rather than aiding in treatment efforts.
Regulatory and Ethical Concerns
The push for government endorsement of psychedelic therapies raises numerous ethical questions. Should substances with known psychoactive properties be part of mainstream health care? The regulatory environment surrounding these compounds is fraught with challenges, including ensuring quality control, standardizing dosages, and preventing misuse. With the legalization movements in various regions, the potential for recreational abuse expands, risking public health and safety.
Historical Context and Social Implications
Looking back, the late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by a psychedelic counterculture that resulted in societal turmoil and increased drug abuse. The legacy of this era still looms large; many young individuals romanticize psychedelic use without regarding the severe consequences that accompanied its earlier popularity, including addiction, mental health crises, and a societal disregard for safety protocols.
A Dangerous Precedent
By calling for a more prominent role for psychedelics in treatment protocols, the advocates of the ‘PsychedeliCare’ initiative may unintentionally set a dangerous precedent. Replacing established, evidence-based treatments with unproven psychedelic therapies could detract from the very real progress made in mental health care. It could shift focus away from holistic approaches that consider lifestyle, therapeutic counseling, and medication tailored to individual needs.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding the ‘PsychedeliCare’ initiative should prompt a vigilant and cautious examination of the implications of endorsing psychedelics as treatment options. While there is a critical need for innovative approaches in mental health care, rushing to embrace unproven therapies poses significant risks. It is paramount that we prioritize rigorous scientific scrutiny, ethical considerations, and the well-being of individuals over the allure of quick solutions. The only clear path forward is one grounded in proven therapies, comprehensive research, and unwavering commitment to public health.
Chocolate is a favorite delicacy for people, but for cats and dogs it is a real poison, writes the magazine ” Sciences et Avenir” and explains why pets should not be “pampered” with chocolate under any circumstances.
For them, chocolate is toxic, because it is not properly absorbed by their body. This is due to the alkaloid theobromine, which is contained in cocoa and therefore in chocolate.
The substance becomes dangerous to health when large amounts of it are stored in the liver. About 12 grams of theobromine are contained in dark chocolate, twice as much in milk chocolate, and very small amounts in white chocolate.
Theobromine does not harm humans, as the human body manages to break it down quickly.
However, it takes 20 hours for dogs to get rid of this molecule. It can build up in their liver and cause poisoning if large amounts of chocolate are ingested at once.
Among the symptoms are vomiting, diarrhea, rapid pulse, convulsions.
The same is true for cats. However, they are less attracted to chocolate than dogs because they cannot taste sweets with their tongues, although there are exceptions.
In addition, pet obesity is the subject of a number of educational campaigns aimed at owners.
A court in North West England has banned a British man from keeping pets for the next 10 years because his Dalmatian became too fat. wrote the English tabloid “Sun” in November 2009.
40-year-old man John Green, a resident of Macclesfield in Cheshire, showed extreme irresponsibility towards his dog Barney and fed him chips and chocolate.
Thus, in just three months, it became several times fatter than normal for its breed and reached 70 kg.
Green was tipped off by alarmed, vigilant fellow citizens.
Animal control officials warned Green that his dog’s health was in danger and recommended that he be put on a diet.
However, he did not follow the recommendations and the dog continued to gain weight.
The Dalmatian was eventually removed from his owner’s home in June and put on a diet in a private kennel, where staff made sure he got enough exercise.
As a result, Barney, who is eight years old, lost 40 kg.
Green pleaded guilty to causing his dog unnecessary suffering, but the court found some mitigating circumstances because the man treated Barney more like a friend than a dog and did not realize he was harming him.
That’s why Green was only sentenced to 200 hours of community service and to pay £780 in costs.
Illustrative Photo by Glenn: https://www.pexels.com/photo/high-angle-photo-of-a-corgi-looking-upwards-2664417/
Dozens of Bulgarian families from Duisburg have received letters from German municipal authorities with a notification that they must leave their apartments by mid-September 2024. This was reported by the organization “Stolipinovo* in Europe”.
From there they also state that all those affected are tenants from the streets Gertrudenstraße, Diesterwegstraße, Pestalozzistraße, Wilfriedstraße, Halskestraße and Wiesenstraße, who are correct tenants of the company Ivere Property Management. It turns out that the company that owns the properties, about 50 in total, has not paid the electricity and water bills to the municipal utility company for months. It now intends to cut off the drinking water supply, which municipal authorities say is making the apartments unfit and leading to a planned mass eviction.
“Investigations show that this fraudulent scheme, in which the owner company collects amounts for electricity and water from the tenants, but does not forward them to the respective companies, has also been implemented in other cities in the Ruhr and Thuringia. The difference, however, is that there the local authorities have fully sided with those affected, instead of using forced evictions as a measure to ‘solve’ the problem. Policies of forced evictions are not new to Duisburg. In our work, as a mutual aid society for migrants from Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries, we work daily with people who have been forcibly removed from their homes. After restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian workers fell in 2014, the municipality of Duisburg introduced forced eviction policies in order to reduce the number of habitable dwellings declared unfit. Since the beginning of 2014, 96 homes have been inspected, with 79 of them immediately closed. This leaves thousands of residents, mostly Bulgarians and Romanians, without shelter. In our practice, we encounter extremely severe cases in which minor children, in need of treatment, elderly people on hemodialysis are forcibly evicted without prior notification and without provision of alternative housing. The upcoming mass evictions will affect over 900 residents of the neighborhood, most of whom are Bulgarian citizens who earn their living in Germany as construction, supply and industrial cleaning workers,” the organization wrote.
The September 5, 2024 protest against the evictions brought together over 400 residents of the neighborhood, including many of the affected Bulgarian citizens, who demanded the repeal of the repressive municipal measures.
* Note: Stolipinovo is a neighborhood in the eastern part of the city of Plovdiv, on the southern bank of the Maritsa River. It is the largest urban ghetto in Bulgaria with a population of nearly 40,000. The vast majority of the inhabitants are Muslim gypsies, traditionally called millet and self-identified as Turks. Another major group, comprising an estimated 15-20% of the residents, mainly in the north-eastern edge of the district, are Christian Gypsies, these days mainly evangelized, who are traditionally called Burgudji and self-identify as Roma.
Stolipinovo arose in 1889, when the municipal council of Plovdiv, on the occasion of a smallpox epidemic, decided to evict the gypsies scattered around the city, at that time about 350 people, to a newly created “gypsy village” 2 kilometers east of Plovdiv.[3] The first residents were families from the Bey-Mejid neighborhood of Plovdiv. It was originally called “New Village”, but later it was named after General Stolypin, deputy of Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, also a participant in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, after which the Liberation of Bulgaria became a fact.
There is a trade in heroin in the neighborhood and it is known as the largest distribution depot in Southern Bulgaria. Crime and trafficking in women is the other problem, as well as moneylenders lending money to poorer people and then demanding triple the amount given. According to information from the 6th police station in Plovdiv, Stolipinovo quarter is the most criminal of all the city districts in the city of Plovdiv.
According to the Report on the Implementation of the Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion of the Republic of Bulgaria, “The share of illegal construction in large urban ghettos, such as the Stolipinovo district in Plovdiv, reaches 80%. “According to other sources, this share for Stolipinovo is 98%.
Photo: Oblique Aerial Map view of Stolipinovo district of Plovdiv, BG / NASA – NASA World Wind. Created: 05:46, 21 August 2010 (UTC).
On the occasion of the Day of Sobriety celebrated in the country today, the Russian Orthodox Church called on mass culture not to promote alcoholism, TASS reported.
The agency recalls that the All-Russian Day of Sobriety is celebrated on the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church on September 11 to remind people of the harm caused by alcohol. On this day, in some parts of Russia, the sale of alcohol is limited or completely prohibited.
“The culture of attitude towards this is very important. There are many “nice jokes” about alcoholism in our everyday culture. There is nothing good about that. We know what the state of intoxication leads to. Those who deal with mass culture should make an effort that the image of the “dear drunkard” should still leave our mass culture,” said the head of the synodal department of the Moscow Patriarchate for Church Interaction on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg Forum of United Cultures with society and media Vladimir Legoida.
Asked whether it would be appropriate to ban or restrict the sale of alcohol across the country, he said “that would be wonderful”. “But it is important that people do this consciously, independently, not because someone is forcing them, and also that there is, as it is customary to say, a public consensus,” he stated.
Legoida noted that the category of “sobriety” is important for the church in general, which refers not only to abstinence from alcohol.
Meanwhile, during a press conference dedicated to the All-Russian Day of Sobriety, Russia’s Deputy Health Minister Oleg Salagai said that alcohol abuse can reduce a man’s life expectancy by six years and a woman by five years.
“The systemic measures that were adopted allowed us to really reduce alcohol consumption. Today, it can be confidently said that Russia is not one of the most drinking countries in the world,” said the deputy minister, who pointed out that in 2023 alcohol consumption in the country was about 8.4 liters per person, while at the beginning of the century the indicator was in double digits.
By Emmanuel Ande Ivorgba, Centre for Faith and Community Development, Nigeria ([email protected]m)
1. INTRODUCTION
Crime prevention – whether at the societal, community or individual level – is a much sought-after goal in contemporary societies across the globe today, particularly among the developing poor nations (Cornish & Clarke 2016). Law enforcement agencies and security departments are some agencies put in place to ensure orderly conduct in communities, among other mandates.
It is believed that the presence of the police in our security domain can assist in discouraging crime and increase the sense of security among the populace.
Enforcement activities of the police and other law enforcement agencies are seen by most scholars as reactive in nature. While this may be true about these agencies’ primary mandate as generators of calls for service, repeated crime victims and communities are beginning to push towards community policing, which emphasizes proactive problem-solving rather than reactive enforcement. This provides police personnel with the opportunity to respond directly to important community concerns. Community policing is a proactive approach to law enforcement that focuses on building strong and sustainable relationships between the police and the communities they serve. According to Teasley (1994), community policing goes beyond traditional law enforcement methods because it encompasses crime prevention, problem-solving and community engagement. It involves collaboration between law enforcement officers and members of communities to identify and address public safety concerns. An important principle of community policing is the concept of community partnerships. It involves working closely with local businesses, residents and community organizations to develop a shared understanding of the priorities of public safety and to create solutions tailored towards addressing those priorities. As Gill (2016) observe, by involving local communities in decisionmaking processes and problem-solving efforts, the police can build trust, improve communication, and enhance overall public safety.
The role of community policing in crime prevention is particularly critical, especially in an environment like Nigeria where criminal activities are on the ascendency as a result of the growing number and influence of armed groups and gangs, inter-group, ethnic and religious violence, and increasing political instability aggravated by the overall aggravating economic climate (Kpae & Eric 2017). The Nigeria Police therefore needs to incorporate community mobilization with a full panoply of strategies in order to increase the likelihood of order and safety in communities. Police officers should be mindful of the kind of relationships by being responsive to the needs of the community, accurate in their handling of law enforcement situations, and be courteous and respectful in ways that go the extra mile toward individuals. According to Rosenbaum & Lurigo (1994), “Community policing is an approach to policing in which police officers work with and within the community to facilitate the exchange of information and build relationships with a view to minimizing the fear of crime and enhancing community safety”. It is a policing philosophy that advocates law enforcement as well as crime prevention and intervention through proactive use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques between the police and the community (Braga & Weisburd 2010). When properly implemented, community policing can help avert threats to public order through partnership-based efforts that seek to deter criminal activity, develop and sustain a partnership relationship with the community which, in the long run, can be substantiated with mutual trust and respect.
Definition of community policing
The main goal of community policing is to create new partnerships and strengthen existing ties between the police and the communities that enable them to work together with mutual trust and respect (Smith, 2015). Encouraging active collaboration among police and other providers of public safety, human services, and government is another important goal. It is towards recognizing and favoring the principle of a secure and organized community that results from policecommunity partnership that community policing advocates (McEvoy & Hideg 2000). Community policing requires that the relationship between the police and the community is rooted in the principle of the need for cooperative effort and mutual respect between the police and the public they serve and to participate in policing and crime prevention activities, designed to reduce and prevent crime, disorder, and fear of crime, ensuring public safety.
Community policing involves decentralizing police services to enhance direct and meaningful contact with local individuals and groups to address public safety problems as a team. Such policing changes the fundamental functions of the police (Peak & Glensor 1999). In essence, it suggests the police share with the populace the duty and responsibility for the preservation and protection of security and order. It is an innovative and reformative force that would make a secure and organized community. Community policing represents a major shift of law enforcement policy and organizational practice (Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988). It moves from a centralized to a decentralized and participatory power-sharing with the local people in making and executing decisions for the purpose of providing public safety and security.
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN NIGERIA
Community policing is not a new idea; it is as old as the history of organized society. Indeed, it dates back to ancient and medieval times (Smith, 2020). In the early stages of human history, particularly among hunters and gatherers, there was a round-the-clock aspect to preventing and detecting crime (Smith, 2010). This situation arose around the time when humans began living in permanent communities and developed as a result of their behavioral activities, which were detrimental and harmful to the growth and development of such communities. At that time, there were no formal written laws to regulate societal relationships. Instead, there was a form of self-help justice based on the idea that an assault on one’s neighbor should be punished by an assault on the assailant. This concept, known as “lex talionis,” implied a law of vendetta. It involved reciprocal or mutual punishment, or blood revenge (Cohen, 1992; Smith & Johnson, 2005). This system is still present in the societies of Niger Republic (Hauck & Kapp, 2013), Mauritania (Camara, 2018), Libya (Lia, 2016), Chad (International Crisis Group, 2014), Sudan (Abdalla 2012), Kenya (Okeno, 2019), and among the Tiv and Jukun (Alubo, 2011; Egwu, 2014), and other parts of Nigeria.
2.1 Pre-Colonial and Colonial Era In the southern part of Nigeria, systems were generally more egalitarian, and emphasis was on giving individuals the opportunity for the utilization and development of their resources and potential, as well as preserving social harmony. Rules governing male behavior were established locally and included the age group of the respective communities. Females and children belonged to age groups, which met periodically to discuss matters of interest to their members. Other forms of corporate associations such as the Ekpe, Ekine, Ogu, were established to control crime (Egbo, 2023). When necessary, they called the native administration or its police to carry out the required punishment. In the precolonial era, the death penalty was imposed by a native supreme council or local chiefs’ council, but the need for restraint prevented this from being used frequently (Smith, 2020a). Most of the disputes in the traditional societies were social rather than legal because of the more egalitarian and democratic nature of these nascent societies. The rules of the society were broad, focusing mainly on unnecessary anti-social activities that were likely to disrupt the community. Common crimes were theft from a fellow society member, a fellow citizen, or a guest in the community. Such thefts were of food, cattle, farm products, livestock, poultry, and minor property. Custom and tradition demanded that people who begged for alms must do so during the day and in an open place. They were forbidden to throw sand against houses, and those who stopped to beg contributed to community service. In the olden days, these types of communal responsibility were legitimate because they sought to ensure the safety and security of the community (Harnischfeger, 2005). Since the pre-colonial period, nearly every cultural group has had an informal policing system based on communal responsibility (Braithwaite, 2002). During this period, security was the job of the community and everyone was involved. Members of the traditional societies confined harmful behavior by socializing the younger people to respect traditional norms, values, and standards. Disputes were settled at community meetings or by age groups, respected individuals, or influential members of the community (Damborenea, 2010; Goldstein, 1990a). Serious cases were transferred to traditional chiefs’ courts where folklore, witchcraft, spirits, or oracles often played a role in the administration of justice. This method used to administer justice was based on the nature and severity of the offense. Even the colonial government did not abolish these traditional societies because it could not administer or police every corner of the Nigerian territory. Colonial policing was concentrated in the trading regions and in the provinces. The communities were left to settle minor disputes among themselves while the police provided protection and escorted traditional rulers on their territorial “tours”.
2.2 Post-Independence Period
The regionalization of the Nigerian Police up to 1966, when it was made national after military intervention in Nigerian politics, was seen as a stage in the evolution of police organization instead of a way of improving the police operational role and performance (Edigheji, 2005; Oko, 2013). The second phase of this period also saw a high degree of political involvement in police administration and operations as a stage in the evolution of police philosophy, organization, functions, and performance before the current police philosophy and operational policies were finally achieved (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2004; Fakorode, 2011).
Consequent upon the adoption of the 1960 Emergency law, the Nigerian Federation obtained partial self-rule leading to self-rule in 1960 (Smith, 2020b), but the fear of undue pressures and intimidation from the police of the pre-colonial period, and experiences of police abuse prompted some sections of the Nigerian community to favor the retention of expatriate police officers; thus the present type of police organization was maintained (Smith, 2020c, Smith 2020d). However, instead of the police being used as a repressive organ of government as was customary, the police was used, among other things, as the parastatal institution instrumental to smooth succession by the ruling political class.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF COMMUNITY POLICING
The idea that police are the extended arm of a society in maintaining order and enforcing the law and order, is the basic theoretical foundation of community policing. A more complete theory of community policing must meet two very disparate but related objectives. First, in its most broadly conceptualized form, community policing is seen as a component of neighborhood building. However, community policing also is a practical program requiring changes in the police department’s structure, particularly for staffing and deployment up to its most complex blueprints. Central to many of these blueprints is the police substation and the severing of the geographical area policed from the larger, incorporating political jurisdiction. Understanding this duality is an important element in developing the next generation of practical community policing programs. But it is important to remove conflict between principle and practice from the policy debate.
Both the police and the public act as one entity in providing good governance and a peaceful society as the basic key objectives of every democratic government. Watson (2023) observes that police research in the area of police service orientation has shown that there is no empirical evidence that indicates that governmental policy influences a change of service or the public perception of the police, nor that the community’s perception of the police is influenced by the level of response to the community’s needs. Rather, the internal characteristics of the police department seem to influence its response to the community’s needs as well as changing the public perception of the police. 3.1 Broken Windows Theory The Broken Windows theory was propounded by Wilson and Kelling (1982). They argued that if there are broken windows and visible vandalism, potential criminals will presume that laws are not respected and that nobody controls these places. Streets and parks will get dirty, and the law needs to have control. This produces a declaration of deficiency from authorities and residents. This type of environment is a sign that residents do not care. Once the environment has entered into complete disrepair, violent crime can happen. These thinkers proposed that crime can be fought through the restoration based on social order, and this restoration of order had to come from the same society.
On the other hand, the theory also puts forth the idea that nobody respects anything: reserves, morality, rules of discretion, and the rights of neighbors. The authorities had to intervene, showing force, and obtaining immediate obedience from those who do not respect the smallest rules (like begging, prostitution, loitering, mixing at the window, imposing curfew and dress codes) appearing with police uniforms, using cars, and safe communications. This theory split right away into two distinct strategies which were based on one adopting the term to prevent social decay, facilitating violence practice.
This theory argues that the physical environment of a society must be congruent with the behaviors the society wishes to maintain. In the context of neighborhood community policing, the success of the program depends on the improvement of the physical environment as well as a change in crime-producing or enabling behaviors.
Specifically, it focuses on not only addressing police factors, such as police responding faster in emergency situations, but also the appearance of the neighborhood, such as reducing the rate of building abandonment. The police role is not only to prevent initial crime but also to prevent further criminal behavior that results from the appearance of disorder. Although Wilson and Kelling (1982) were primarily concerned with describing the “war on crime” policies and the effects of fear in urban cities, some variation can be made to fit our description of community policing.
3.2 Problem-Oriented Theory The philosophy of problem-oriented policing starts from a clear understanding of the aims of a police department in a liberal-democratic society. The basic function of the police is to prevent crime and disorder. This function is achieved by being responsive to the concerns of many different public and private organizations and individuals. The necessity for the police to work in partnership with others is paramount because most public and private resources for reducing and preventing crime and disorder are located outside the police department (Goldstein, 1979; Kelling & More, 1988; Boba, 2003; Eck & Clarke, 2009). This orientation leads to two conclusions about the police role. First, as a central concern of any police department, it is to ensure that it works effectively in partnership with other public and private bodies that can contribute to the prevention of crime and disorder. The police have to be problem-solvers working in partnership with others (Clarke, 1997). The primary function of the police has to be the prevention of crime and disorder, not the management of people’s problems. Conflict resolution and service functions are important elements of this problem-oriented approach, but their relevance is confined to those problems that are capable of police solutions. The proper role of the police is that of the “peacemakers” who, working with all different members of the community, resolve problems and maintain a peaceful environment in which the maximum expression of personal and social potential is achieved. Everything the police do has to be evaluated against these standards. Certainly, problem-oriented policing must underpin a true risk management system. Everything that the police do to prevent crime and disorder must be directly or indirectly aimed at resolving common problems. The danger of a mismanaged police department playing down its crime prevention role in favor of attending to all kinds of fashionable but irrelevant “needs” is acutely present, but good use of the police resources pressed into service of efficient crime prevention. According to Goldstein (1990), problem-oriented policing (POP) focuses on identifying the underlying problems within the community in relation to crime occurrences. The aim is to deal with these problems once and for all by developing and implementing particular strategies to reduce or even prevent those underlying problems from reoccurring. POP, therefore, represents a model of police practice, which goes beyond the traditional means of policing. In other words, many police forces spend their time dealing with the immediate or short-term signs of trouble and conflicts between people. Such a policing practice is often referred to as incident-driven, and it might have some positive results but is not enough to work towards producing long-term changes in the quality of life of the community. At the greatest level, the police action, which solely focuses on removing the symptoms of disorder, may create bigger problems when actions are expedient and grossly inadequate.
4. COMMUNITY POLICING MODELS
According to Westley (1970), the history of modern police science has been marked by a series of attempts, beginning with Sir Robert Peel (1829), to relate the structure and activities of the police to the needs of the society they serve. Central to these discussions has been the question of what the police were established to do. In what ways, if any, should they participate in social engineering, ensuring social change, and improving the quality of life? Differences of opinion on these matters have resulted in great diversity in police tactics and organizational structure. Such differences are reflected in the variety of terms that define what the police as an institution “are,” what they “do,” and what they “should do.” Structure and functions, particularly the third, have driven the ongoing debate about policing. What shapes this debate is the historical, social, economic, philosophical, and political character of a given period and of the people, particularly political leaders, who are making the decision. Good police relations, studies have shown (Smith, 2020d) are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee community contentment with police. Recently, reform, in the form of changing the fundamental guiding principles of the police institution, is on the national and international agenda. The concept of “community policing” is a keystone in the majority of these reform efforts.
4.1 The SARA Model
The SARA concept is a problem-solving model that has the potential to assist officers with their tasks to prevent crime and disorder. It is a blueprint for how officers should analyze and solve problems, whatever their nature or complexity (Eck & Spelman, 1987). SARA is capable of integrating prevention within a broader, reactive problem-solving set of activities. The effectiveness of SARA, and of community policing in general, depends not only on the development of adoptable models, but also on changing the organizational culture of police agencies so that problem solving and decision making are encouraged and rewarded. The SARA process provides officers with guidance to analyze the problems they are expected to solve, to identify an effective response, and to examine how well that response is working (Davis et al., 2006; Goldstein, 1990). Working together with the neighborhood, community policing officers can analyze problems and develop responses, comparing the advantages of preventive and remedial interventions.
They even have potential cooperation with service providers to address underlying factors potentially contributing to crime. By combining its versatility and its problem-solving focus, SARA represents the transformative potential of the community policing philosophy, combining strategic, tactical, and problemoriented aspects of doing police work.
4.2 The CAPRA Model The CAPRA (Client-and Problem-Oriented) model was developed by Eck and Clarck (2009). The five steps of the CAPRA process are: 1) Community organizing; community issues are out there waiting for communities to find together. 2) Analysis; it takes a lot of time because it can involve a lot of information and different perspectives; data collection from locations, victims, offenders and agencies that respond. 3) Response can take many forms; using suppression, regulation and social development. 4) Assessment; what was the problem? How are you doing? 5) Planning; for a lot of problems, intervention can never be totally finished. CAPRA starts with a simple premise: police should regard citizens as clients and address not only their concerns but ways to satisfy them. The model is most consistent with community policing. Its key component, problem solving, is a core value of community policing. CAPRA calls for problems to be analyzed in a comprehensive way, to be solved at the appropriate level, and persisted with until the problem is significantly lessened or has been reframed. The model’s critics note that CAPRA’s formal step-by-step approach can be so constraining to officers that it makes them less creative and less responsive to unique problems. Despite these many potential problems, community policing could benefit from an approach that guides officers engaged in problem solving.
5. COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA An important community policing strategy is the neighborhood watch of the late 1990s (Smith, 1999). They were usually friends and cohabitants who kept an eye on the neighborhood against criminals but did not have as much power as the Vigilante Group of Nigeria. Also, at that time, the members did not get paid. In 1999 community policing was ratified into law as forms of the policing system and both the Vigilante Group of Nigeria and neighborhood watch automatically became the official community policing strategy for Nigeria despite its flaws. Community policing no longer meant information gathering; it now includes law enforcement and crime prevention. Community policing in Nigeria has a long history that dates back to 1979 with the introduction of the system as part of the Police Plan 1979-1983 of the Nigeria Police Force (Okojie, 2010; Eze, 2018). The system started with what was referred to as the consultation model, where police held meetings with community leaders and other opinion leaders in the neighborhoods with a view to sharing information and intelligence and soliciting voluntary information from the public. There were other community interventionists during that period like the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, which was a privately formed security group that was recognized by the state (Smith, 2020).
5.1 Partnerships with Community Organizations
To build a strong and effective partnership, the police must identify potential partners and begin networking with them. Community organizations are groups run by the people in the community, with the police usually not involved in their affairs, except under security conditions. They include owners of small grocery shops residing in neighborhoods; therefore, the police need to allocate a lot of attention to these relationships. People often seem intimidated when police officers are present, and in this situation, little useful communication can occur between the police and community members.
However, when the police are not acting as authority figures, but instead as members of community organizations, like a church, a mosque, a youth organization, etc., more honest and effective communication is possible. Additionally, the relationship becomes more equal.
5.2 Community Engagement and Empowerment
Trust between the police and community members is critical to the achievement of police goals and ultimately the sustenance of a stable society in a democratic polity. The community engagement approach plays out during the implementation phase of the problem-solving model. In this phase, police together with community members undertake efforts to address identified problems and evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. Examples of community engagement activities include community meetings, relationship-building with important community groups and events. These relationships have proven to be successful under community policing initiatives because these relationships are removed from the negative interactions associated with the routine enforcement role of the police. Community policing is about police working in partnership with community members to perform tasks at hand. As part of the community policing strategy, the empowered and engaged community is where police identify problems together with community members and collaborates with them to solve the problem as partners.
It means that police departments in Nigeria should increase their use of community engagement by actively involving community members in their planning process on service initiatives or crime prevention partnerships with police. True partnerships between police and the communities they serve and collaborative problemsolving efforts provide the most comprehensive solutions to the problems associated with crime and disorder.
6. CHALLENGES OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN NIGERIA The thrust of security-force enhancement policies for promoting order on the streets must evolve in new directions that factor in other possibilities for organizing police resources. The search for a character that blends traditional police responsibilities of public safety, without adding to the extreme adventurism of either side of the state-society divide, and one which maintains their reason for being, is informed by the quest for optimizing consensual policing arrangements and improving current mainstream configurations. Thus, the community policing model in Nigeria has contended with at least three different episodes of conflict in which the service has been involved. Apart from criticisms of its operation, with pockets of reform measures introduced, large-scale attacks and negative perceptions, especially within the local demographics of policing, have arisen suggesting the prospect of a disjointed polity. The Nigerian police and its political architecture thus face challenges that militate against the logic of providing mere security for public safety. The advent of community policing in Nigeria, as elsewhere, did not produce a drastic change in established police behaviors overnight. The Nigerian police institutions, since their inception, have always operated within the bottom-up, top-down continuum, which merges community and centralized policing. As a result, police initiatives premised on community participation in police practices targeting street crime, social disorder, and developing crime prevention measures had been common characteristics of policepublic activity, especially in plugging gaps hitherto unattended by the police.
Because the Nigerian police are short of manpower, they easily become involved in crowd control when social tension runs high. In recent times, the increase in the number of political groups and campaigns often results in police intervention in the form of crowd control. Such negates the community police ideals. In essence, while a lack of appreciation of the role of the police in a democratic society has contributed to the fall of the Nigerian police in the esteem of the public, an attitude of public insistence on democratic policing, especially through community involvement and police professionalism could, in the long run, provide the muchneeded impetus for an improved community-police. Apart from the issue of stigma and non-acceptance of the community policing strategy, the practicability of the idea under the present conditions of economic underdevelopment offers some challenge. Even if there is political will, training and re-training of police on a continuous basis in some enlightened countries can improve police performance. The Nigerian experience is not encouraging because of the lack of resources. The Nigerian police is neither well-equipped nor well-trained.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
For a sound community policing and optimal crime prevention to occur, it is important for any society to develop and sustain social bonds and activities that promote communal harmony, dialogue, and exchange.
This paper, using Nigeria as a case study, has demonstrated how Western-derived strategies can be repackaged alongside the strengths within the country’s socio-cultural environment to enhance sound and sustainable community development. It is important for community policing and crime prevention strategies to work effectively that reliable and good governance practices must exist, the powers of the police are used both judiciously and without fear or favor to ensure the protection of all, and the negative use of extrajudicial powers to suppress the weak and the vulnerable while enabling the strong to misuse their authority must at all times be guarded against. These development paths would make a more positive contribution within the Nigerian polity in the area of local community development, strengthening democracy, and national security.
While appreciating community policing as a police strength, the present paper calls for a disposition of strength as distinguished from harshness, petulance, and arbitrariness. The government should see itself as an assured arbiter and father of all, developing an internal balance but not ignoring outright challenges that tend to disrupt the balance. Among others, it has been noted from this paper that community policing is to be peopleoriented in nature, aimed at assisting the police to know the people’s needs and grievances, preventing them from committing crimes, and gaining their trust and support within the community. A workable community policing constitutes a sure beginning of a crime prevention strategy. Research has also clearly indicated that irrespective of gender, level of education, and income, residents living in areas with a high level of social integration reported a lower level of victimization experience.
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Originally published: SPECTRUM Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 01, No. 04 (2024) 145-152, doi: 10.61552/SJSS.2024.04.005 – http://spectrum.aspur.rs.
Illustrative Photo by Tope A. Asokere: https://www.pexels.com/photo/top-view-photo-of-men-playing-board-game-3316259/
The fee for traveling abroad, which Turkish citizens pay, is increased from 150 to 500 Turkish lira (about 14 euros). The Ordinance was published in the issue of the Turkish State Gazette (Resmi Gazete) dated August 2, 2024.
The fee for going abroad is a type of tax that must be paid by every Turkish citizen over the age of 7 when going abroad.
Inflation in Turkey, which was 71.6 percent in June, once again hit the pockets of Turkish citizens. Compared to 2022, the fee for going abroad has risen by 233 percent, according to the newspaper “Birgun”. This will put a heavy burden on families’ budgets when they travel abroad with children over 7 years old.
The fee for going abroad in the amount of the then 100 dollars was introduced in 1963 by a decision of the Council of Ministers and applied until 1996, when it was abolished. In 2001, it began to be applied again, and its amount was 50 dollars. Since 2007, it has been 15 pounds. After 12 years of implementation, in 2019 the amount of the fee was increased to 50 Turkish lira.
In March 2022, by decree of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the fee was increased to 150 Turkish lira.
The latest increase was proposed by Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek. According to media reports, the proposal was to make the fee 3,000 Turkish lira (about $90 or 83.50 euros), but that proposal sparked strong protests, including among the ruling Justice and Development Party, and was dropped.
According to official data, the revenue from fees for going abroad in 2023 was 1 billion 311 million Turkish lira. From the beginning of this year to the month of April, the revenue from the fee is in the amount of 427 million Turkish lira.
Fifteen Turkish liras of the fee are paid to TOKI – the State Agency for Housing Construction.
Turkish citizens holding dual citizenship are exempt from paying the fee.
The application of the new regulation entered into force on August 12 of this year.
Illustrative Photo by Enes Akdoğan: https://www.pexels.com/photo/a-black-and-white-photo-of-money-in-a-glass-jar-28184340/
Russian citizens or Russian companies participate in 11,939 companies in our country. This is clear from the answer of the Bulgarian Minister of Justice Maria Pavlova to a question posed by the parliamentarian Martin Dimitrov. He asked about the number of companies in Bulgaria in which Russians participate or Russian companies with a share of more than 40%.
The information provided by Minister Pavlova is based on the data in the Information System of the Trade Register and the Register of Non-Profit Legal Entities, “Focus” reported. The inspection concerns the participation of individuals or legal entities in limited liability companies, sole proprietorships and sole proprietorships.
7118 companies in our country are owned by Russian individuals or legal entities. 4,659 Russians participate with a share of over 40% in companies in Bulgaria. There are 162 companies in which a Russian citizen is registered as the actual owner.
The question of the national representative was provoked by the published statistics of the agency Moody’s that Bulgaria is in second place in the European Union in terms of companies with Russian connections.
Illustrative Photo by Kiril Gruev: https://www.pexels.com/photo/surva-festival-in-pernik-at-the-end-of-the-year-the-days-between-christmas-and-jordan-s-day-the-6th-of-january-yordanovden-are-called-dirty-days-it-is-the-coldest-and-darkest-time-15045130/
