UNMISS/Gregório Cunha
- UN peacekeepers conduct a night patrol in Bentiu, South Sudan.
As South Sudan prepares to hold its first-ever elections in December, resolving critical outstanding issues requires political will for compromise, the UN envoy to the country said on Friday.
With 15 months to the end of the transition period, “time is of the essence” for getting the election process settled, UN Special Representative for South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom told the Security Council.
“Critical questions remain unanswered. Resolving them does not require material resources, only the political will to reach compromise and consensus,” he said.
These include decisions on the type of the election, voter registration issues, delineating constituencies, and management of electoral disputes.
While there has been modest progress, such as initial discussions on election budgets and the passing of a national elections act, important institutions including the National Elections Commission and political party registration system, have not been set up.
Mr. Haysom told ambassadors that President Salva Kiir had made a clear commitment that South Sudan will not return to war and that the elections will be held on time.
At a major public event, President Kiir also said that all parties must work to end the era of perpetual transition, Mr. Haysom added.
In July 2011, South Sudan gained independence from Sudan following a referendum.
However just two years later, a political face-off between two factions erupted into full-blown armed conflict, exposing weak institutions and leading to a major humanitarian crisis and immense suffering.
The country’s leaders signed a new peace agreement in September 2018, including a timeline for national elections.
Ceasefire ‘largely holding’
Mr. Haysom, also the head of the UN Mission in the country (UNMISS), said that it is looking at a two-phased approach to support the elections.
This would include capacity building and expanding political space, followed by supporting the ballot process itself.
Against this backdrop, the ceasefire agreed in 2018 is “largely holding” across the country, he added, although communal tensions and sporadic fighting between security forces and groups that did not sign the peace accord continue to present obstacles.
UN Photo/Manuel Elías – Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan, briefs the Security Council.
Humanitarian situation
Also briefing the Security Council, Edem Wosornu, Director of Operations at the UN relief coordination office (OCHA) said that the situation in South Sudan together with the crisis in neighbouring Sudan and limited funding are “deeply complicating” the humanitarian picture.
At the start of this year, over than 9.4 million people in South Sudan – 76 per cent of its population – relied on aid due to violence climatic shocks.
But the outbreak of conflict in Sudan forced over 260,000 people to flee across the border, including many South Sudanese refugees themselves.
“The massive influx of returnees and refugees comes on the backdrop of limited funding, that has imposed a huge burden on already stretched support services, leaving insufficient capacity to meet the wide range of needs,” she said.
Rising hunger
The Sudan crisis has also had knock-on effects on South Sudan’s trade and economy, leading to sharp food price increases and rising hunger.
The culinary specialties of Mechelen: a delight for the taste buds
The town of Mechelen, located in Belgium, is renowned for its rich culinary tradition. The inhabitants of this charming town have preserved traditional recipes and ancestral cooking techniques, giving rise to unique and delicious gastronomic specialties. In this article, we invite you to discover the culinary treasures of Mechelen, which are a real delight for the taste buds.
One of Mechelen’s most famous specialties is “Gouden Carolus”, a locally brewed beer. This internationally renowned beer is produced in the Het Anker brewery, which has existed since the 15th century. Gouden Carolus is a high quality beer, brewed with carefully selected ingredients. It is known for its rich and complex taste, which is the result of a meticulous brewing process. Beer lovers should not miss tasting this local specialty during their visit to Mechelen.
When it comes to cuisine, Mechelen is famous for its meat dishes. One of the city’s most iconic dishes is stoofvlees, a beef stew simmered in a dark beer-based sauce. This specialty is prepared with love and patience, letting the meat simmer for hours until tender and flavorful. Stoofvlees are often accompanied by crispy fries, making it a comforting and delicious dish.
Another popular meat dish in Mechelen is “pensen”, a typical Belgian pork sausage. This sausage is prepared with pork blood, minced meat, onions and spices, which gives it a unique and intense flavor. Pansies are often served with mashed potatoes and a mustard-based sauce, creating a perfect marriage of flavors.
The town of Mechelen is also famous for its high-quality dairy products. Mechelse koekoek cheese is one of the region’s most popular culinary treasures. This cheese is made from local cow’s milk, and is known for its creamy texture and delicate taste. It can be enjoyed alone, with bread or used in different recipes, adding a touch of flavor to any dish.
The inhabitants of Mechelen also have a passion for sweets. “Mechelse koekjes” are small, traditional biscuits that are very popular in the city. These cookies are made with simple ingredients like flour, sugar and butter, but they are incredibly tasty. They are often served with a cup of coffee or tea, for a well-deserved gourmet break.
Finally, Mechelen is known for its numerous fresh produce markets, where locals can purchase high-quality local produce. Fresh fruits and vegetables, seafood, and baked goods are abundant in these markets, providing locals and visitors with a wide variety of choices for preparing delicious meals at home.
In conclusion, the culinary specialties of Mechelen are a real treat for the taste buds. Whether you’re a meat, beer, cheese or sweet lover, this charming town has something for everyone. Traditional recipes and ancestral cooking techniques are carefully preserved, giving rise to unique and delicious dishes. During your visit to Mechelen, don’t miss the opportunity to savor these culinary treasures and treat yourself.
Violence in the Sahel countries can be link to the participation of the Tuareg armed militias, who are fighting for an independent state
by Teodor Detchev
The beginning of the new cycle of violence in the Sahel countries can be tentatively linked to the Arab Spring. The link isn’t really symbolic and it’s not related to someone’s “inspirational example”. The direct link is related to the participation of the Tuareg armed militias, which for decades have been fighting for the creation of an independent state – mostly in the northern part of Mali. [1]
During the civil war in Libya, during the lifetime of Muammar Gaddafi, the Tuareg militias sided with him, but after his death, they returned to Mali with all their heavy and light weapons. The sudden appearance of much stronger than before Tuareg paramilitaries, who are literally armed to the teeth, is bad news for the authorities in Mali, but also for other countries in the region. The reason is that a transformation has taken place among the Tuareg and some of their armed factions have “rebranded” themselves from fighters for national independence into Uzhkim Islamist militant formations. [2]
This phenomenon, in which ethnocentric formations with a long history, suddenly embrace “jihadi” slogans and practices, the author of these lines calls “double bottom organizations”. Such phenomena are not a specialty of West Africa alone, such is the “God’s Resistance Army” in Uganda, as well as various Islamist armed formations in the southernmost islands of the Philippine archipelago. [2], [3]
Things in West Africa came together in such a way that after 2012-2013, the region became a battleground where “franchises” of global terrorist networks, which to a greater or lesser extent can be called “terrorist” disorganizations”, due to their particular structure, rules and leadership, which are the negation of classical organizations. [1], [2]
In Mali, the Tuareg, newly minted Islamists, in confrontation with al-Qaeda but in alliance with Salafist formations that did not belong to either the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, attempted to create an independent state in northern Mali. [2] In response, the Malian authorities launched a military operation against the Tuareg and jihadists, which was supported by France with a mandate from the UN Security Council – under the so-called UN Stabilization Mission in Mali – Minusma.
Operations Serval and Barhan begin one after the other, Operation Serval is a French military operation in Mali conducted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. The resolution was voted on at the request of the Malian authorities, with no one, including Russia, objecting, let alone a Security Council veto. The goal of the operation with the mandate of the UN is to defeat the forces of the jihadists and the Tuareg “organizations with a double bottom” in the northern part of Mali, which are beginning to make their way to the central part of the country.
In the course of the operation, three of the five leaders of the Islamists were killed – Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, Abdel Krim and Omar Ould Hamaha. Mokhtar Belmokhtar fled to Libya and Iyad ag Ghali escaped to Algeria. Operation Serval (named after the famously lovable African wild cat) ended on 15 July 2014 to be succeeded by Operation Barhan, which began on 1 August 2014.
Operation Barhan is taking place on the territory of five Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 4,500 French soldiers are participating, and the five countries of the Sahel (G5 – Sahel) are training about 5,000 soldiers to join the anti-terrorist operations.
The attempt to secede the northern part of Mali into some kind of Tuareg-Islamist state failed. Operations “Serval” and “Barkhan” are achieving their immediate objectives. The ambitions of Islamists and “double bottom organizations” are over. The bad thing is that this does not put an end to the violence and, accordingly, to the hostilities in the Sahel. Although defeated and forced to think first and foremost about how to hide from the forces of France and the G5-Sahel countries, the Islamic radicals are turning to guerrilla warfare, turning at times into simple banditry.
Although after the Serwal and Barkhan operations, the Islamic radicals are no longer able to achieve any strategic successes, at least at first sight, the number of attacks against civilians is not decreasing, but in certain places is increasing. This creates an extremely nervous and unhealthy environment, which is taken advantage of by ambitious military men who do not share the view that the army belongs in the barracks.
On the one hand, the African army is a social elevator. It enables a person to rise to some kind of meritocratic principle. On the other hand, the practice of military coups in Africa is so widespread that aspiring army commanders do not seem to consider it a crime at all.
As STATISTA data shows, between January 1950 and July 2023 there were about 220 successful and failed coup attempts in Africa, accounting for almost half (44 percent of all coup attempts in the world. Including failed attempts, Sudan tops the list of African countries with the most coups since 1950 with a total of 17. After Sudan, Burundi (11), Ghana and Sierra Leone (10) are the countries with the most coup attempts since the mid-20th century.
In today’s situation in the Sahel, following the initial advance of radical Islamists and “double bottom organizations” in northern Mali and the corresponding counterattack by the armed forces of the G5 Sahel countries and France, the main concern is personal security of people. Some citizens of different countries in the region share similar feelings, which can be summed up in the aphorism of a citizen of Burkina Faso: “During the day we tremble lest the military from the regular army come, and at night we tremble lest the Islamists come.”
It is precisely this situation that gives courage to certain circles among the military to reach for power. This is basically justified by the thesis that the current government does not cope with the terror imposed by Islamic radicals. It should be noted that the moment was chosen quite precisely – on the one hand, the jihadists are defeated and their ability to permanently seize territories is not so great. At the same time, attacks by Islamic radicals remain very dangerous and deadly for many civilians. Thus, the military in some countries take advantage of the work done by the UN and G5 Sahel forces against troublemakers and at the same time (quite hypocritically) raise the issue that their territories are not pacified and their “competence” is needed intervention.
One might argue that at one point Burkina Faso, where the authorities are believed to have secure control of just 60 percent of the country’s territory as of early 2022, has proved to be an exception. [40] This is true, but only in parts. It should be clear that Islamic radicals do not exercise control over the remaining 40 percent of the territory in the sense that the word “control” could be used under the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq or the attempt to secede the northern Tuareg-populated part slow down. There is no local administration here that has been installed by the Islamists, and no de facto control at least over basic communications. It’s just that the rebels can commit crimes with relative impunity, and that’s why critics of the government at the time (and probably the current one as well) believe that this part of the country’s territory is not under the control of the authorities. [9], [17], [40]
In any case, the undeniably extremely painful issue of constant attacks by Islamic radicals has given moral justification (at least in their own eyes) for the military in some Sahel countries to take power by force, justifying their actions with concern for the security of the people. The last such coup to hit the region was the coup d’état in Niger, where General Abdurahman Tiani seized power on 26 July 2023. [22]
It is important to say here that the coup in Gabon, which is arguably the most recent possible coup in West Africa, cannot be seen in the same context as that created by the processes taking place in the Sahel countries. [10], [14] Unlike Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, there is no hostilities between government forces and Islamic radicals in Gabon, and the coup is aimed, at least for now, against the presidential family, the Bongo family, who already rule Gabon 56 years.
Anyway, it should be emphasized that after the period of relative calm between 2013 and 2020, there were 13 coup attempts in Africa, including in Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. [4], [32]
Here we have to point out as somewhat related to the current new maelstrom of political instability in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, the ongoing violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), where two civil wars have been fought back-to-back. The first, known as the Central African Republic Bush War, began in 2004 and ended formally with a de jure peace agreement in 2007, and de facto in March 2013. The second, known as the “civil war in the Central African Republic” (Central African Republic Civil War), began in April 2013 and has not ended to this day, although government troops have now laid hands on the largest part of the territory of the country they once controlled.
Needless to say, a country that is extremely poor, its human development index is at the lowest possible levels of the ranking (the last place, at least until 2021 was reserved for Niger) and the risk of undertaking any economic activity is extremely high, is practically a “failed state” and sooner or later becomes prey to various political and military vultures. To this category we can in good conscience refer Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan from the group of countries considered in this analysis.
At the same time, the list of countries in Africa where the Russian private military company Wagner has been confirmed to have a noticeable and government-agreed presence includes Mali, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar. [4], [39]
A comparison between the list of “failed states” ravaged by civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, military coups and other such misfortunes and the list of countries where PMC Wagner mercenaries “work” ostensibly in favor of legitimate governments shows a remarkable coincidence.
Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan feature prominently on both lists. There is still no confirmed data on the official presence of PMC “Wagner” in Burkina Faso, but there are enough indications of Russian intervention and support in favor of the latest coup plotters in the country, not to mention the rampant pro-Russian sentiments, already to the fact that the mercenaries of the late Prigozhin had already managed to “distinguish themselves” in the neighboring country of Mali. [9], [17]
In fact, PMC Wagner’s “appearances” in the Central African Republic and in Mali should rather cause horror among Africans. Russian mercenaries’ penchant for mass slaughter and brutality have been public since the Syrian period in their appearances, but their exploits in Africa, especially in the aforementioned CAR and Mali, are also well documented. [34] At the end of July 2022, the commander of French forces in the UN-flagged Operation Barhan, General Laurent Michon, directly accused PMC Wagner of “looting Mali”. [24]
In fact, as already mentioned above, the events in Mali and Burkina Faso are connected and follow the same pattern. The “contagion” of radical Islamist violence started in Mali. It went through a Tuareg-Islamist insurgency in the north of the country and, after the defeat of the rebels by the UN forces and the G5 – Sahel, then took the form of guerrilla warfare, violence against the civilian population and outright banditry in the middle part of Mali, where he sought the support of the Fulani or Fulbe people (a very important issue that will be analyzed in detail later) and moved to Burkina Faso. Analysts even talked about Burkina Faso becoming the “new epicenter of violence”. [17]
However, an important detail is that in August 2020, a military coup overthrew the elected president of Mali – Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This had a bad effect on the fight against the jihadists, because the military that came to power looked with distrust on the UN force, which consisted mainly of French soldiers. They rightly suspected that the French did not approve of the military coup. That is why the new, self-appointed authorities in Mali hastened to demand the termination of UN operations (especially the French) in Mali. At that very moment, the country’s military rulers were more afraid of the UN-mandated French forces on their territory than of Islamic radicals.
The UN Security Council ended the peacekeeping operation in Mali very quickly and the French began to withdraw, apparently without much regret. Then the military junta in Bamako remembered that the guerilla war of the Islamic radicals had not ended at all and sought other external help, which appeared in the form of PMC “Wagner” and the Russian Federation, which is always ready to serve like-minded statesmen. Events developed very quickly and PMC “Wagner” left deep footprints of its shoes in the sands of Mali. [34], [39]
The coup in Mali triggered the “domino effect” – two coups followed in one year in Burkina Faso (!), and then in Niger and Gabon. The pattern and motivations (or rather justifications) for carrying out the coups in Burkina Faso were identical to those in Mali. After 2015, violence, sabotage and armed attacks by Islamic radicals increased sharply. The various “franchises” of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (the Islamic State of West Africa, the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, etc.) and independent Salafist formations have killed thousands of civilians, and the number of “internally displaced”, you understand – refugees has exceeded two million people. Thus, Burkina Faso acquired the dubious reputation of being “the new epicenter of the Sahel conflict.” [9]
On January 24, 2022, the military in Burkina Faso, led by Paul-Henri Damiba, overthrew President Roch Kabore, who had ruled the country for six years, after several days of rioting in the capital, Ouagadougou. [9], [17], [32] But on September 30, 2022, for the second time in the same year, another coup was carried out. The self-appointed president Paul-Henri Damiba was overthrown by the equally ambitious captain Ibrahim Traore. After ousting the current president, Traore also dissolved the transitional government created by Damiba and suspended (finally) the constitution. In no uncertain terms, the army spokesman said that a group of officers had decided to remove Damiba because of his inability to deal with the armed insurgency of Islamic radicals. That he belongs to the same institution that has failed to deal with jihadists under two successive presidents for about seven years does not faze him at all. Moreover, he openly states that “in the last nine months” (that is, right after the military coup in January 2022 with his participation), “the situation has worsened”. [9]
In general, a model of violent seizure of power is being created in countries where there is an intensification of the subversive work of Islamic radicals. Once the UN forces (understand the “bad” French and the G5 – Sahel troops) break the offensive drive of the jihadists and the fighting remains in the sphere of guerilla warfare, sabotage and attacks on the civilian population, the local military in a given country considers that its hour has struck; it is said that the fight against radical Islamists is not successful and … takes power.
Undoubtedly, a comfortable situation – the Islamic radicals no longer have the strength to enter your capital and establish some form of “Islamic State” for you, and at the same time, the fighting is far from over and there is something to scare the population. A separate issue is that a large part of the population is afraid of their “native” army for a number of reasons. They range from the irresponsibility of army commanders to disparities in the tribal affiliation of the same generals.
To all this, the frank horror of the methods of “Wagner”, who are supporters of “radical actions” and “industrial logging”, has already been added. [39]
It is here that we must leave for a moment the long flight over the history of the Islamic penetration into West Africa and pay attention to a coincidence that is most likely not accidental. In search of human resources for their cause, especially after being largely abandoned by the Tuareg militias following the failure of the insurgency in northern Mali, Islamic radicals are turning to the Fulani, a semi-nomadic people of hereditary herders who engage in migratory pastoralism in a belt from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea, south of the Sahara desert.
The Fulani (also known as Fula, Fulbe, Hilani, Philata, Fulau, and even Pyol, depending on which of the many languages spoken in the region) are one of the first African peoples to convert to Islam and by virtue of their lifestyle and livelihood are to a certain extent marginalized and discriminated against. In fact, the geographical distribution of the Fulani looks like this:
The Fulani number approximately 16,800,000 in Nigeria out of a total population of 190 million; 4,900,000 in Guinea (with capital Conakry) out of 13 million inhabitants); 3,500,000 in Senegal out of a country of 16 million; 3,000,000 in Mali out of 18.5 million inhabitants; 2,900,000 in Cameroon out of 24 million inhabitants; 1,600,000 in Niger out of 21 million inhabitants; 1,260,000 in Mauritania out of 4.2 million inhabitants; 1,200,000 in Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) out of a population of 19 million; 580,000 in Chad out of a population of 15 million; 320,000 in The Gambia out of a population of 2 million; 320,000 in Guinea-Bissau out of a population of 1.9 million; 310,000 in Sierra Leone out of a population of 6.2 million; 250,000 in the Central African Republic of 5.4 million inhabitants (with researchers stressing that this is half of the country’s Muslim population, which in turn is about 10% of the population); 4,600 in Ghana out of a population of 28 million; and 1,800 in Côte d’Ivoire out of a population of 23.5 million. [38] A Fulani community has also been established in Sudan along the pilgrimage route to Mecca. Unfortunately, the Sudanese Fulani are the least studied community and their numbers was not assessed during official censuses.[38]
As a percentage of the population, the Fulani make up 38% of the population in Guinea (with capital Conakry), 30% in Mauritania, 22% in Senegal, just under 17% in Guinea-Bissau, 16% in Mali and Gambia, 12% in Cameroon, almost 9% in Nigeria, 7.6% in Niger, 6.3% in Burkina Faso, 5% in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, just under 4% of the population in Chad and very small shares in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire Ivory. [38]
Several times in history, the Fulani have created empires. Three examples can be cited:
• In the 18th century, they established the theocratic state of Futa-Jalon in Central Guinea;
• In the 19th century, the Massina Empire in Mali (1818 – 1862), established by Sekou Amadou Barii, then Amadou Sekou Amadou, who succeeded in conquering the great city of Timbuktu.
• Also in the 19th century, the Sokoto Empire was established in Nigeria.
These empires proved to be unstable state entities, however, and today, there is no state that is controlled by the Fulani. [38]
As already noted, traditionally the Fulani are migratory, semi-nomadic pastoralists. They have remained so for the most part, even if it is considered that a number of them have gradually become settled, both because of the limitations imposed on them by the continuous expansion of the desert in certain regions, and because of their dispersion, and because some governments have created programs aimed at guiding the nomadic population to a sedentary lifestyle. [7], [8], [11], [19], [21], [23], [25], [42]
The vast majority of them are Muslims, almost all of them in a number of countries. Historically, they played an important role in the penetration of Islam into West Africa.
The Malian writer and thinker Amadou Hampate Bâ (1900-1991), who himself belongs to the Fulani people, recalling the way in which they are perceived by other communities, makes a comparison with the Jews, as much as the Jews before the creation of Israel , they have been dispersed in many countries, where they generate repeated insults from other communities, which do not vary much from country to country: the Fulani are often perceived by others as prone to communitarianism, nepotism and treachery. [38]
The traditional conflicts in the migration areas of the Fulani, between them, on the one hand, as semi-nomadic herders and settled farmers of different ethnic groups, on the other, and the fact that they are more present than other ethnic groups in a large number of countries (and therefore in contact with different groups of the population), doubtless contribute to the explanation of this reputation, too often maintained by the population with which they entered into opposition and dispute. [8], [19], [23], [25], [38]
The idea that they are pre-emptively developing vectors of jihadism is much more recent and can be explained by the role of the Fulani in the noted not so long ago rise of terrorism in the central part of Mali – in the Masina region and in the bend of the Niger River . [26], [28], [36], [41]
When talking about the emerging points of contact between the Fulani and the “Jihadists”, it must always be borne in mind that historically throughout Africa, conflicts have arisen and continue to exist between settled farmers and pastoralists, who are usually nomadic or semi-nomadic and have the practice of migrating and moving with their herds. Farmers accuse cattle herders of ravaging their crops with their herds, and herders complain of livestock theft, difficult access to water bodies and hindrances to their movement. [38]
But since 2010, the increasingly numerous and deadly conflicts have taken on a completely different dimension, especially in the Sahel region. Hand-to-hand combat and club fights have been replaced by shooting with Kalashnikov assault rifles. [5], [7], [8], [41]
The continuous expansion of agricultural land, imposed by very rapid population growth, gradually limits the areas for grazing and animal husbandry. Meanwhile, severe droughts in the 1970s and 1980s prompted herders to migrate south to areas where settled people were unaccustomed to competing with nomads. In addition, the priority given to policies for the development of intensive animal husbandry tend to marginalize nomads. [12], [38]
Left out of development policies, migrant pastoralists often feel discriminated against by the authorities, feel that they live in a hostile environment and mobilize to protect their interests. In addition, terrorist groups and militias fighting in West and Central Africa are trying to use their frustration to win them over. [7], [10], [12], [14], [25], [26]
At the same time, the majority of pastoral nomads in the region are Fulani, who are also the only nomads to be found in all countries of the region.
The nature of some of the Fulani empires mentioned above, as well as the distinct warlike tradition of the Fulani, has led many observers to believe that Fulani involvement in the emergence of terrorist jihadism in central Mali since 2015 is in some sense a combined product of the historical heritage and identity of the Fulani people, who are presented as the bête noire (“black beast”). The participation of the Fulani in the growth of this terrorist threat in Burkina Faso or even in Niger seems to confirm this view. [30], [38]
When talking about the historical legacy, it should be noted that the Fulani played an important role in the resistance against French colonialism, especially in Futa-Jalon and the surrounding regions – the territories that would become the French colonies of Guinea, Senegal and French Sudan.
Furthermore, the important distinction must be made that while the Fulani played an important role in the creation of a new terrorist center in Burkina Faso, the situation in Niger is different: it is true that there are periodic attacks by groups composed of Fulani, but these are external attackers. coming from Mali. [30], [38]
In practice, however, the situation of the Fulani varies greatly from country to country, whether it is their way of life (degree of settlement, level of education, etc.), the way they perceive themselves, or even the way , according to which they are perceived by others.
Before proceeding with a more in-depth analysis of the various modes of interaction between the Fulani and the jihadists, a significant coincidence should be noted, to which we will return towards the end of this analysis. It was stated that the Fulani live scattered in Africa – from the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean in the west, to the shores of the Red Sea in the east. They live practically along one of the most ancient trade routes in Africa – the route running immediately along the southern edge of the Sahara desert, which to this day is also one of the most important routes along which migratory agriculture takes place in the Sahel .
If, on the other hand, we look at the map of the countries where PMC “Wagner” carries out official activities, in aid of the relevant government forces (regardless of whether the government is at all legal or came to power as a result of a recent coup – see especially Mali and Burkina Faso ), we will see that there is a serious overlap between the countries where the Fulani reside and where the “Wagnerovites” operate.
On the one hand, this can be attributed to coincidence. PMC “Wagner” relatively successfully parasitises countries where there are severe internal conflicts, and if they are civil wars – even better. With Prigozhin or without Prigozhin (some people still consider him alive), PMC “Wagner” will not budge from its positions. Firstly, because it has to fulfill contracts for which money has been taken, and secondly, because such is the geopolitical mandate of the central government in the Russian Federation.
There is no greater falsification than the declaration of “Wagner” as a “private military company” – PMC. One would rightly ask what is “private” about a company that was created at the behest of the central government, armed by it, assigned tasks of prime importance (first in Syria, then elsewhere), provides it is “personal staff”, through the parole of prisoners with heavy sentences. With such “service” by the state, it is more than misleading, it is downright perverse, to call “Wagner” a “private company”.
PMC “Wagner” is an instrument of the realization of Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and is responsible for the penetration of “Russky Mir” in places where it is not “hygienic” for the regular Russian army to appear in all its parade official form. The company usually appears where there is great political instability to offer its services like a modern-day Mephistopheles. The Fulani have the misfortune of living in places where political instability is very high, so at first glance their clash with PMC Wagner should not come as a surprise.
On the other hand, however, the opposite is also true. “Wagner” PMCs extremely methodically “moved” along the route of the already mentioned ancient trade route – today’s key migratory cattle-breeding route, part of which even coincides with the route of many African nations for the Hajj in Mecca. The Fulani are about thirty million people and if they are radicalized, they could cause a conflict that would have the character of at least an all-African war.
Up to this point in our time, countless regional wars have been fought in Africa with huge casualties and incalculable damage and destruction. But there are at least two wars that claim the albeit unofficial labels of “African world wars”, in other words – wars that involved a large number of countries on the continent and beyond. These are the two wars in the Congo (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo). The first lasted from October 24, 1996 to May 16, 1997 (more than six months) and led to the replacement of the dictator of the then country of Zaire – Mobuto Sese Seko with Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 18 countries and paramilitary organizations are directly involved in the hostilities, supported by 3 + 6 countries, some of which are not completely open. The war was also to some extent triggered by the genocide in neighboring Rwanda, which led to a wave of refugees in the DR Congo (then Zaire).
As soon as the First Congo War ended, the victorious Allies came into conflict with each other and it quickly turned into the Second Congo War, also known as the “Great African War”, which lasted almost five years, from August 2, 1998 to July 18, 2003. The number of paramilitary organizations involved in this war is almost impossible to ascertain, but suffice it to say that on the side of Laurent-Désiré Kabila are fighting contingents from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Sudan, while against the regime in Kinshasa are Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. As researchers always emphasize, some of the “helpers” intervene completely uninvited.
In the course of the war, the president of the DR Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, died and was replaced by Joseph Kabila. Besides all the possible cruelty and destruction, the war is also remembered for the total extermination of 60,000 pygmy civilians (!), as well as about 10,000 pygmy warriors. The war ended with an agreement that saw the formal withdrawal of all foreign forces from DR Congo, the appointment of Joseph Kabila as interim president, and the swearing in of four pre-agreed vice presidents, depending on the interests of all warring parties. In 2006, general elections were held, as they might be held in a Central African country that has experienced two consecutive intercontinental wars within more than six years.
The example of the two wars in the Congo can give us some rough idea of what could happen if a war was ignited in the Sahel involving the 30 million Fulani people. We cannot doubt that a similar scenario has long been considered in the countries of the region, and especially in Moscow, where they probably think that with the engagements of PMC “Wagner” in Mali, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and Cameroon ( as well as in the DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar), they “keep their hand on the counter” of a large-scale conflict that could be provoked out of necessity.
Moscow’s ambitions to be a factor in Africa are not from yesterday at all. In the USSR, there was an exceptionally prepared school of intelligence officers, diplomats and, above all, military specialists who were ready to intervene in one or another region of the continent if necessary. A large part of the countries in Africa were mapped by the Soviet General Administration of Geodesy and Cartography (back in 1879 – 1928) and the “Wagners” can count on very good information support.
There are strong indications of strong Russian influence in carrying out the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. At this stage, there are no allegations of Russian involvement in the Niger coup, with US Secretary of State Blinken personally dismissing such a possibility. The latter, of course, does not mean at all that during his lifetime Prigozhin did not welcome the coup plotters and did not offer the services of his “private” military company.
In the spirit of the former Marxist traditions, here too Russia operates with a minimum program and a maximum program. The minimum is to “set foot” in more countries, seize “outposts”, create influence among local elites, especially among the military, and exploit as many valuable local minerals as possible. PMC “Wagner” has already achieved results in this regard.
The maximum program is to gain control over the entire Sahel region and let Moscow decide what will happen there – peace or war. Someone would reasonably say: “yes, of course – it makes sense to collect the money of the coup governments and dig up as much valuable mineral resources as possible. But what the hell do the Russians need to control the existence of the Sahel countries?”.
The answer to this reasonable question lies in the fact that in the event of a military conflict in the Sahel, flows of refugees will rush to Europe. These will be masses of people that cannot be contained by police forces alone. We will witness scenes and ugly sights with a huge propaganda charge. Most likely, European countries will try to accept part of the refugees, at the expense of detaining others in Africa, who will have to be supported by the EU due to their complete defenselessness.
For Moscow, all this would be a paradisiacal scenario that Moscow would not hesitate to set in motion at a given moment, if given the opportunity. It is clear that the capacity of France to play the role of a major peacekeeping force is in question, and also in question is the desire of France to continue to perform such functions, especially after the case in Mali and the termination of the UN mission there. In Moscow, they are not worried about carrying out nuclear blackmail, but what is left for detonating a “migration bomb”, in which there is no radioactive radiation, but the effect can still be devastating.
Precisely for these reasons, the processes in the Sahel countries should be followed and studied in depth, including by Bulgarian scientists and specialists. Bulgaria is at the forefront of the migration crisis and the authorities in our country are obliged to exert the necessary influence on the policy of EU in order to be prepared for such “contingencies”.
Part two follows
Sources used:
[1] Detchev, Teodor Danailov, The Rise of Global Terrorist Disorganizations. Terrorist franchising and rebranding of terrorist groups, Jubilee collection in honor of the 90th anniversary of Prof. D.I.N. Toncho Trandafilov, VUSI Publishing House, pp. 192 – 201 (in Bulgarian).
[2] Detchev, Teodor Danailov, “Double bottom” or “schizophrenic bifurcation”? The interaction between ethno-nationalist and religious-extremist motives in the activities of some terrorist groups, Sp. Politics and Security; Year I; no. 2; 2017; pp. 34 – 51, ISSN 2535-0358 (in Bulgarian).
[3] Detchev, Teodor Danailov, Terrorist “franchises” of the Islamic State seize bridgeheads in the Philippines. The environment of the Mindanao island group offers excellent conditions for the strengthening and growth of terrorist groups with a “double bottom”, Research Papers of the Graduate School of Security and Economics; Volume III; 2017; pp. 7 – 31, ISSN 2367-8526 (in Bulgarian).
[4] Fleck, Anna, A renewed wave of coups in Africa?, 03/08/2023, blacksea-caspia (in Bulgarian).
[5] Ajala, Olayinka, New drivers of conflict in Nigeria: an analysis of the clashes between farmers and pastoralists, Third World Quarterly, Volume 41, 2020, Issue 12, (published online 09 September 2020), pp. 2048-2066
[6] Benjaminsen, Tor A. and Boubacar Ba, Fulani-Dogon killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, African Security, Vol. 14, 2021, Issue 1, (Published online: 13 May 2021)
[9] Burkina Faso”s coup and political situation: All you need to know, October 5, 2022, Al Jazeera
[10] Cherbib, Hamza, Jihadism in the Sahel: Exploiting Local Disorders, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2018, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)
[14] Cline, Lawrence E., Jihadist Movements in the Sahel: Rise of the Fulani?, March 2021, Terrorism and Political Violence, 35 (1), pp. 1-17
[15] Cold-Raynkilde, Signe Marie and Boubacar Ba, Unpacking “new climate wars”: Actors and drivers of conflict in the Sahel, DIIS – Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS REPORT 2022: 04
[39] The Soufan Center Special Report, Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army, Jason Blazakis, Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sean Steinberg, The Soufan Center, June 2023
Teodor Detchev has been a full-time associate professor at the Higher School of Security and Economics (VUSI) – Plovdiv (Bulgaria) since 2016.
He taught at New Bulgarian University – Sofia and at VTU “St. St. Cyril and Methodius”. He currently teaches at VUSI, as well as at UNSS. His main teaching courses are: Industrial relations and security, European industrial relations, Economic sociology (in English and Bulgarian), Ethnosociology, Ethno-political and national conflicts, Terrorism and political assassinations – political and sociological problems, Effective development of organizations.
He is the author of more than 35 scientific works on fire resistance of building structures and resistance of cylindrical steel shells. He is the author of over 40 works on sociology, political science and industrial relations, including the monographs: Industrial relations and security – part 1. Social concessions in collective bargaining (2015); Institutional Interaction and Industrial Relations (2012); Social Dialogue in the Private Security Sector (2006); “Flexible Forms of Work” and (Post) Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (2006).
He co-authored the books: Innovations in collective bargaining. European and Bulgarian aspects; Bulgarian employers and women at work; Social Dialogue and Employment of Women in the Field of Biomass Utilization in Bulgaria. More recently he has been working on issues of the relationship between industrial relations and security; the development of global terrorist disorganizations; ethnosociological problems, ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts.
Member of the International Labor and Employment Relations Association (ILERA), the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the Bulgarian Association for Political Science (BAPN).
Social democrat by political convictions. In the period 1998 – 2001, he was Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Policy. Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” from 1993 to 1997. Director of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” in 2012 – 2013. Deputy Chairman and Chairman of SSI in the period 2003 – 2011. Director of “Industrial Policies” at AIKB since 2014 .to this day. Member of NSTS from 2003 to 2012.
As reported through a newsletter from the Brussels-based NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers, the end of summer vacation in France, known as the “rentrée,” often brings renewed social tensions. This year has followed that pattern, as the calm of summer gave way to another dispute over a recurring national issue: how Muslim women should dress.
In late August, with France still, on break, Gabriel Attal, the 34-year-old newly appointed education minister and a favourite of President Emmanuel Macron, announced that “the abaya can no longer be worn in schools”, reports Roger Cohen in the New York Times
His abrupt order, applying to public middle and high schools, banned the loose-fitting full-length robe worn by some Muslim students. It ignited another debate over French identity.
The government believes education should eliminate ethnic or religious differences in service of a shared commitment to the rights and responsibilities of French citizenship. As Mr. Attal put it, “You should not be able to distinguish or identify the students’ religion by looking at them.”
Protests on the ban of the abaya
Since the announcement, Muslim organizations representing the approximately 5 million Muslim minority have protested. Some girls have worn kimonos or other long garments to school to show the ban seems arbitrary. A heated debate erupted over whether Mr. Attal’s August surprise, right before the school year, was a political stunt or a necessary defence of France’s secular ideals.
“Attal wanted to appear tough for political gain, but this was cheap courage,” said Nicolas Cadène, co-founder of an organization monitoring secularism in France. “Real courage would be addressing segregated schooling that leads to separate ethnic and religious identities.”
The issue of religious symbols in schools is not new. France banned “ostentatious” ones in 2004, leaving room for interpretation.
The question has been whether the law equally targeted Muslim headscarves, Catholic crosses and Jewish kippas, or mainly focused on Islam. The abaya, reflecting Muslim identity but potentially just modest attire, was a grey area until Mr. Attal’s statement.
In practice, “ostentatious” has often meant Muslim. France’s concern over secularism fractures, heightened by devastating Islamist attacks, has centred on Muslims shunning “Frenchness” for religious identity and extremism.
The niqab, veil, burkini, abaya and even headscarves on school trips have received unusual scrutiny in France compared to Europe and especially the United States, which emphasizes religious freedom over French freedom from religion.
In recent years, strict secularism, intended in 1905 to remove the Catholic Church from public life, hardened from a widely accepted model permitting religious freedom into an unbending contested doctrine embraced by the right and broader society as a defence against threats ranging from Islamic extremism to American multiculturalism.
“This should have been done in 2004, and would have been if we did not have gutless leaders,” said Marine Le Pen, the far-right, anti-immigration leader, of Mr Attal’s move. “As General MacArthur observed, lost battles can be summed up in two words: too late.”
The question is: too late for what? Banning abayas in schools as Mr. Attal demands? Or stopping the spread of disadvantaged schools in troubled suburbs where opportunities for Muslim immigrant children suffer and radicalization risks grow?
This is where France splits, with over 80 percent approving the ban but critical for the country’s future.
Some see secularism as enabling equal opportunity, while others view it as hypocrisy masking prejudice, as illustrated by those suburbs.
The teacher Samuel Paty’s 2020 beheading by an extremist still provokes fury. Yet the riots after a police shooting of a teen of Algerian and Moroccan descent showed resentment over perceived Muslim risk.
“The French government invokes 1905 and 2004 laws to ‘protect Republican values’ from a teenage dress, revealing its weakness in enabling peaceful coexistence beyond differences,” wrote sociologist Agnès de Féo in Le Monde.
Éric Ciotti of the centre-right Republicans retorted that “communautarisme” or prioritizing religious/ethnic identity over national identity “threatens the Republic.” Mr. Attal, he said, responded appropriately.
The Republicans matter because Mr. Macron lacks a parliamentary majority, making them a likely legislative ally.
Mr. Attal’s move has clear political aims. Mr Macron governs from the centre but leans right.
Mr Attal replaced Pap Ndiaye, the first Black education minister, in July after rightist attacks forced him out, with thinly veiled racism in the vitriol.
He was accused of importing America’s “diversity doctrine” and “reducing everything to skin colour,” as the far-right Valeurs Actuelles put it.
Before his ouster, Mr Ndiaye rejected a sweeping abaya ban, saying principals should decide case-by-case.
Sheik Sidibe, a 21-year-old Black teaching assistant outside a Paris high school, said his former principal mistreated Muslim students with arbitrary dress checks.
“We should focus on real problems, like teachers’ poor salaries,” said Mr. Sidibe, a Muslim. “Marginalized students in precarious situations need help, not policing clothes.”
The political impact remains unclear. But the measure appears more divisive than unifying despite secularism’s aim.
“Secularism must enable liberty and equality regardless of belief,” said Mr. Cadène. “It must not become a weapon to silence people. That will not make it attractive.”
Liège is a Belgian city located in the Walloon region, known for its rich cultural and historical heritage. If you are planning to visit this charming city with your children, you will be delighted to discover the many fun and family activities it has to offer. Here are some of the best activities not to be missed during your visit to Liège.
First of all, don’t miss visiting the famous Aquarium-Museum of Liège. This museum houses an incredible collection of marine animals and insects, including sharks, exotic fish, turtles and spiders. Your children will be amazed by the diversity of species on display and will have the opportunity to participate in interactive workshops. This is an educational and fun experience not to be missed.
Then, why not take your children to Parc de la Boverie? This beautiful park is located on an island in the Meuse and offers many activities for children. You can rent bikes or scooters to explore the park, have a picnic on the grass or simply relax admiring the beautiful scenery. The park is also home to the famous Liège Art Museum, where you can discover works of contemporary and modern art.
If your children love animals, don’t miss out on visiting the Forestia Animal Park, located a few kilometers from Liège. This park offers a unique experience by allowing visitors to discover European wildlife in their natural habitat. You can observe deer, wild boar, wolves and many other animals. There is also an adventure course for children, with zip lines and suspension bridges.
Another fun activity to do with children in Liège is to visit Parc d’Avroy. This park is ideal for families, with its numerous playgrounds, picnic areas and cycle paths. Your children can have fun on the slides, swings and climbing structures, while you can enjoy a relaxing walk in the park.
If you want to offer your children a unique experience, go to the Museum of Walloon Life. This museum offers a journey through time through the history and culture of Wallonia. Your children will be able to discover the daily life of the Walloons at different times, thanks to interactive exhibitions and historical reconstructions. This is a great opportunity to learn while having fun.
Finally, don’t miss visiting the famous Batte market, which takes place every Sunday morning along the banks of the Meuse. This market is the largest open-air market in Belgium and offers a unique experience for the whole family. You can find all kinds of products, from fresh fruits and vegetables to clothing and accessories. This is a great opportunity to taste the local cuisine and experience the lively atmosphere of Liège.
In conclusion, Liège offers many fun and family activities not to be missed during your visit with children. From animal museums to wildlife parks, parks and markets, there is something for everyone. So, get ready to experience unforgettable moments with your family during your visit to Liège.
Within the European Union in a drug market in full swing helped by the use of social media or internet marketing and applications, appears an additional drug situation, with the increasing importation, production and consumption of uncontrolled synthetic drugs called new psychoactive substances (NPS). A psychoactive substance “affects mental processes, e.g. perception, consciousness, cognition or mood and emotions”.
According to the Early Warning Advisory on New Psychoactive Substances (EWA-2022), the NPS is defined as “substances of abuse, either in a pure form or a preparation, that are not controlled by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs or the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, but which may pose a public health threat”.
The NPS are a range of drugs that have been designed to mimic established illicit drugs and they are classified according to their effects.
At the end of 2022, the European Monitoring Center for Drug and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was monitoring around 930 NPS, 41 were first reported in Europe in 2022.
In Europe, the use of opioids (morphine, codeine, heroin, fentanyl, methadone, tramadol and other similar substances) has started to increase since the beginning of the 21st century. In recent years, there has been a significant rise in the number of new psychotropic synthetic opioids with 74 reported to the EU Early Warning System (EWS).
Note: Opiates are natural drugs from the opium poppy plant; Opioid is a generic term including opiates, semi-synthetic (as oxycodone) and synthetic (as fentanyl) opioids.
The new synthetic opioids are relatively well-established in some European drug markets where they are sold often cheaper as replacements for opioids such as heroin. The opioid addictive effects are very high even at low doses.
According to the European Drug Report 2023, in many European countries, the use of synthetic opioids is growing as shown by the number of seizures reported by EMCDDA. Meanwhile, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ms. Ylva Johansson, and the EMCDDA Director, Mr. Alexis Goosdeel, alerted on increasing use of one of the worst opioids: Fentanyl. She said: “We must make sure America’s present does not become Europe’s future”. Indeed, last year in the USA, 109,000 people died from synthetic drugs most of them from fentanyl.
The prevalence of opioid dependence among European adults is still low, varies considerably between countries and is associated with infectious diseases, health problems, social exclusion, unemployment, homelessness, crime, and mortality. In people over the age of 40 who use opioids, the cumulative effects of drug-related harm which includes polydrug use and poor health over many years are making these individuals more susceptible to infection, overdose and suicide.
The fentanyl (C22H28N2O) was first synthesized from a benzyl-piperidone in 1959 (patented in 1964) by the chemist Paul Janssen in Belgium. Three other methods were developed:
-Suh et al. 1998: a method by total synthesis.
-Siegfried in early 2000 and used in illicit labs ;
-Gupta P.K. et al. 2005: a one-pot synthesis illicitly used in 2021 but with low purity ;
The fentanyl due to its high lipid solubility easily penetrates the central nervous system with sedative and rapid analgesic effects and a short duration of action. Its absorption is rapid by the oral mucosa (15/30 min-4 hrs) but it can also be administered by injection (2min-30 min), transdermal (patch) or used in a gaseous state as spray (10min-60min).
The fentanyl analgesic effect is about 100 times more powerful than morphine and 50 times more than heroin. Under its legal medical form, this synthetic opioid is used in the treatment of severe chronic and resistant pain. Since 2021 it has been part of the “essential medicines” of the World Health Organization and classified on schedule III with morphine and oxycodone.
From a veterinary viewpoint, the high efficacy of fentanyl is used for analgesia, sedation and anaesthesia on animals as well as to treat depression and agitation in animals.
But, fentanyl has also been diverted from its use as a painkiller to be taken as a drug, easily produced in clandestine laboratories without having the cultivation and harvesting problem of plants! Produced in China, Mexico and India, the fentanyl also called China White, Apache, Jackpot, Murder 8,… became a major issue on the current European drug scene. One kilo of fentanyl powder could contain 50,000 doses.
Currently, among some 1,400 fentanyl derivatives, 700 derivatives have been identified in Europe, some often 1,000 times stronger than heroin. The 3-methyl fentanyl is 3,200 times as potent as morphine and the derivative, the carfentanyl, is 10,000 times stronger than morphine.
The fentanyl is highly toxic even by simple contact with the skin. Only 2 milligrams can kill an adult. The danger is when added to other drugs by the dealers, people are using it without knowing. Indeed, fentanyl is often mixed, cut, and ingested alongside with other drugs, including cocaine and heroin. Jobski K et al. (2023) did an interesting study on the abuse, dependence, withdrawal and its route of administration in Europe. Fentanyl is so powerful that it is impossible to be cut with accuracy thus increasing the risk of overdose.
Fentanyl has been classified as an international narcotic since 1964, due to its health hazards, misuse risks, and handling complexity. In humans, the lethal dose (LD50) of fentanyl is estimated for an adult at two milligrams (2mg).
Note: The fentanyl patch (often chewed by the drug users) is one of a few medications that may be especially harmful, and in some cases fatal, with just one dose, if misused by a child (Food and Drug Administration, 2022). The effects can last between 30 minutes and 4 hours depending on the product used. But in the absence of hindsight and scientific studies, their duration of effects is not yet well known.
Repeated use of fentanyl or its derivatives, even therapeutics, can lead to a risk of dependence and in case of heavy consumption, there is a risk of overdose with respiratory depression and possible paralysis of the thoracic muscles, shock, severe hypotension, muscle rigidity or coma that can lead to death. The risk of respiratory arrest is increased when the consumption of fentanyl (or its derivatives) is associated with alcohol, benzodiazepines and other opioids. Their illicit use is also dangerous in case of pregnancy for the woman and for the fetus.
Fentanyl and non-medical derivatives are detectable up to about 48 hours in the urine and up to about 12 hours in the blood.
The illicit use of fentanyl and derivatives has been well summarized by J. Botts (2023): Fast, Cheap and Deadly.
Mechanism of action :
In the body exist some 20 endogenous naturally produced opioid neurotransmitters sorted by the number of amino acids. They include the different forms of :
-The endorphins (endogenous morphine), polypeptides synthesised by hypophyse and hypothalamus. They mask the pain for a short time (which contributes to survival) and also cause a feeling of relaxation (anxiolytics), well-being or even in some cases, euphoria as for the beta-endorphins.
-The enkephalins (from the Greek enkephalos = head) are inhibitors of the propagation of the pain message to the brain creating short analgesia; they are also able to modulate the amount of dopamine (the reward chemical) produced and to regulate the smooth muscle’s activity.
-The dynorphins (from the Greek dynamis = power) produced in the hypothalamus, hippocampus and spinal cord regulate and influence vital functions such as body temperature, long-term memory, hunger, thirst, sleep, and sensory information processing.
The existence of opioid-specific transmembrane receptors in the brain was first shown simultaneously in 1973 by Pert C.B. et al., Simon E.J. et al. and Terenius L. These neurotransmitter receptors are found in the brain, spinal cord and digestive system. They are G-protein coupled receptors and when activated they contribute to modulating pain response, mood, stress and physical dependence.
There are three types of opioid receptors: mu, delta and kappa, widely distributed in the brain. If the euphoric effect of opiates is controlled by mu and delta receptors, the activation of kappa receptors, is basically a homeostatic mechanism but chronic drug use is leading to its dysregulation creating psychiatric disorders and negative affective states ( Tejeda H.A. & Bonci A. 2019).
The effects of opioids are linked to the activation of the endogenous opioid system in the brain at the level of Nucleus Accumbens (NAc) and Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) of the limbic system. Thus, opioids and fentanyl increase in excess the release of dopamine into the limbic system by activation of mu and delta receptors in the NAc (Yoshida Y. et al. 1999 – Hirose N. et al. 2005). Compulsive drug-taking behaviors are a result of the permanent functional changes in the mesolimbic dopamine system arising from repetitive dopamine stimulation which flooding the Nervous System is the base of addiction.
This made the use of opioids at first fantastic but the problem is that there is more and more need to get the same dopamine surges for pleasure, joy and finally this became just a basic need leading fast to the fatal overdose of fentanyl and derivatives.
The medication naloxone is used to revert the effects of opioid overdose. This drug in 2-3 min after injection acts as a competitive antagonist with a high affinity for the mu-opioid receptor, allowing the reversal of the effects of opioids (Jordan M.R. and Morrisonponce D., 2023) in acute intoxication by heroin, fentanyl, codeine, morphine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, etc.
It has been shown that fentanyl and other analogues might also affect psychomotor performances on daily human tasks with a particular focus on driving (Bilel S. et al. 2023). In addition, Gasperini S. et al. (2022) demonstrated that the illicit non-pharmaceutical analogues of fentanyl were found to be genotoxic, inducing structural and numerical chromosomal aberrations.
The fentanyl withdrawal symptoms appear as soon as 12 hours after the last dose with intense cravings, nausea, irritability, stomach cramps, tiredness, etc. and last about one week or more. Recent research has shown that even after the final stages of withdrawal have been passed, drug-seeking behaviour can be restored if exposed to drug or drug-related stimuli.
In 2016, under the framework of the WHO/UNODC Programme on Drug Dependence Treatment and Care, the “Stop Overdose Safely (S-O-S)” Initiative was launched, to provide training on recognizing the risk of overdose and providing emergency care. Unfortunately, despite the regulations and the procedures in place to keep opioids and derivatives out of the wrong hands, millions of people are still physically dependent and need help.
In conclusion, in a society witnessing too often the decline of critical intelligence and with the difficulty of making logical deductions, how to efficiently face this scourge of drugs? The philosopher Socrates (470-399 B.C.) had already pointed to this question on ignorance: “But if to consider as a duty to seek what we do not know we become better, more energetic, less lazy instead of considering as impossible and foreign to our duty the search for the unknown truth, I would dare to support this against everyone... ”.
About opioids, fentanyl and other drugs, a lot is said on the streets, at school, through the Internet, in movies, and on TV; some are true and some are not. The slick marketing often does not match the reality of the effects and consequences the drugs actually have. General education of the population – and adapted for the youth- should be aggressively done with factual and scientific data to provide a reality on this obscure and degrading world of drugs and to avoid becoming hooked on them: “Education is a progressive discovery of our own ignorance” said Will J. Durant (1885-1981).
As life and health are too precious to be wasted, get the true facts about illicit psychoactive drugs to avoid their deadly trap. To make an informed decision about these drugs and not make a mess of your life, start consulting the series of booklets and videos The Truth About Drugs(*) because it’s easier to prevent than to cure!
On September 12, to the ringing of bells, the Russian Patriarch Cyril, in the presence of members of the government of St. Petersburg and “participants of the special military operation”, carried with lithium the coffin with the relics of Prince Alexander Nevsky to the Church of the Annunciation of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, where the historical silver crab handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church from the State Hermitage was placed. In May 2023, the Hermitage and the Russian Orthodox Church signed an agreement to transfer the tomb for temporary use for 49 years, with the possibility of extending this period.
The Silver Tomb remains state property and part of the country’s museum fund. Its condition will be monitored by Hermitage employees: temperature conditions and humidity, anti-corrosion particles in the air and other indicators will be monitored in real time. Sensors have been installed in the Annunciation Temple, which are connected to computers in the Hermitage.
The relocation of the reliquary was carried out on the eve of the holiday celebrated by the Russian Orthodox Church on September 12 – the day of the transfer of the relics of St. Prince Alexander Nevsky. The wooden coffin was placed in the silver one, and the saint’s relics, kept in the Lavra, were brought there in a procession led by Patriarch Cyril.
This is considered another significant victory of the Russian Orthodox Church, after it was able to receive Rublev’s “Holy Trinity” icon by order of V. Putin. The icon of Rublev and the historic massive cancer that kept the body of the Russian prince were handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church as thanks for the ideological support for the Russian war in Ukraine, as well as as signs of the new state ideology, in which the “sacred power” is given a leading place.
After placing the coffin with the relics of St. Prince Alexander Nevsky in a silver reliquary, Patriarch Kirill held a prayer service in the lower church of the Church of the Annunciation, at the grave of General A. V. Suvorov, whom the Russian Orthodox Church intends to canonize as a saint.
With this, he completed the landmark actions aimed at reinforcing in the mass consciousness the image of the “holy and God-pleasing war” – a leading theme in state propaganda today.
In his sermon, the Moscow Patriarch placed new emphasis on historical events that had the same goal – to confirm that all great Russian rulers in the past had the same vision of Russia’s place on the political map as the Kremlin does today. They aimed to fight the “collective West”, which is the greatest danger to the Russian state, and sought to protect “Russian identity from Western influence”.
In particular, Patriarch Kirill gave a new assessment of the policy of Peter the Great, who is known for his program to Europeanize the Russian Empire. According to the patriarch, however, Peter the Great had the exact opposite task – to preemptively prepare Russia for Western aggression by building defense facilities in Petersburg, as well as by increasing the role of the Russian Church. In fact, the ecclesiastical policy of Peter the Great aimed at the weakening of the Russian Church by its complete submission to secular power.
According to Patriarch Cyril, “Peter is fighting against Western political influences, aiming to weaken Russia, to occupy St. Petersburg at a certain point. The king was aware of all this, so he fortified St. Petersburg. Look at the forts that were built – they are truly amazing feats of engineering, still standing like new. The forts close the entrance to St. Petersburg and create a powerful defense system. Peter did not believe in the kindness of his neighbors, therefore St. Petersburg became both a capital and a fortress. But so that no intellectual, or rather pseudo-intellectual, pseudo-cultural, pseudo-spiritual influences could destroy the inner strength of our people, destroy their self-awareness, Peter made the new capital and capital of the Russian Orthodox Church”.
At the end of his speech, Cyril once again in the last month announced officially from the pulpit the idea that Russia is the so-called “katechon” from the message of St. Apostle Paul, or “restraining force” that prevents the coming of the antichrist into the world ( 2 Thess. 2:7). This means that the idea, which until a few years ago was considered marginal and characteristic only of philosophical circles such as Al’s. Dugin, is now becoming an official part of Russian church and state ideology. It also impresses Kremlin policy by giving Russia carte blanche to act throughout the world, not just in defense of its state interests. Here are the words of the patriarch:
“Today, Russia is faced with the task of emerging victorious from the struggle that the forces of evil have waged against us. And we should not underestimate the complexity of the moment! Today we need the mobilization of all – both military and political forces; and, of course, the church must be mobilized first. To pray for our authorities and army, but also to be there, on the front line, where our wonderful regimental chaplains are now working and, unfortunately, dying.
We still have a lot to do, not only on a national scale, but also, I am not afraid to say, on a global scale, remaining the Deterrent. And it is the Restraining Force, the Catechon, that prevents total world evil from overwhelming the entire human race. And may the Lord help us to fulfill in this way the great historical spiritual mission of our church, so that our fatherland can prosper, our people can be strengthened spiritually, and peace, tranquility and justice can be restored in the world”.
The chairman of the Russian church in Sofia, Archimandrite Vasian (Zmeev), has been banned from entering North Macedonia, several Macedonian publications report. The publications refer to sources from the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which three Russian diplomats will be expelled, and a Russian cleric has been banned from visiting North Macedonia.
According to the publication “Almakos”, which is the primary source of the information, these are the political advisers I. Khropiachkov, A. Rozhdestvenski, as well as the attache S. Popov. According to information from the competent authorities, these persons have carried out activities that contradict the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations and in the next five days they will have to leave the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia. According to the publication, “other specialized security bodies have already expelled priest V. Zmey.” According to the publication Tatkovina, it is about the chairman of the Russian court in Sofia, Archimandrite Vasian (Zmeev).
The site “Religia.mk” writes that “unofficially, Zmeev coordinated the entire policy of the MOC-OA in relation to its church diplomacy in the last year, which led to a complete standstill in relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the issue of granting the autocephaly to the MOC-OA” .
North Macedonian media also reported that for the past year the chairman of the Russian church in Sofia has been traveling to Skopje every month. At the end of June, he also visited Kumanovo-Osogovo Metropolitan Grigoriy for St. Peter’s Day, accompanied by the Russian ambassador to North Macedonia. Metropolitan Grigoriy has the fame of the most zealous defender of Russian political interests in North Macedonia. During this visit, he presented an edition of his diocese against Patriarch Bartholomew. Two weeks earlier, North Macedonian Prime Minister Stevo Pendarovski announced that security services had received information from partner services that members of St. Synod of the MOC work in favor of the Russian secret services, but did not name specific names.
Archaeologists have announced that they are very close to discovering the place where the last ruler of Egypt, Cleopatra, and her lover, the Roman general Mark Antony, were buried, in all probability together.
Scientists believe they have pinpointed the exact location where some of the most influential figures in human history are buried.
The mysterious tomb of Cleopatra and Mark Antony will finally be discovered. It is located in the area of Taposiris Magna, about 30 km from Alexandria, said the famous Egyptian archaeologist Zahi Hawass (pictured).
“I expect very soon to come across their tomb where they were both laid to rest. We are on the right track and we know exactly where we need to dig to find it,” assured Hawass, who is Egypt’s former tourism minister.
Cleopatra and Mark Antony commit suicide in 30 BC. At that time, the ruler of Egypt, the last ruling representative of the Ptolemaic dynasty, was 39 years old, and Mark Antony was 53 years old, notes 20minutos.
Back in February 2013, researchers announced that they had found the bones of Cleopatra’s murdered sister, Arsinoe IV, in Turkey. The remains were discovered as early as 1985 in a ruined temple in the ancient Greek city of Ephesus (today’s western Turkey). The archaeologist who claims to have discovered the bones has high hopes for new forensic techniques to definitively identify the find.
At first glance, it appears that the remains belong to the one killed more than 2,000 years ago by order of Queen Arsinoe. But opponents of this view believe that a DNA test cannot confirm whose bones they are because they have been processed too many times. However, the scientists from the Austrian Academy of Sciences who made the discovery are convinced that the remains belong to the classical era of the Egyptian royal family.
Princess Arsinoe is believed to be Cleopatra’s younger half-sister. Their father is believed to be Ptolemy XII Auletus, but it is not known whether the two were from the same mother.
It is known that the two did not love each other. After Caesar’s murder, Cleopatra convinces her lover Mark Antony to kill Arsinoe, as she sees in her a rival in the struggle for power.
