On the occasion of the Day of Sobriety celebrated in the country today, the Russian Orthodox Church called on mass culture not to promote alcoholism, TASS reported.
The agency recalls that the All-Russian Day of Sobriety is celebrated on the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church on September 11 to remind people of the harm caused by alcohol. On this day, in some parts of Russia, the sale of alcohol is limited or completely prohibited.
“The culture of attitude towards this is very important. There are many “nice jokes” about alcoholism in our everyday culture. There is nothing good about that. We know what the state of intoxication leads to. Those who deal with mass culture should make an effort that the image of the “dear drunkard” should still leave our mass culture,” said the head of the synodal department of the Moscow Patriarchate for Church Interaction on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg Forum of United Cultures with society and media Vladimir Legoida.
Asked whether it would be appropriate to ban or restrict the sale of alcohol across the country, he said “that would be wonderful”. “But it is important that people do this consciously, independently, not because someone is forcing them, and also that there is, as it is customary to say, a public consensus,” he stated.
Legoida noted that the category of “sobriety” is important for the church in general, which refers not only to abstinence from alcohol.
Meanwhile, during a press conference dedicated to the All-Russian Day of Sobriety, Russia’s Deputy Health Minister Oleg Salagai said that alcohol abuse can reduce a man’s life expectancy by six years and a woman by five years.
“The systemic measures that were adopted allowed us to really reduce alcohol consumption. Today, it can be confidently said that Russia is not one of the most drinking countries in the world,” said the deputy minister, who pointed out that in 2023 alcohol consumption in the country was about 8.4 liters per person, while at the beginning of the century the indicator was in double digits.
By Emmanuel Ande Ivorgba, Centre for Faith and Community Development, Nigeria ([email protected]m)
1. INTRODUCTION
Crime prevention – whether at the societal, community or individual level – is a much sought-after goal in contemporary societies across the globe today, particularly among the developing poor nations (Cornish & Clarke 2016). Law enforcement agencies and security departments are some agencies put in place to ensure orderly conduct in communities, among other mandates.
It is believed that the presence of the police in our security domain can assist in discouraging crime and increase the sense of security among the populace.
Enforcement activities of the police and other law enforcement agencies are seen by most scholars as reactive in nature. While this may be true about these agencies’ primary mandate as generators of calls for service, repeated crime victims and communities are beginning to push towards community policing, which emphasizes proactive problem-solving rather than reactive enforcement. This provides police personnel with the opportunity to respond directly to important community concerns. Community policing is a proactive approach to law enforcement that focuses on building strong and sustainable relationships between the police and the communities they serve. According to Teasley (1994), community policing goes beyond traditional law enforcement methods because it encompasses crime prevention, problem-solving and community engagement. It involves collaboration between law enforcement officers and members of communities to identify and address public safety concerns. An important principle of community policing is the concept of community partnerships. It involves working closely with local businesses, residents and community organizations to develop a shared understanding of the priorities of public safety and to create solutions tailored towards addressing those priorities. As Gill (2016) observe, by involving local communities in decisionmaking processes and problem-solving efforts, the police can build trust, improve communication, and enhance overall public safety.
The role of community policing in crime prevention is particularly critical, especially in an environment like Nigeria where criminal activities are on the ascendency as a result of the growing number and influence of armed groups and gangs, inter-group, ethnic and religious violence, and increasing political instability aggravated by the overall aggravating economic climate (Kpae & Eric 2017). The Nigeria Police therefore needs to incorporate community mobilization with a full panoply of strategies in order to increase the likelihood of order and safety in communities. Police officers should be mindful of the kind of relationships by being responsive to the needs of the community, accurate in their handling of law enforcement situations, and be courteous and respectful in ways that go the extra mile toward individuals. According to Rosenbaum & Lurigo (1994), “Community policing is an approach to policing in which police officers work with and within the community to facilitate the exchange of information and build relationships with a view to minimizing the fear of crime and enhancing community safety”. It is a policing philosophy that advocates law enforcement as well as crime prevention and intervention through proactive use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques between the police and the community (Braga & Weisburd 2010). When properly implemented, community policing can help avert threats to public order through partnership-based efforts that seek to deter criminal activity, develop and sustain a partnership relationship with the community which, in the long run, can be substantiated with mutual trust and respect.
Definition of community policing
The main goal of community policing is to create new partnerships and strengthen existing ties between the police and the communities that enable them to work together with mutual trust and respect (Smith, 2015). Encouraging active collaboration among police and other providers of public safety, human services, and government is another important goal. It is towards recognizing and favoring the principle of a secure and organized community that results from policecommunity partnership that community policing advocates (McEvoy & Hideg 2000). Community policing requires that the relationship between the police and the community is rooted in the principle of the need for cooperative effort and mutual respect between the police and the public they serve and to participate in policing and crime prevention activities, designed to reduce and prevent crime, disorder, and fear of crime, ensuring public safety.
Community policing involves decentralizing police services to enhance direct and meaningful contact with local individuals and groups to address public safety problems as a team. Such policing changes the fundamental functions of the police (Peak & Glensor 1999). In essence, it suggests the police share with the populace the duty and responsibility for the preservation and protection of security and order. It is an innovative and reformative force that would make a secure and organized community. Community policing represents a major shift of law enforcement policy and organizational practice (Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988). It moves from a centralized to a decentralized and participatory power-sharing with the local people in making and executing decisions for the purpose of providing public safety and security.
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN NIGERIA
Community policing is not a new idea; it is as old as the history of organized society. Indeed, it dates back to ancient and medieval times (Smith, 2020). In the early stages of human history, particularly among hunters and gatherers, there was a round-the-clock aspect to preventing and detecting crime (Smith, 2010). This situation arose around the time when humans began living in permanent communities and developed as a result of their behavioral activities, which were detrimental and harmful to the growth and development of such communities. At that time, there were no formal written laws to regulate societal relationships. Instead, there was a form of self-help justice based on the idea that an assault on one’s neighbor should be punished by an assault on the assailant. This concept, known as “lex talionis,” implied a law of vendetta. It involved reciprocal or mutual punishment, or blood revenge (Cohen, 1992; Smith & Johnson, 2005). This system is still present in the societies of Niger Republic (Hauck & Kapp, 2013), Mauritania (Camara, 2018), Libya (Lia, 2016), Chad (International Crisis Group, 2014), Sudan (Abdalla 2012), Kenya (Okeno, 2019), and among the Tiv and Jukun (Alubo, 2011; Egwu, 2014), and other parts of Nigeria.
2.1 Pre-Colonial and Colonial Era In the southern part of Nigeria, systems were generally more egalitarian, and emphasis was on giving individuals the opportunity for the utilization and development of their resources and potential, as well as preserving social harmony. Rules governing male behavior were established locally and included the age group of the respective communities. Females and children belonged to age groups, which met periodically to discuss matters of interest to their members. Other forms of corporate associations such as the Ekpe, Ekine, Ogu, were established to control crime (Egbo, 2023). When necessary, they called the native administration or its police to carry out the required punishment. In the precolonial era, the death penalty was imposed by a native supreme council or local chiefs’ council, but the need for restraint prevented this from being used frequently (Smith, 2020a). Most of the disputes in the traditional societies were social rather than legal because of the more egalitarian and democratic nature of these nascent societies. The rules of the society were broad, focusing mainly on unnecessary anti-social activities that were likely to disrupt the community. Common crimes were theft from a fellow society member, a fellow citizen, or a guest in the community. Such thefts were of food, cattle, farm products, livestock, poultry, and minor property. Custom and tradition demanded that people who begged for alms must do so during the day and in an open place. They were forbidden to throw sand against houses, and those who stopped to beg contributed to community service. In the olden days, these types of communal responsibility were legitimate because they sought to ensure the safety and security of the community (Harnischfeger, 2005). Since the pre-colonial period, nearly every cultural group has had an informal policing system based on communal responsibility (Braithwaite, 2002). During this period, security was the job of the community and everyone was involved. Members of the traditional societies confined harmful behavior by socializing the younger people to respect traditional norms, values, and standards. Disputes were settled at community meetings or by age groups, respected individuals, or influential members of the community (Damborenea, 2010; Goldstein, 1990a). Serious cases were transferred to traditional chiefs’ courts where folklore, witchcraft, spirits, or oracles often played a role in the administration of justice. This method used to administer justice was based on the nature and severity of the offense. Even the colonial government did not abolish these traditional societies because it could not administer or police every corner of the Nigerian territory. Colonial policing was concentrated in the trading regions and in the provinces. The communities were left to settle minor disputes among themselves while the police provided protection and escorted traditional rulers on their territorial “tours”.
2.2 Post-Independence Period
The regionalization of the Nigerian Police up to 1966, when it was made national after military intervention in Nigerian politics, was seen as a stage in the evolution of police organization instead of a way of improving the police operational role and performance (Edigheji, 2005; Oko, 2013). The second phase of this period also saw a high degree of political involvement in police administration and operations as a stage in the evolution of police philosophy, organization, functions, and performance before the current police philosophy and operational policies were finally achieved (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2004; Fakorode, 2011).
Consequent upon the adoption of the 1960 Emergency law, the Nigerian Federation obtained partial self-rule leading to self-rule in 1960 (Smith, 2020b), but the fear of undue pressures and intimidation from the police of the pre-colonial period, and experiences of police abuse prompted some sections of the Nigerian community to favor the retention of expatriate police officers; thus the present type of police organization was maintained (Smith, 2020c, Smith 2020d). However, instead of the police being used as a repressive organ of government as was customary, the police was used, among other things, as the parastatal institution instrumental to smooth succession by the ruling political class.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF COMMUNITY POLICING
The idea that police are the extended arm of a society in maintaining order and enforcing the law and order, is the basic theoretical foundation of community policing. A more complete theory of community policing must meet two very disparate but related objectives. First, in its most broadly conceptualized form, community policing is seen as a component of neighborhood building. However, community policing also is a practical program requiring changes in the police department’s structure, particularly for staffing and deployment up to its most complex blueprints. Central to many of these blueprints is the police substation and the severing of the geographical area policed from the larger, incorporating political jurisdiction. Understanding this duality is an important element in developing the next generation of practical community policing programs. But it is important to remove conflict between principle and practice from the policy debate.
Both the police and the public act as one entity in providing good governance and a peaceful society as the basic key objectives of every democratic government. Watson (2023) observes that police research in the area of police service orientation has shown that there is no empirical evidence that indicates that governmental policy influences a change of service or the public perception of the police, nor that the community’s perception of the police is influenced by the level of response to the community’s needs. Rather, the internal characteristics of the police department seem to influence its response to the community’s needs as well as changing the public perception of the police. 3.1 Broken Windows Theory The Broken Windows theory was propounded by Wilson and Kelling (1982). They argued that if there are broken windows and visible vandalism, potential criminals will presume that laws are not respected and that nobody controls these places. Streets and parks will get dirty, and the law needs to have control. This produces a declaration of deficiency from authorities and residents. This type of environment is a sign that residents do not care. Once the environment has entered into complete disrepair, violent crime can happen. These thinkers proposed that crime can be fought through the restoration based on social order, and this restoration of order had to come from the same society.
On the other hand, the theory also puts forth the idea that nobody respects anything: reserves, morality, rules of discretion, and the rights of neighbors. The authorities had to intervene, showing force, and obtaining immediate obedience from those who do not respect the smallest rules (like begging, prostitution, loitering, mixing at the window, imposing curfew and dress codes) appearing with police uniforms, using cars, and safe communications. This theory split right away into two distinct strategies which were based on one adopting the term to prevent social decay, facilitating violence practice.
This theory argues that the physical environment of a society must be congruent with the behaviors the society wishes to maintain. In the context of neighborhood community policing, the success of the program depends on the improvement of the physical environment as well as a change in crime-producing or enabling behaviors.
Specifically, it focuses on not only addressing police factors, such as police responding faster in emergency situations, but also the appearance of the neighborhood, such as reducing the rate of building abandonment. The police role is not only to prevent initial crime but also to prevent further criminal behavior that results from the appearance of disorder. Although Wilson and Kelling (1982) were primarily concerned with describing the “war on crime” policies and the effects of fear in urban cities, some variation can be made to fit our description of community policing.
3.2 Problem-Oriented Theory The philosophy of problem-oriented policing starts from a clear understanding of the aims of a police department in a liberal-democratic society. The basic function of the police is to prevent crime and disorder. This function is achieved by being responsive to the concerns of many different public and private organizations and individuals. The necessity for the police to work in partnership with others is paramount because most public and private resources for reducing and preventing crime and disorder are located outside the police department (Goldstein, 1979; Kelling & More, 1988; Boba, 2003; Eck & Clarke, 2009). This orientation leads to two conclusions about the police role. First, as a central concern of any police department, it is to ensure that it works effectively in partnership with other public and private bodies that can contribute to the prevention of crime and disorder. The police have to be problem-solvers working in partnership with others (Clarke, 1997). The primary function of the police has to be the prevention of crime and disorder, not the management of people’s problems. Conflict resolution and service functions are important elements of this problem-oriented approach, but their relevance is confined to those problems that are capable of police solutions. The proper role of the police is that of the “peacemakers” who, working with all different members of the community, resolve problems and maintain a peaceful environment in which the maximum expression of personal and social potential is achieved. Everything the police do has to be evaluated against these standards. Certainly, problem-oriented policing must underpin a true risk management system. Everything that the police do to prevent crime and disorder must be directly or indirectly aimed at resolving common problems. The danger of a mismanaged police department playing down its crime prevention role in favor of attending to all kinds of fashionable but irrelevant “needs” is acutely present, but good use of the police resources pressed into service of efficient crime prevention. According to Goldstein (1990), problem-oriented policing (POP) focuses on identifying the underlying problems within the community in relation to crime occurrences. The aim is to deal with these problems once and for all by developing and implementing particular strategies to reduce or even prevent those underlying problems from reoccurring. POP, therefore, represents a model of police practice, which goes beyond the traditional means of policing. In other words, many police forces spend their time dealing with the immediate or short-term signs of trouble and conflicts between people. Such a policing practice is often referred to as incident-driven, and it might have some positive results but is not enough to work towards producing long-term changes in the quality of life of the community. At the greatest level, the police action, which solely focuses on removing the symptoms of disorder, may create bigger problems when actions are expedient and grossly inadequate.
4. COMMUNITY POLICING MODELS
According to Westley (1970), the history of modern police science has been marked by a series of attempts, beginning with Sir Robert Peel (1829), to relate the structure and activities of the police to the needs of the society they serve. Central to these discussions has been the question of what the police were established to do. In what ways, if any, should they participate in social engineering, ensuring social change, and improving the quality of life? Differences of opinion on these matters have resulted in great diversity in police tactics and organizational structure. Such differences are reflected in the variety of terms that define what the police as an institution “are,” what they “do,” and what they “should do.” Structure and functions, particularly the third, have driven the ongoing debate about policing. What shapes this debate is the historical, social, economic, philosophical, and political character of a given period and of the people, particularly political leaders, who are making the decision. Good police relations, studies have shown (Smith, 2020d) are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee community contentment with police. Recently, reform, in the form of changing the fundamental guiding principles of the police institution, is on the national and international agenda. The concept of “community policing” is a keystone in the majority of these reform efforts.
4.1 The SARA Model
The SARA concept is a problem-solving model that has the potential to assist officers with their tasks to prevent crime and disorder. It is a blueprint for how officers should analyze and solve problems, whatever their nature or complexity (Eck & Spelman, 1987). SARA is capable of integrating prevention within a broader, reactive problem-solving set of activities. The effectiveness of SARA, and of community policing in general, depends not only on the development of adoptable models, but also on changing the organizational culture of police agencies so that problem solving and decision making are encouraged and rewarded. The SARA process provides officers with guidance to analyze the problems they are expected to solve, to identify an effective response, and to examine how well that response is working (Davis et al., 2006; Goldstein, 1990). Working together with the neighborhood, community policing officers can analyze problems and develop responses, comparing the advantages of preventive and remedial interventions.
They even have potential cooperation with service providers to address underlying factors potentially contributing to crime. By combining its versatility and its problem-solving focus, SARA represents the transformative potential of the community policing philosophy, combining strategic, tactical, and problemoriented aspects of doing police work.
4.2 The CAPRA Model The CAPRA (Client-and Problem-Oriented) model was developed by Eck and Clarck (2009). The five steps of the CAPRA process are: 1) Community organizing; community issues are out there waiting for communities to find together. 2) Analysis; it takes a lot of time because it can involve a lot of information and different perspectives; data collection from locations, victims, offenders and agencies that respond. 3) Response can take many forms; using suppression, regulation and social development. 4) Assessment; what was the problem? How are you doing? 5) Planning; for a lot of problems, intervention can never be totally finished. CAPRA starts with a simple premise: police should regard citizens as clients and address not only their concerns but ways to satisfy them. The model is most consistent with community policing. Its key component, problem solving, is a core value of community policing. CAPRA calls for problems to be analyzed in a comprehensive way, to be solved at the appropriate level, and persisted with until the problem is significantly lessened or has been reframed. The model’s critics note that CAPRA’s formal step-by-step approach can be so constraining to officers that it makes them less creative and less responsive to unique problems. Despite these many potential problems, community policing could benefit from an approach that guides officers engaged in problem solving.
5. COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA An important community policing strategy is the neighborhood watch of the late 1990s (Smith, 1999). They were usually friends and cohabitants who kept an eye on the neighborhood against criminals but did not have as much power as the Vigilante Group of Nigeria. Also, at that time, the members did not get paid. In 1999 community policing was ratified into law as forms of the policing system and both the Vigilante Group of Nigeria and neighborhood watch automatically became the official community policing strategy for Nigeria despite its flaws. Community policing no longer meant information gathering; it now includes law enforcement and crime prevention. Community policing in Nigeria has a long history that dates back to 1979 with the introduction of the system as part of the Police Plan 1979-1983 of the Nigeria Police Force (Okojie, 2010; Eze, 2018). The system started with what was referred to as the consultation model, where police held meetings with community leaders and other opinion leaders in the neighborhoods with a view to sharing information and intelligence and soliciting voluntary information from the public. There were other community interventionists during that period like the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, which was a privately formed security group that was recognized by the state (Smith, 2020).
5.1 Partnerships with Community Organizations
To build a strong and effective partnership, the police must identify potential partners and begin networking with them. Community organizations are groups run by the people in the community, with the police usually not involved in their affairs, except under security conditions. They include owners of small grocery shops residing in neighborhoods; therefore, the police need to allocate a lot of attention to these relationships. People often seem intimidated when police officers are present, and in this situation, little useful communication can occur between the police and community members.
However, when the police are not acting as authority figures, but instead as members of community organizations, like a church, a mosque, a youth organization, etc., more honest and effective communication is possible. Additionally, the relationship becomes more equal.
5.2 Community Engagement and Empowerment
Trust between the police and community members is critical to the achievement of police goals and ultimately the sustenance of a stable society in a democratic polity. The community engagement approach plays out during the implementation phase of the problem-solving model. In this phase, police together with community members undertake efforts to address identified problems and evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. Examples of community engagement activities include community meetings, relationship-building with important community groups and events. These relationships have proven to be successful under community policing initiatives because these relationships are removed from the negative interactions associated with the routine enforcement role of the police. Community policing is about police working in partnership with community members to perform tasks at hand. As part of the community policing strategy, the empowered and engaged community is where police identify problems together with community members and collaborates with them to solve the problem as partners.
It means that police departments in Nigeria should increase their use of community engagement by actively involving community members in their planning process on service initiatives or crime prevention partnerships with police. True partnerships between police and the communities they serve and collaborative problemsolving efforts provide the most comprehensive solutions to the problems associated with crime and disorder.
6. CHALLENGES OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN NIGERIA The thrust of security-force enhancement policies for promoting order on the streets must evolve in new directions that factor in other possibilities for organizing police resources. The search for a character that blends traditional police responsibilities of public safety, without adding to the extreme adventurism of either side of the state-society divide, and one which maintains their reason for being, is informed by the quest for optimizing consensual policing arrangements and improving current mainstream configurations. Thus, the community policing model in Nigeria has contended with at least three different episodes of conflict in which the service has been involved. Apart from criticisms of its operation, with pockets of reform measures introduced, large-scale attacks and negative perceptions, especially within the local demographics of policing, have arisen suggesting the prospect of a disjointed polity. The Nigerian police and its political architecture thus face challenges that militate against the logic of providing mere security for public safety. The advent of community policing in Nigeria, as elsewhere, did not produce a drastic change in established police behaviors overnight. The Nigerian police institutions, since their inception, have always operated within the bottom-up, top-down continuum, which merges community and centralized policing. As a result, police initiatives premised on community participation in police practices targeting street crime, social disorder, and developing crime prevention measures had been common characteristics of policepublic activity, especially in plugging gaps hitherto unattended by the police.
Because the Nigerian police are short of manpower, they easily become involved in crowd control when social tension runs high. In recent times, the increase in the number of political groups and campaigns often results in police intervention in the form of crowd control. Such negates the community police ideals. In essence, while a lack of appreciation of the role of the police in a democratic society has contributed to the fall of the Nigerian police in the esteem of the public, an attitude of public insistence on democratic policing, especially through community involvement and police professionalism could, in the long run, provide the muchneeded impetus for an improved community-police. Apart from the issue of stigma and non-acceptance of the community policing strategy, the practicability of the idea under the present conditions of economic underdevelopment offers some challenge. Even if there is political will, training and re-training of police on a continuous basis in some enlightened countries can improve police performance. The Nigerian experience is not encouraging because of the lack of resources. The Nigerian police is neither well-equipped nor well-trained.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
For a sound community policing and optimal crime prevention to occur, it is important for any society to develop and sustain social bonds and activities that promote communal harmony, dialogue, and exchange.
This paper, using Nigeria as a case study, has demonstrated how Western-derived strategies can be repackaged alongside the strengths within the country’s socio-cultural environment to enhance sound and sustainable community development. It is important for community policing and crime prevention strategies to work effectively that reliable and good governance practices must exist, the powers of the police are used both judiciously and without fear or favor to ensure the protection of all, and the negative use of extrajudicial powers to suppress the weak and the vulnerable while enabling the strong to misuse their authority must at all times be guarded against. These development paths would make a more positive contribution within the Nigerian polity in the area of local community development, strengthening democracy, and national security.
While appreciating community policing as a police strength, the present paper calls for a disposition of strength as distinguished from harshness, petulance, and arbitrariness. The government should see itself as an assured arbiter and father of all, developing an internal balance but not ignoring outright challenges that tend to disrupt the balance. Among others, it has been noted from this paper that community policing is to be peopleoriented in nature, aimed at assisting the police to know the people’s needs and grievances, preventing them from committing crimes, and gaining their trust and support within the community. A workable community policing constitutes a sure beginning of a crime prevention strategy. Research has also clearly indicated that irrespective of gender, level of education, and income, residents living in areas with a high level of social integration reported a lower level of victimization experience.
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Originally published: SPECTRUM Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 01, No. 04 (2024) 145-152, doi: 10.61552/SJSS.2024.04.005 – http://spectrum.aspur.rs.
Illustrative Photo by Tope A. Asokere: https://www.pexels.com/photo/top-view-photo-of-men-playing-board-game-3316259/
The fee for traveling abroad, which Turkish citizens pay, is increased from 150 to 500 Turkish lira (about 14 euros). The Ordinance was published in the issue of the Turkish State Gazette (Resmi Gazete) dated August 2, 2024.
The fee for going abroad is a type of tax that must be paid by every Turkish citizen over the age of 7 when going abroad.
Inflation in Turkey, which was 71.6 percent in June, once again hit the pockets of Turkish citizens. Compared to 2022, the fee for going abroad has risen by 233 percent, according to the newspaper “Birgun”. This will put a heavy burden on families’ budgets when they travel abroad with children over 7 years old.
The fee for going abroad in the amount of the then 100 dollars was introduced in 1963 by a decision of the Council of Ministers and applied until 1996, when it was abolished. In 2001, it began to be applied again, and its amount was 50 dollars. Since 2007, it has been 15 pounds. After 12 years of implementation, in 2019 the amount of the fee was increased to 50 Turkish lira.
In March 2022, by decree of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the fee was increased to 150 Turkish lira.
The latest increase was proposed by Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek. According to media reports, the proposal was to make the fee 3,000 Turkish lira (about $90 or 83.50 euros), but that proposal sparked strong protests, including among the ruling Justice and Development Party, and was dropped.
According to official data, the revenue from fees for going abroad in 2023 was 1 billion 311 million Turkish lira. From the beginning of this year to the month of April, the revenue from the fee is in the amount of 427 million Turkish lira.
Fifteen Turkish liras of the fee are paid to TOKI – the State Agency for Housing Construction.
Turkish citizens holding dual citizenship are exempt from paying the fee.
The application of the new regulation entered into force on August 12 of this year.
Illustrative Photo by Enes Akdoğan: https://www.pexels.com/photo/a-black-and-white-photo-of-money-in-a-glass-jar-28184340/
Russian citizens or Russian companies participate in 11,939 companies in our country. This is clear from the answer of the Bulgarian Minister of Justice Maria Pavlova to a question posed by the parliamentarian Martin Dimitrov. He asked about the number of companies in Bulgaria in which Russians participate or Russian companies with a share of more than 40%.
The information provided by Minister Pavlova is based on the data in the Information System of the Trade Register and the Register of Non-Profit Legal Entities, “Focus” reported. The inspection concerns the participation of individuals or legal entities in limited liability companies, sole proprietorships and sole proprietorships.
7118 companies in our country are owned by Russian individuals or legal entities. 4,659 Russians participate with a share of over 40% in companies in Bulgaria. There are 162 companies in which a Russian citizen is registered as the actual owner.
The question of the national representative was provoked by the published statistics of the agency Moody’s that Bulgaria is in second place in the European Union in terms of companies with Russian connections.
Illustrative Photo by Kiril Gruev: https://www.pexels.com/photo/surva-festival-in-pernik-at-the-end-of-the-year-the-days-between-christmas-and-jordan-s-day-the-6th-of-january-yordanovden-are-called-dirty-days-it-is-the-coldest-and-darkest-time-15045130/
More than three hundred Moldovan priests went on a “pilgrimage” to Moscow, with all their expenses covered. The organization of the clergy took place on Viber, and as the sponsor of the entire event, Moldovan media named Ilon Shor – a former Moldovan politician and banker, sentenced to fifteen years in prison for major fraud, who fled to Russia in 2023, and this year received a Russian citizenship. In each diocese of the small Moldovan Metropolitanate (MP), there were several trusted persons – from metropolitan to deacons, who gathered participants.
The priests travel with their wives and parishioners in three groups – in the months of August and September, with the first of one hundred and twenty people leaving at the end of August. The first group of over a hundred people was photographed by Moldovan television at the airport in Chisinau and thus it becomes clear about the event organized by the Moscow Patriarchate.
In Moscow, the priests participated in “several religious conferences and had a meeting with high-ranking officials of the Moscow Patriarchate.” The center of the conversations were the problems of the Russian Orthodox Church and the “persecution against the Ukrainian Church”. Guests from Moldova were impressed with “royal receptions” and rich meals. They also visited the largest plant for church utensils “Sofrino”, where they received gifts for their parishes.
Finally, many of the clerics received MIR bank cards from the sanctioned Promsvyazbank for supporting the Russian war in Ukraine. The priests received the bank cards at a ceremony at the Theological Academy in Moscow. Each priest has signed a contract with the bank, and the card does not have his name on it, but the bank account is his. They were promised that they would receive 1,000 euros in “temple aid” each month.
Moscow Patriarchate spokesman Vladimir Legoida said “pilgrimages can have a very big impact.”
Hundreds of priests have agreed to the “free pilgrimage “, although they admit that the very procedure and form of the organization is strange. “Many priests are confused about the program and purpose of the visit, as the pilgrimage does not fit into any festive or religious context,” noted a source from the Chisinau Metropolitanate, which denied being the organizer.
The purpose of the venture is to buy the clerics under a good pretext to influence public opinion in the upcoming presidential elections in Moldova, in which Ilon Shor is participating through a party from Moscow, and for the October 20 referendum on the country’s accession to the European Union.
The visits of the priests were not supposed to become public, but after local media revealed that the hundreds of tickets were bought at once by a Russian agency, and the clerics are expected to exert political influence after their return at a critical moment for the state, the press office of Chisinau The Metropolitanate stated that “the visits have no pre-election or political goals, but aim to acquaint the Moldovan clergy with the spiritual and historical heritage of Orthodox Russia, strengthening the fraternal ties between the two Orthodox churches.”
The press service of the Metropolitanate of Moldova also stated that “the pilgrimages are organized for priests with limited resources, especially from the poor rural areas of Moldova, and do not pursue political goals.”
“The priests who returned from Moscow denied any form of financial support from their hosts. The Metropolitan will closely monitor this case and will take all necessary measures to prevent the participation of clergy in political or pre-election activities” – this is stated in a press release of the Metropolitan of Chisinau.
The EU Special Envoy on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Mr Frans van Daele, is on the eve of carrying out a fact-finding mission in Pakistan. The dates announced two months ago were 8-11 September and it was quite recently confirmed that he would be in Islamabad this week. At this stage, it is not known who will be his interlocutors as there was no official announcement about his mission, his program and his objectives.
However, it can be expected that he will raise a number of issues concerning the egregious human rights violations particularly affecting local religious minorities and it is to be hoped that he will collect useful and concrete information for the European Commission in relation with the commercial privileges of the GSP+ status granted by the EU to Pakistan. Last but not least, we would recommend him that hevisit a person imprisoned on blasphemy allegations. This would be an encouragement to all the religious prisoners of conscience – over 50 of them, according to the Database of documented cases of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom – and to Pakistani civil society.
Human Rights Without Frontiers has contacted representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, Catholic associations, Ahmadi groups, lawyers and human rights activists in Pakistan but they were unaware of that visit or said they had not received any invitation for a meeting. A number of talks will certainly take place in the premises of the EU Delegation to Pakistan.
The commercial privileges linked to the GSP+ status
Pakistan is a country of high concern for its systematic and serious religious freedom and other human rights’ violations.
The GSP+ – Generalised System of Preferences – is an EU scheme which grants privileged access (reduced or zero duties) to the EU market to products from certain less developed countries. When the eligible country gets GSP+ status, its products across approximately 66% of all EU tariff lines enter the EU market with 0% duties BUT to become and to remain a beneficiary of the GSP+ status, the beneficiary country must demonstrate a tangible progress on the implementation of27 international treatiesregarding labor rights, good governance, climate and environment, and human rights (including freedom of religion and other rights pertaining to religious minorities and their members).
The GSP+ status, religious freedom and human rights
On 29 April 2021, the European Parliament called on the Commission and the European External Action Service to immediately review Pakistan’s eligibility for GSP+ status in the light of recent human rights abuses, as “the government systematically enforced blasphemy laws and failed to protect religious minorities from abuses by non-state actors, with a sharp rise in targeted killings, blasphemy cases, forced conversions, and hate speech against religious minorities (…); whereas abduction, forced conversion to Islam, rape and forced marriage remained an imminent threat for religious minority women and children in 2020, particularly those from the Hindu and Christian faiths”.
On Jan. 17, 2023, the Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously voted to expand the country’s laws on blasphemy extending the punishment to those deemed to have insulted the Muhammad ‘s wives, family and companions, with 10 years in prison or life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has asked the Government, through its police, to deal more carefully with blasphemy cases and avoid the misuse of blasphemy laws (*), in a process in August 2022.
About the desperate situation of the Ahmaddiyya community in Pakistan
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan is enduring an alarming rise in violence and systemic persecution in 2024, with a disturbing trend of targeted murders, desecration of mosques and graves, and the continued denial of basic civil rights.
In January 2024, Punjab police desecrated 65 Ahmadi tombstones in Musay Wala, claiming to act on orders from a local official known for persecuting Ahmadis. These acts of desecration not only violate the sanctity of the community’s religious sites but also send a chilling message that their existence is unwelcome in Pakistan.
This year, up to July 2024 alone, four Ahmadi Muslims have been brutally murdered in religiously motivated attacks. These include the killing of Tahir Iqbal, the president of the local Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Bahawalpur, who was gunned down by motorcyclists in March. In June, a 16-year-old madrassa student murdered two Ahmadi men, Ghulam Sarwar and Rahat Ahmad Bajwa, in separate incidents in Mandi Bahauddin, citing religious motives. The violence continued in July when Zaka ur Rehman, a 53-year-old dentist, was shot dead in his clinic in Lala Musa, Gujrat. These heinous acts reflect the extreme vulnerability of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, who are routinely targeted for their faith, with little accountability for the perpetrators.
The violence against the community extends beyond physical attacks to the systematic desecration of Ahmadi Muslim mosques and graves. In February 2024, extremists armed with guns, hammers, and shovels attacked an Ahmadi mosque in Kotli, Azad Jammu and Kashmir,destroying its minarets and brutally beating worshippers. In June, during Eid celebrations, a mob of 150 people attacked another Ahmadi mosque in Kotli and across Pakistan more than 30 Ahmadis were arrested – including a 13 year old boy – for celebrating the Islamic festival of Eid.
About the desperate situation of Christians, Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan
Christians have been repeatedly victims of mob violence following blasphemy allegations.
On 16 August 2023, a violent mob of hundreds of people ransacked and torched nearly two dozen churches, attacked the homes and businesses of the Christian community, and the office of the local assistant commissioner in Jaranwala. According to estimates compiled by Faisalabad’s district administration, at least 22 churches and 91 houses were ransacked by mobs.
As per police and local sources, the violence erupted after some locals alleged that several desecrated pages of the Holy Quran were found near a house at Cinema Chowk in Jaranwala, where two Christian brothers resided.
On early July 2024, it was reported that Ehsan Shan, a Christian in his early 20s, had been put put on death row for reposting on his TikTok account an image of the text of the Qu’ran damaged in Jaranwala on 16 August 2023. Ehsan Shan, though not a party to the desecration, was sentenced under numerous articles of the Pakistan Penal Code, to 22 years’ “rigorous imprisonment” and fined 1 million Pakistan Rupees (UK£2,830).
Over the decades, hundreds of people have been falsely accused and many killed in targeted sectarian attacks.
There is no comparison when it comes to deciding which form of violence based on religious intolerance is worse. While forced conversion and targeted sectarian killings have affected millions in the country, misuse of blasphemy laws, vigilantism, lynching, personal vendettas, burning down entire communities, and destroying places of worship are all human rights crises and symptomatic of collective social disorder.
Christians, Sikhs, and Ahmadis have also been killed in sectarian hate crimes outside any accusation of blasphemy and justice is rarely delivered.
According to data compiled by the Centre for Social Justice in Pakistan, 202 cases of abduction, forced marriage and forced conversion were recorded and documented in 2021-2022: 120 Hindu women and girls, 80 Christians and 2 Sikhs. Almost all of them took place within the Sindh and Punjab provinces.
Beyond the data, it is also worth highlighting the concrete case of an 18-year old Hindu woman named Pooja Kumari who resisted an abduction attempt and was shot by her aggressors on 21 March 202 in a city in the Sindh province.
Acts of the Apostles, chapter 6. 1 – 6. The first Christian deacons. 7 – 15. St. Archdeacon Stephen.
Acts 6:1. In those days, when the disciples were multiplying, a murmur arose among the Hellenists against the Jews, because their widows were not looked after in the distribution of the daily rations.
“In these days” – an indefinite chronological indication, giving in any case a reason to conclude that the events described were not so distant from their predecessors.
“among the Hellenists…against the Jews…”. i.e. between the Hellenistic Christians and the Jews. The “Hellenists” are Jews living in the various countries of the pagan (Greco-Roman) world, speaking the then widespread Greek language. Many of them were proselytes, i.e. Gentiles who accepted the Jewish faith. Sometimes the Hellenists migrated from heathen countries to live in Palestine and Jerusalem, and in any case they considered it their duty to travel to Jerusalem for the festivals, staying there for a longer or shorter time, and sometimes staying longer. long because of his commercial and other affairs. Many of them also accepted Christianity, being fully prepared for it.
By the name “Jews” here are understood Christians from the original permanent Jews, local inhabitants of Palestine, who spoke the Hebrew language.
“When dividing the daily rations…”. In the Greek original: ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ τῇ διακονίᾳ, in the Slavic translation: “in everyday service…”. As the text further shows, this was the service of the “tables,” that is, supplying the needy with food and other necessities during the communal meals (Acts 2:46), which were probably arranged in the various parts of the city, in the public places of the meetings of the Christians. It seemed to the Hellenists that their widows were neglected. This neglect, of course, was not due to the apostles themselves, but evidently to their immediate subordinates in charge of this activity. St. John Chrysostom also suggests that “this was not done out of ill will, but out of inattention to the multitude of people… because in such a case there cannot be difficulties.”
It is possible that here a certain spirit of exaltation manifested itself before the Hellenists, who were in closer contact with the impure heathen environment, which spirit of exaltation could not smooth out, as can be seen, even the high spirit of Christianity in the first community in Jerusalem. Whatever the cause, the neglect of the Hellenistic widows was there, and it caused a discontent which was more dangerous than the persecutions from outsiders, and therefore the apostles so wisely rooted it out at the very beginning.
Acts 6:2. Then the twelve apostles, calling together the whole multitude of disciples, said: it is not good for us to leave the word of God and take care of the tables.
“having called together the whole multitude of the disciples…” i.e. as far as possible the whole Christian community of Jerusalem, and not only its representatives or elect. The apostles proposed to the whole society to remove this turmoil, and did not decide to remove it only through their authority (cf. John Chrysostom and blessed Theophylact).
“it is not good that we…” – οὐκ ἀρεστόν ἐστιν ἡμᾶς, that is, “we do not like, we do not like.”
“to leave the word of God,” i.e. preaching the word of God, which is their main duty.
Acts 6:3. Therefore, brethren, take care to choose from among you seven men of good name, filled with the Holy Spirit and with wisdom, whom we will appoint to this office;
“Choose”. The apostles make available to the whole community of believers to choose from among themselves people to place them in this office.
“seven souls…” Seven is a sacred number.
“filled with the Holy Spirit…”. This ministry also requires the special gifts of the Holy Spirit, because the ministry of the poor is not only dedicated to their physical needs, but also to their spiritual needs.
“and with wisdom…”. In the usual sense of the word, to organize all activity wisely, successfully, carefully – that is, a purely practical life virtue is meant.
Acts 6:4. and we will constantly remain in prayer and in the service of the word.
“in the service of the word,” i. of the preaching of the gospel, as opposed to the care of the table and the food.
Acts 6:5. This proposal pleased the whole multitude; and they chose Stephen, a man full of faith and the Holy Spirit, Philippa and Prochora, Nicanora and Timon, Parmena and Nicholas, a proselyte from Antioch,
“full of faith” – this refers to a miraculous faith (1 Cor. 12:9), a man with a special gift of the Holy Spirit, through which Stephen performed great miracles and signs (Acts 6:8).
After Stephen, the most famous of the others is Philip (Acts 8). Of the rest, nothing more is mentioned in the writings of the apostles. But church tradition has preserved important information about them: Prochorus was a companion at first of the Apostle Peter, then a companion or scribe of the Apostle John the Theologian, and subsequently a bishop of Nicomedia (in Bithynia), and died a martyr in Antioch.
“Nicanor” – this deacon was killed by the Jews on the day of the murder of Archdeacon Stephen. “Timon” according to tradition was a bishop of Bostra (in Arabia) who was also martyred.
“Parmenus” died before the eyes of the apostles and was buried by them.
“Nicolaus” – a proselyte, an Antiochian, whose choice shows the wisdom of the electors, for he undoubtedly belonged to the Hellenists, whose widows were neglected and became an occasion for discontent to arise. It is not known whether he remained at the height of his ministry, only that his name is not recorded as a saint.
Acts 6:6. which they placed before the Apostles, and they, having prayed, laid hands on them.
“which they placed before the Apostles” – for their actual placing in this ministry. It is not the society that elected them itself that appoints them, but grants this to the Apostles, who alone had the right and authority to perform the installation of the elect by the laying on of hands.
“having prayed” that God’s grace, which heals the weak and fills up the deficient, would vouch for the elect for this special ministry of God’s Church.
“laid hands on them.” A way, and with it, an outward symbolic sign of the pouring out upon ordinations of the special gifts of the Holy Spirit. This ordination (cf. Num. 27:18) followed the prayer, as a symbolic act distinct from it, and not merely accompanying the prayer. This was precisely the action of consecrating the elect, or the external side of the sacrament.
“Notice,” says St. John Chrysostom here, “how the writer says nothing superfluous; he does not explain in what way, but simply says that they were ordained by prayer, because that is how ordination is done. A hand is laid upon man, but all things are done by God, and His right hand touches the head of the ordination, if the ordination be done as it should be”…
Acts 6:7. And so the word of God grew, and the number of disciples increased exceedingly in Jerusalem; and a great multitude of priests obeyed the faith.
“And so the word of God grew,” a remark which gives reason to conclude that the Christian community was calmed down, and the apostolic preaching became especially successful, owing to their concentrating entirely on this preaching. The success was especially manifested in the fact that many priests even accepted faith in Jesus the Messiah, defeated in their stubbornness by the persuasiveness of the apostolic preaching.
Actions. 6:8. And Stephen, full of faith and power, performed great miracles and omens among the people.
“filled with faith and power” – faith as the cause or source of miraculous power, and power as the particular manifestation and operation of faith. Here, for the first time, it is mentioned about the performance of great omens and miracles not only by the apostles, but also by other believers – for the more successful spread of Christ’s Church.
Acts 6:9. When there arose some of the synagogue, so called the synagogue of the libertines, and of that of Cyrenes, Alexandrians, and those who were from Cilicia and Asia, entered into a dispute with Stephen;
Acts 6:10. but they could not resist the wisdom and spirit with which he spoke.
“some… entered into a dispute”, ἀνέστησαν δέ τινες… δέμαροῦντες τῷ Στεφάνῳ…, in the Slavic translation: “Vozstasha ze netsyi… contending with Stephen”.
Those who entered into dispute with Stephen were Hellenists, as Stephen himself seems to have been, judging by his name and speech (Acts 7), in which the Old Testament passages are brought to him by the translation of the Septuagint. Tradition says that he was even a relative of Saul, who, as is known, was a native of Tarsus of Cilicia.
Those who disputed with Stephen were, moreover, “of the so-called synagogue of Libertines and Cyreneans and Alexandrians” – and “from Cilicia and Asia.” At that time in Jerusalem, according to the calculation of the rabbis, there were about 500 synagogues, including the mentioned five.
“Libertines” are Jews resettled by the Romans (especially under Pompey in 60 BC) as prisoners of war in Rome, but then released and now free returned to their homeland (many of them, however, they voluntarily preferred to stay in Rome). These conquered (libertini) formed their own synagogue after their return – “of the libertines”.
“Cyreneans and Alexandrians” – these are Jews from Cyrene and Alexandria who moved to Jerusalem or temporarily resided there.
In Cyrene (a city in Libya, west of Egypt), according to the testimony of Josephus, a quarter of its inhabitants were Jews, and in Alexandria (in Lower Egypt) of the five parts of the city – two of them were inhabited entirely by Jews ( Jewish Antiquities (XIV, 6, 1; XIX, 5, 2). In both cities they have lived for a long time, settled there as prisoners of war or moved voluntarily. Alexandria was a center of Jewish-Greek scholarship, the imprint of which was probably borne by the synagogue of the Alexandrians in Jerusalem.
“Cilicia and Asia” – two Asia Minor regions where many of the Jews also lived, and the emigrants or temporary residents of them in Jerusalem also had their own special synagogues.
All these five synagogues rebelled against Stephen in the person of some of their members and tried to challenge him, i.e. his teaching and right to influence the people.
“They could not resist wisdom.” Wisdom not in the sense of Judeo-Hellenic education, but in the sense of true Christian wisdom, in the sense of enlightenment with the truths of the Gospel teaching and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. 12:8).
Actions. 6:11 a.m. Then they taught some men to say: We heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses and against God.
Actions. 6:12 a.m. And they stirred up the people, the elders and the scribes, and, having attacked him, seized him and brought him to the Sanhedrin.
It is remarkable that in the case of Stephen, the enemies of Christianity succeeded in winning over the people who had been on the side of the Christians and the apostles (cf. Acts 5, 13, 26). This is done by accusing Stephen of blasphemy, the most serious crime under the Mosaic Law. As in the judicial accusation of the Lord Himself, the people lightly believed this slander, and were cunningly led to indignation and indignation against the supposed blasphemer and those to whom he belonged.
The deliberateness of the accusation against Stephen, and the indignation of the people against him, is evident from the fact that the Sanhedrin was already fully prepared to try Stephen when they openly seized him and brought him thither.
In this way, the hidden dream of the enemies of Christ was realized – to cause a pogrom in the Christian community by arousing the anger of the people, if not against the apostles personally, then first against one of the newly appointed deacons, and then against the whole community with the apostles at the head .
Acts 6:13. And they presented false witnesses, who said: This man does not stop speaking blasphemous words against this holy place and against the Law,
“They presented false witnesses,” i.e. people who attributed things to Stephen that he did not actually say, twisting his words.
“He, perhaps, spoke very frankly and spoke about the abolition of the law, or, more precisely, he did not speak, but hinted, because if he had spoken clearly, then these “some” would not have needed false witnesses” (blessed Theophylact).
“against this holy place” – κατὰ τοῦ τοπου τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ τοῦ νόμου·, i.e. The Jerusalem temple “and against the law,” i.e. The Mosaic Law, the foundation of all Old Testament life.
Just as during the condemnation of the Lord Jesus, the false witnesses misinterpreted one of His sentences about the destruction of the temple (Matt. 26:61; cf. John 2:19) in order to present Him as a blasphemer, so now the false witnesses against Stephen probably interpreted some his words where he spoke of the transforming action of Christianity in relation to the Old Testament. This became likely in his disputes with the Hellenists, and it happened more than once (“does not cease”).
Acts 6:14. for we have heard him say that Jesus of Nazareth will destroy this place and change the customs that Moses handed down to us.
“we heard him say…”, ἀκηκόαμεν γὰρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, We heard him say that…- but the further words are not actually Stephen’s, but were put into his mouth by the false witnesses and interpreted by them in their own way.
“Jesus of Nazareth…”, in the Greek and Slavic text with the addition of the contemptuous “He” (οὗτος).
Actions. 6:15. And all who sat in the Sanhedrin looked at him and saw that his face was like the face of an Angel.
“They saw that his face was like the face of an Angel.” This was all the more surprising, all the more unnatural for an ordinary defendant, whom one would have expected to see frightened, despairing, or at least in the hostile mood of a man offended by slander.
Filled with entirely other feelings, Stephen’s pure soul gave his countenance a manly calmness and a triumphant vitality, which contrasted with the atmosphere of the accusers, with their malice and fury, and imparted to his young countenance a truly angelic light and pleasantness. If earlier Stephen was filled with a special power of the Holy Spirit (Acts 6:8), then at this decisive and solemn moment for him, he was undoubtedly awarded with a special illumination from the Spirit of God, which turned his very appearance into an angel-like one.
Illustrative Photo: Orthodox icon “Martyrdom of St. Stephen”. – The place of St. Archdeacon Stephen’s martyrdom is traditionally identified as being close to the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem, where today there is a church dedicated to the martyred deacon. Christians immediately felt a great devotion to St. Stephen, a devotion that only grew when his relics were re-discovered in the early part of the 5th century. His life and martyrdom are portrayed in countless works of art. Stephen is traditionally pictured with the palm of martyrdom, or with stones that show how he died.
Source in Russian: Explanatory Bible, or Commentaries on all the books of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments: In 7 volumes / Ed. prof. A. P. Lopukhin. – Ed. 4th. – Moscow: Dar, 2009, 1232 pp.
Russian forces have destroyed ancient burial mounds on the front line in southern Ukraine. In doing so, they potentially violated the Hague and Geneva Conventions, according to a study by the Ukrainian Conflict Observatory published on September 4, the Kyiv Independent reported.
In Ukraine, there are many ancient graves known as kurgans – up to 20 meters high and dating back to 3000 BC. They contain archaeological treasures, including from the Scythian era.
The Conflict Observatory analyzed open geospatial data to find that the two sites in the Vasilovsky district of Zaporozhye Oblast, for example, were damaged during their occupation by the Russian armed forces. In addition, they were used by the Russians for military purposes as military infrastructure was built around them.
Apart from the military constructions, the damage “may mean looting or destruction of the mound-related artifacts and ancient remains,” the report said.
Since cultural heritage is entitled to protection under international law, damage to the sites and their potential looting may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law under the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
Additionally, the limitations of open-source intelligence research suggest that “the true number of archaeological sites affected by Russian fortification construction is likely to be much higher than documented in this report,” the observatory added.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has had a severe impact on Ukrainian cultural heritage, destroying around 2,000 cultural sites and leaving 1.5 million museum artifacts in Russian-occupied territories. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) passed a resolution in late June recognizing Russia’s genocidal intent to destroy Ukraine’s cultural heritage and identity.
Scientists at Australia’s Flinders University have found that healthy soil is a surprisingly noisy place. And deforested places or those with poor soil “sound” much quieter.
Experts draw this conclusion thanks to a new field in science – ecoacoustics, which studies soundscapes.
They listened to sounds made by ants, worms and other creatures living underground in South Australia to assess the relationship between soil sounds and biodiversity.
In the Journal of Applied Ecology, the researchers describe experiments with three different types of forest patches: two deforested patches of land, two forested patches that have been reforested in recent years, and two largely untouched patches of land.
Soil sounds were recorded during daylight hours at all six sites, and were supplemented by recordings of soil samples taken in a soundproof chamber.
The researchers counted the number of invertebrates in each soil sample to determine how many living creatures lived at each location.
The analysis showed greater diversity in both intact and restored sites, both of which have more complex acoustics.
Soil sound recordings at these sites include snaps, gurgles and a variety of other sounds – evidence of the diversity and health of life below the surface. The deforested area was quieter.
“Listening” to the soil could help identify areas in need of restoration or protection, or even warn of environmental disturbances, the researchers wrote.
“All living organisms make sounds, and our preliminary results show that different soil organisms have different sound profiles depending on their activity, shape, limbs and size,” said Jake M. Robinson, an ecologist at Flinders University in Australia, one of the the authors of the study, cited by Besjournals.
Illustrative Photo by Muffin Creatives: https://www.pexels.com/photo/close-up-photo-of-person-holding-sand-2203683/
The head of UN aid coordination office OCHA in the war-torn country Justin Brady said the famine conditions which already prevail in Zamzam camp, in North Darfur, are “very dire” and access has become increasingly difficult.
The UN-partnered IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) announced last week that famine conditions are ongoing in the Zamzam Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp which hosts 500,000 IDPs outside besieged El Fasher.
In an interview with UN News’s Khaled Mohamed, Mr. Brady stressed that an effective response to the famine that is now evident as rival militaries continue to wreak havoc across Sudan, cannot be made on a “shoestring budget.”
“People think famine, and they think food, when in fact, what we need to respond, be it famine or displacement, is a package of assistance”, he said.
Water, sanitation, and hygiene are a crucial part of keeping beleaguered civilians alive, caught between Government troops and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for the past 15 months of brutal fighting: “They need health, protection, shelter, and non-food items.”
More resources critical
He told us that the situation can be reversed, “though it will take more than just humanitarians trying their hardest. We need the resources, political leverage, and advocacy to make the parties come to the table and end this war.”
FAO said a rapid scale up of life-saving food, nutrition and cash assistance must go hand in hand with emergency agricultural aid.
“This is critical in conflict-affected areas to address immediate needs and avert the risk of famine from increasing and affecting other locations across Sudan”, the agency said.
Sudan is facing the worst levels of hunger ever recorded by the IPC in the country, as well as the world’s largest internally displaced crisis, with a staggering 755, 000 people are currently facing catastrophic levels of acute hunger (IPC Phase 5).
Around 25.6 million people are experiencing high levels of acute hunger.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
UN News: The IPC Famine Review Committee reported this month that the ongoing conflict in Sudan has pushed communities in North Darfur State into famine, notably the Zamzam camp near the state capital Al Fasher. Have you had the opportunity to get on-the-ground information recently about the current situation in that area? And is that area inaccessible to humanitarian workers?
Justin Brady: The situation in Zamzam particularly is very difficult. As you say, just outside of the state capital, which has been under siege and attacked by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for some weeks, if not months now. and access in that general area has become very difficult.
There are some partners on the ground there, such as MSF, who are providing us direct information, “ground truthing” on the situation, which is very dire, obviously given the classification of famine, which is something that, since April, when we launched the famine prevention plan, we were we were trying to avoid.
If we don’t have enough resources and we don’t have enough access, it is going to be very difficult to stop famine conditions from taking hold.
And that’s exactly what happened. we did see a major shift in the Government’s, approach to access. They were much more open to providing visas and travel permissions. That started in about mid-May. A bit late, though, in the process – and then, unfortunately, RSF has actually increased its bureaucratic impediments.
The Famine Review Committee returned a classification of famine for that location [Zamzam]. They did not draw a conclusion or provide recommendations on the other two camps – Abu Shouk and Al Salam – because they said that the data wasn’t sufficient. Think about it. Why wasn’t the data sufficient enough? Getting the data out due to access constraints has been a problem.
If we can’t get data out, how do we get the aid in? it’s just not a manageable situation in that regard. Now, people will then ask, are you going to declare a famine? The United Nations is not going to declare a famine in Sudan. Sudan has an internationally recognized government. In 2011, the United Nations did declare a famine in Somalia at a time when the Federal Transitional Government was not internationally recognized.
however, the Government of Sudan has indicated, through a press conference it recently held, as well as direct meetings I’ve had with them, that they do not recognize the classification of famine. They do not believe the data supports that. So, we should not expect a famine declaration from the Government at this time.
UN News: Which areas are most at risk of entering the famine cycle if the current conditions in Sudan continue?
Justin Brady: Yeah. The FRC (Famine Review Committee) data and this again is based off the integrated phase classification, the IPC, which is the internationally recognized system, for looking at food insecurity. They drew the conclusion that there are 14 localities where conditions similar to ZamZam probably exist. What are those conditions? Heavy displacement, conflict. you know, impacting access not only of humanitarians, but also of the commercial sector to provide goods to the market.
So we’re not even talking about people’s access to food. we’re talking about the availability of food. Is food actually there?
If there is food there, the access to it is quite limited because it is extremely expensive. We’re in a war economy. And we’ve seen prices skyrocket. We’ve seen the value of the Sudanese pound plummet. So those 14 localities, those are in the greater Darfurs, not just in North Darfur, Khartoum state, Kordofan states, and Jazeera, which is the breadbasket of the country.
To think that a famine might take hold there really exposes the nature of this entire conflict. So, we are doing our best to get to those various areas. And in recent weeks, the seasonal rains have started. and those are an impediment themselves that you can’t negotiate with.
The Government in February closed our access as humanitarians to the Adri crossing from Chad. That would lead very quickly, to West Darfur’s capital, Al Jenina, and then give us access to not only West Darfur, but Central and South Darfur as well. and the only opening we had that was authorized by the Government was the Tina crossing in North Darfur. That leads to Al Fasher.
Access continues to be a major problem. And some donors have seen that and said, well, we’ll give you funding when you get access.
I’m afraid, one, there’s a natural lag between funding streams and actual operations on the ground, depending on what one needs to procure, whom you need to recruit, and the activity you’re doing – it could take six, eight weeks, for money that’s received by a donor to translate into activities.
So we need to be ahead of this.
Second of all, when we do get access, we need to take advantage of those openings very quickly. If we don’t, they will close very quickly. So not having enough resources…Our appeal for this year is only a third funded, under $900 million received.
Having been involved with two famine prevention operations and now what is a famine response operation, you can’t do these on a shoestring budget. We need resources and, we are just not receiving them in the quantities required to do this.
And that limitation in resources has also caused us to prioritize. So that we are not really responding to people who are in IPC 3 phase [of the emergency food classification], which is a crisis level…Unfortunately, we’re having to drive right by them as we try to reach, the most, vulnerable cases, those closest to famine, when in fact, we should be helping everybody.
Children collect clean, safe water from a UNICEF-installed station in Al-Serif village in Darfur.
UN News: Could you tell us more about the latest response to displacement from areas across Sudan, including Sennar, the Blue Nile, and Kassala States?
Justin Brady: You have this offensive that RFS have pushed, into Sennar state and White Nile, that has caused quite a bit of displacement from Sinja Town itself, most of that headed north into Government-controlled areas where we already have massive numbers of displaced. This is the largest displacement crisis in the world with 10 million internally displaced.
Another two million-plus have gone over the border into neighboring countries in the region. So, the interesting thing is, when we talk about ZamZam, we’re talking about an IDP camp. And that was sort of the norm. The model in Darfur was that IDPs would be settled into a camp. Whereas in the east and the north, since the war began in April of 2023, the vast majority of these IDPs are residing with host communities.
Now, this has a couple of impacts. Number one, it’s a little bit difficult for us to find them. and we don’t do a status-based response. If you’re an IDP, you don’t, by definition, get assistance. but it’s very difficult for us to assess the condition of those people. But their presence there is also having, a debilitating effect on the resilience of the host communities themselves.
The best we could do there is to pump resources into the basic services, so everybody benefits. But again, we don’t have enough resources to prioritize those caseloads.
I’m not even touching on the education. the fact of the matter is, the education system in Sudan, except for a few locations, has broken down completely over the past year. plus, we were seeing children missing out on another year of education. this is having a debilitating effect on the present, but it will.
The legacy of this conflict is going to be felt for decades and generations to come.
UN News: You mentioned floods and heavy rain, and those are another challenge facing people in Sudan. Can you please tell us more about the humanitarian impact of this and the and response?
Justin Brady: The rains, as I said, are a yearly occurrence. And, you know, when we talk about Al Jazeera State River Nile states in the past and I served here as the Head of Office back in 2022, if we had any activities in those states, it was only related to the flooding. They did not experience humanitarian problems there.
Flooding is causing damage and losses, to people’s, belongings as well as their livelihoods, causing them to displace, if only on a temporary basis in some cases, the bigger concern is that it is going to contribute to waterborne diseases.
Water, sanitation, hygiene is not going to solve it on its own. We need those partners who do those various activities working together in one location to have an impact. And that has been an issue because the funding, as I mentioned, is only a third. but it is unevenly distributed across the areas of work. food security has received over 50 per cent of the funding that they have requested.
Obviously, people think famine and they think food, when in fact, what we need to respond, be it famine or displacement, is a package of assistance. not just food, but people also need, water, sanitation, hygiene. They need health, they need protection. They need shelter and non-food items. and in the case of famine areas, we need nutrition working there very closely.
UN News: The conflict poses a special challenge for women and girls. UNFPA reports that 6.7 million people are at risk of gender-based violence. And 3.5 million women and girls of reproductive age need reproductive health care services. Could you tell us more about this?
Justin Brady: For months now, we’ve been saying this has been a war against women and girls. And rape, sexual violence has been part of the strategy of some of the belligerents.
The reports of that [are] much more prevalent in areas controlled by the RSF or where the RSF is present. The RSF may deny that and say it’s not them, but they have created the conditions where this is possible.
They have removed the rule of law and, unfortunate impunity allows these perpetrators to do the worst thing possible. and we have reports of survivors of these attacks committing suicide thereafter.
The stigma in Sudan is very heavy from sexual based violence. and it’s very difficult to continue, as you did before.
This is something that we are looking to see how we can provide more funding – again, an area of work that has gotten very short shrift from the donors. as far as, the resources go. And this is also part of our approach to have a centrality of protection. This is a concept in the humanitarian field where we have the protection cluster, we have protection actors.
The reality is they only encounter tens of maybe hundreds of thousands of people. because of the reach they have. We’re talking hundreds if not millions of Sudanese. And this is, an approach where those other technical areas of work take on the responsibilities of strengthening the protection environment.
This is particularly important, since the departure of UNITAMS, the political mission, which had a protection pillar, and had people in the field who were reporting, they were working very closely with the High Commissioner for Human rights. When the Government, asked for that mandate to end, we lost a lot of capacity in this field.
I think one great development from the increase in visas allowed by the government, in addition to more humanity and technical staff coming in to help with the work, is the fact that journalists are now getting visas and coming in to not just Port Sudan, but traveling throughout, different portions of Sudan and bringing some accountability…shedding light on what has been a dark area where people, you know, nefarious actors, mostly young men, have gotten away with some of the most horrible acts you can imagine.
A woman who fled her home due to conflict rests at a centre for displaced people in El Fasher, Darfur.
UN News: Finally, what message would you like to send to reverse the deepening humanitarian crisis in Sudan and restore some normalcy to people’s lives?
Justin Brady: I don’t know if this frustration comes through in my voice. we can stop this. We can contain this. We can reverse this. as we’ve been saying for months, though, it will take more than just humanitarians trying their hardest. we need the resources, and we need the political leverage and advocacy to make the parties come to the table and end this war.
If it doesn’t stop, then it is going to be near impossible for us to reach those who need us with the assistance that we have. If we are to do this on a shoestring budget and pass by people who desperately need our assistance but who aren’t on death’s doorstep, we are doing a disservice to the people of Sudan again, not just today, but for generations to come.
