At the European Council, leaders gave their strategic guidance on many key foreign policy issues, from our relations with China, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabach and the poisoning of Aleksei Navalny. On the Eastern Mediterranean, we will pursue dialogue with Turkey on outstanding issues. And European leaders tasked me to organise a multilateral conference which could address issues on which multilateral solutions are needed, including maritime delimitation, security, energy, migration and economic cooperation. We clearly prefer the path of constructive relations but the political line is clear: in case of renewed actions by Turkey that breach international law, the EU will use options at its disposal.

One big decision that leaders took was to finally impose sanctions on Belarus. There is no point denying that this decision took a long time: almost two months have passed since the rigged Presidential elections. Many observers and commentators have pointed out that divisions among member states were hampering our collective ability to take a stand, even on issues that are core to the EU’s founding principle. In short, our credibility was at stake.

As long as the EU has been working on developing a common foreign policy, it has had to deal with this kind of splits. From the break up of Yugoslavia, to the Middle East Peace process, the war against Iraq in 2003, the independence of Kosovo or Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

This is of course not the first time that we experience divisions. As long as the EU has been working on developing a common foreign policy, it has had to deal with this kind of splits. From the break up of Yugoslavia, to the Middle East Peace process, the war against Iraq in 2003, the independence of Kosovo or Chinese actions in the South China Sea: there have been many examples where divisions among member states have slowed down or paralysed EU decision-making, or emptied it of substance.

The underlying reasons are not hard to state: history, geography, identity. Member-states look at the world through different prisms and it’s not easy to blend these 27 different ways of defining their national interests into a united, common European interest. Having been Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain I have sat at both sides of the table. And I know all too well that in the Council we discuss a common EU line, but as soon as we get home, minister focus above all on conducting their national foreign policy, with their own priorities and red lines.  

The real question is what to do about this. For me it is clear that the main long-term answer lies in the creation of a common strategic culture: the more Europeans agree on how they see the world and its problems, the more they will agree on what to do about them. That is in part what we intend to do with the work on a Strategic Compass. But all this is a long-term process. And in the meantime, we have to be able to take collective decisions, on tough issues, in real time.

And this brings us to the question of how we take decisions on foreign policy. For decades we have agreed that foreign and security policy must be decided by unanimity, with every country holding a veto. In foreign policy we work a lot with so-called discrete instead of continuous variables. This means many of our decisions are binary in nature: you either recognise a government or not, you launch a crisis management operation or not. And this leads to a lot of blockages and paralysis. In the same way, there are other important policy fields such as taxation or the multi-annual EU budget where the unanimity requirement has also created serious difficulties to find adequate solutions.

The contrast here is with those areas of the EU, from the single market to climate to migration, where the EU can take decisions by qualified majority (55% of member states and 65% of population). And crucially, market rules or climate targets are not secondary issues of lesser sensitivity. Indeed, big national interests at stake, which often clash just as much as in foreign policy.

What matters in the EU is not how a discussion begins; what matters is how it ends.

Moreover, it is striking that even in the areas where the EU can take decisions by QMV, it mostly doesn’t. Why? Because the ethos of the club is to work for compromises, something everyone can buy into. But for this, all member states need to move and invest in unity. Simply sitting on one’s position creates blockages. And in this specific sense, having the QMV option is important: not to use it but to create an incentive for member states to move and search for common ground. This is how, outside foreign policy, the EU can take decisions on important topics with big interests at stake, even if member states are divided. What matters in the EU is not how a discussion begins; what matters is how it ends.

Right at the start of my mandate I argued that if, in foreign policy, we want to escape the paralysis and delays of the unanimity rule, we ought to think about taking some decisions without requiring the full unanimity of 27. And in February when we were blocked on the launch of Operation Irini to police the arms embargo on Libya, I raised the question at the Munich Security Council how reasonable it is for one country, which would anyway not participate in the naval operation because it lacks a navy, to prevent the other 26 from moving forward.

Let’s be clear: we will not have majority voting across the board. But one could limit it to aspects where we have been frequently blocked in the past – sometimes for completely unrelated reasons – such as human rights statements or sanctions. In her State of the Union , President Von Der Leyen repeated this proposal (it was actually the line in her speech that attracted the largest amount of applause).

Since then, there has been renewed debate on the merits and risks associated to this idea. For instance, the President of the European Council has warned that dropping the unanimity requirement would risk losing the legitimacy and buy-in that is needed when it comes to implementing any decisions. This is without any doubt, an important issue. Others have pointed to the fact that the national veto is an ‘insurance policy or emergency brake’ to protect especially the ability of small countries to defend their core national interests (larger member states may not even need the veto to protect their core national interests).

Abandoning the unanimity rule would not be a silver bullet. But we need to create the right incentives for member states to come together. Just appealing to the need for unity is not enough.

I welcome this debate. I am clear that abandoning the unanimity rule would not be a silver bullet. But we need a discussion on how to create the right incentives for member states to come together. Just appealing to the need for unity is not enough. Which decisions we make and how credible they are, depends crucially on how we make them.

Going forward, some possibilities seem pertinent to me, to be evaluated and discussed:

Maybe it could be better, sometimes, to accept to issue a quick statement at 25 with good substance than wait for several days and come with a lowest common denominator statement at 27?

Maybe it is also better to think not mainly in terms of introducing QMV but also of ‘constructive abstention’? This was a possibility introduced to enable a country to abstain without blocking the Union from moving forward. For example, this was how the EULEX mission in Kosovo was launched in 2006.

And finally, as we are certainly not going to abandon unanimity across the board, could we define areas and tools and instruments where it could make more sense to experiment (for example sanctions, statements, demarches) and, if so, with what kind of safeguards?

I hope that in the weeks and months ahead, for example in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe, we can debate the pros and cons of these options, knowing that there is a great and urgent need for the EU to protect its capacity to act in a dangerous world.

Mr Valdis Dombrovskis announced “a launch of a WTO trade and climate initiative, focusing on green goods”, acknowledging that “today, trade is about much more than just trade”. He intends to reshape the EU’s future trade policy to make it more sustainable, including in the Mercosur trade agreement where the EU must “find lasting solutions for the Amazon region” before its ratification.

“Europe needs to become more assertive”, he said, adding that EU’s trade partners using unfair practises will be met with new tools, including a new anti-coercion mechanism- if needed, even against the United States. With China, Mr Dombrovskis seeks to conclude the investment agreement now under negotiation while ensuring that the trade relationship is “restructured to be reciprocal, balanced and fair”.

Enforce sustainable trade deals in practice

MEPs welcomed the planned new trade defence measure but also emphasised that the EU’s tools must be sharp enough to ensure that “existing trade agreements don’t only work on paper but in practice, too.” On Transatlantic trade relations, some MEPs asked for the EU to prepare for the WTO judgment to impose USD4 billion worth of tariffs on US goods in the Boeing case.

Several MEPs called for a trade policy linked closely to the Green Deal and the Sustainable Development Goals, and a long-awaited proposal on enforcing sustainable development chapters in trade agreements through sanctions. Several MEPs expect a new trade commissioner to ensure the Mercosur deal is environmentally sustainable and to protect the respect for human rights in the investment deal with China.

MEPs asked the candidate about obligatory due diligence for companies to ensure sustainable supply chains, which Mr Dombrovskis pledged to propose. Other MEPs wanted to know about future steel safeguards against dumping on the EU market and prospects for an EU-UK trade deal.

You can watch the video recording of the full hearing here.

Next steps

Based on the committees’ recommendations, the Conference of Committee Chairs will assess the outcome of the hearing and forward its conclusions to the Conference of Presidents. The latter will carry out the final evaluation on 6 October and decide if the hearing can be concluded. If so, the plenary will vote on whether or not to approve the portfolio change on 7 October, in Brussels.

During her introductory speech, Ms McGuinness told MEPs that her guiding priority would be to put people front and centre of the roll out of the EU’s financial services architecture. The financial system must be used to underpin a more inclusive society. Ms McGuinness also said she would prioritise lending to the real economy, especially SMEs.

MEPs were also keen to sound out Ms McGuinness on these priorities in more detail. Many also asked her to commit to going further with legislation aimed at incentivising investments beneficial to the climate and the environment.

Capital markets union, banking union, and anti-money laundering

Many MEPs asked the Commissioner-designate how she planned to give new impetus to the completion of the capital markets union and the banking union, with a number of them warning that the obstacles laid down by some member states risked paralysing the whole process.

A number of MEPs also asked about the next steps that Ms McGuinness would take to tackle money laundering more efficiently, including on when exactly she would attempt to propose new legislation.

MEPs also raised the topics of Brexit, gender mainstreaming in the financial sector, crypto currencies, and taxation, among others.

Next steps

Based on the committee’s recommendations, the Conference of Committee Chairs will assess the outcome of the hearing and forward its conclusions to the Conference of Presidents. The latter will carry out the final evaluation on 6 October and decide if the hearing can be concluded. If so, the plenary will vote on whether or not to approve the Commissioner-designate on 7 October.

NUR-SULTAN. KAZINFORM As part of the European Union Climate Diplomacy activities and #EU4GreenKZ campaign, the European Union Delegation in Kazakhstan jointly with EU Member States and with the support of Nur-Sultan Mayor Office organized a tree-planting event at the EXPO site of Nur-Sultan city on September 30.

The event aims to contribute to the green and sustainable development of Nur-Sultan city and strengthen cooperation between Kazakhstan and the European Union.

During the solemn opening, EU Ambassador to Kazakhstan Sven-Olov Carlsson noted: «The EU commends Kazakhstan for having taken bold steps to move towards sustainable development. In 2013, Kazakhstan launched the Green Economy Transition Plan, which is one of the most ambitious in Europe and Central Asia region. The EU is proud to be a part of these achievements by contributing to the green development of the country both through our regional and bilateral programmes. Cooperation in the area of environment and green economy is also amongst the priorities of the EU–Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation agreement, which entered into full force in March 2020», the official website of the Delegation of the European Union to Kazakhstan reads.

The welcoming remarks were also delivered by Ambassador of Germany Dr Tilo Klinner (Germany is currently holding Presidency of the Council of the EU), Kazakhstan’s Minister of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources Mr Magzum Mirzagaliyev, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mr Margulan Baimukhan, and Deputy Akim of Nur-Sultan city Ms Malika Bekturova. Ambassadors and representatives of 21 EU Member States accredited to Kazakhstan were present at the event.

Altogether, the diplomats planted 27 trees (15 Christmas trees and 12 oak trees), which is the number of countries represented in the EU. The trees will serve as another symbol of friendship and joint commitment of Kazakhstan and EU to a green and sustainable future.