The field of cyber security is no stranger to hyperbole and scaremongering – including the doom rhetoric forecasting a ‘Cyber Pearl Harbour’ or ‘Cyber 9/11’. For AI, the equivalent would be debates about its existential risks that invoke Arnold Schwarzenegger’s serial portrayal of The Terminator. While both cyber security and AI share the burden of unhelpful baggage, they also share something more important: AI and cyber security are likely to become increasingly interdependent. States have long tried to mitigate the risks and embrace the opportunities of cyberspace. As they now play catch up in efforts to regulate and negotiate shared principles about how to use AI, states should ensure that their respective cyber diplomacy and AI diplomacy are not conducted in silos. They should be pursued as closely together as possible.

No state wants to be left behind in the race to secure strategic advantage in AI or cyberspace – although, realistically, some states are better placed than others to cultivate a domestic ecosystem supportive of AI innovation and to harness its operational benefits. While AI is far from being a new development in cyber security, it will nonetheless be increasingly integrated into both defensive and offensive operations in cyberspace. This will increase the speed and scale of engagements, raising questions about how to ensure adequate human comprehension and control – and how to constrain competition to reduce the risk of imprudent or escalatory uses of AI in cyberspace.

Cyber Diplomacy and Cyber Power

The interdependence of AI and cyber power (in short: the ability of a state to achieve its objectives in and through cyberspace) is a striking example of how contemporary trends in geopolitical competition have affected how we think about developments in science and emerging technology. This is not a new development. International discussions of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and efforts to collaborate against cybercrime have been a formal part of the global agenda for 20 years. Through this process, states and non-state stakeholders (from the private sector to civil society) have wrestled with the darker side of the rise of the internet and digital technologies, discussing the threats posed by cyber-criminals and hostile states. The diplomatic process has had its ups and downs, but it has delivered an emerging agreement about the applicability of international law to cyberspace and the existence of a range of voluntary norms, rules and principles that should guide states’ behaviour therein. Many debates remain to be settled, such as those over the interpretation and implementation of existing norms, the merits of elaborating new norms, and the best institutional format for the next phase of global cyber diplomacy.

Foreign Ministries and Cyber Diplomacy

In the UK and other states, foreign ministries have become increasingly active in this agenda. At one level, it is unsurprising that the Diplomatic Service should be a leading institutional player in cyber diplomacy, but at another level it should be remembered that much of the substance of these diplomatic discussions has a bearing on operational activities that are the domain of a state’s armed forces and intelligence agencies. Consequently, the institutional landscape of cyber policy is somewhat crowded – particularly in those states that possess more ‘cyber power’, such as the UK. Different institutional actors will have different views about what a state’s policy should be, and relatedly, different equities at stake in the decision-making process.

Across four iterations of UK strategy (2009, 2011, 2016 and 2022), it has been evident that the UK has increased its investment in the diplomatic and foreign policy elements of cyber strategy. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is active in global cyber negotiations and discussions, including in forums such as the UN and OSCE. It is engaged in funding and developing the cyber capacities of other states and regional bodies. It is also involved in the UK’s elaboration of the concept of Responsible, Democratic Cyber Power, which serves both as an underlying principle of how the UK approaches the use of cyber power, and as a trope of strategic communication as the UK tries to shape domestic and international debates about how states should organise themselves to exercise cyber power in a precise, proportionate and well-regulated fashion.

The role of foreign ministries in this process is multifaceted. In addition to leading the negotiating effort in diplomatic forums, they provide a window into the thinking of other states about how cyber capabilities should be used and regulated, and act as a source of reporting about foreign AI innovations (both scientific and in policy or regulation). Foreign ministries have long since lost their monopoly on managing relationships with other states – defence ministries, for example, have a clear need to maintain direct contact with their foreign counterparts – but there remains a coordinating role for foreign ministries to ensure that this patchwork of foreign ties is pursued coherently.

Foreign ministries need to be organised for effective performance, for example by creating departments for cyber and emerging technology policy. The FCDO has had a cyber policy department for over a decade, and it has grown significantly in that time, but there is a valid question for the future about whether more coherence could be established by merging the department with its counterpart focused on international technology policy. Similarly, beyond the policy branch, foreign ministries should improve the knowledge baseline for policy decisions by creating and resourcing cadres for research and analysis. For all foreign ministries increasing the size of their policy effort on AI and cyber power, a useful question to ask is what a sensible commensurate increase would look like in supporting functions like research. The risk of pursuing one without the other is that the institution gets less bang for its buck overall. If states are worried about geopolitical competition in AI and cyber power – and they clearly are worried – then there is a need for a systematic net assessment of developments in other states. This should be pursued collaboratively with allies and partners, but it is first necessary to look at domestic arrangements and determine whether they are fit for purpose.

Summit Meetings: Good or Bad?

Finally, a word about the UK’s intended hosting of a global summit for AI safety, announced by the prime minister on his recent visit to the US and scheduled for later this year. It is easy to be cynical or sceptical about such initiatives. Is the cost justified by the likely benefits; could the official bandwidth they consume be devoted to other, more productive things; or will heads of government grandstanding together project the image of substantive engagement, but lead to little in practice?

In fairness, these summits can have their place, so long as they are a productive part of a wider effort. They can signal that heads of government are interested, which can drive bureaucratic activity. Even if the attendance list is restricted to the most ‘likeminded’ states, this can still have value (a recent example is the US-led Summit for Democracy) and in the short term can actually be more productive, helping to coordinate a coalition of those states most willing to embrace the challenge of ensuring that the impact of emerging technologies does not undermine democracy, freedom and human rights. But preaching to the converted will only do so much. This is especially true when an alternative approach, such as China’s, is being marketed energetically to states already receptive to the message that new technologies of surveillance and control can further tip the balance between governments and citizens.

Conclusion

The global agenda of cyber diplomacy is already busy, with debate about norms of state behaviour in cyberspace and a new cybercrime treaty. Similarly, the UK proposal of a summit on AI safety is but one example of intensifying international efforts to address the impact of AI. The challenge for foreign ministries will be to ensure coherence between these two agendas, especially recognising the priority of understanding the implications of AI for cyber norms diplomacy. Foreign ministries need to organise themselves, coordinate effectively (domestically and with allies), and contribute to the process of understanding and shaping relevant developments in other states. The implications of AI and other emerging technologies for cyber power represent a significant new priority for diplomacy and foreign policy. Foreign ministries need to adapt to meet this challenge.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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One of the most resounding absences from the discussion in Vilnius was what to do about Russia. Although Ukraine’s membership (or lack thereof), Sweden’s accession and debates around F-16s all loomed large, when it came to practicalities around the most pressing threat to European security, there were few strategic viewpoints presented beyond deterrence or total disengagement.

The starkest discussion of Russia came not from the final communique but at the NATO Public Forum – which this author attended – which was held on the side-lines of the summit. In a panel discussion, UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace noted that it would be a mistake to dismiss statements from Russia’s senior leadership entirely as propaganda. While tempting to cast them as irrelevancies, public statements do give clues about Russia’s political barometer, and a sense as to how the Russian leadership sees the world. Wallace was referring to a now-notorious essay that President Vladimir Putin wrote in July 2021 about Ukraine, which revealed his belief that Ukraine was not a country independent of Russia. Although this essay was not an inevitable precursor to the subsequent invasion, Wallace did suggest that a closer reading of official statements signalled how Ukraine was being discussed at the highest political levels in Russia.

This discussion was part of a point about the potential for nuclear escalation in Ukraine, but revealed more broadly that there are still many things we don’t know about Russian decision-making on warfare – in particular where Moscow’s red lines or thresholds for escalation might be, or a real sense of how the Kremlin is interpreting the West’s actions. For this, it is worth examining views and actions from Moscow in response to the summit.

Preparing for War?

One of the most alarming responses to the summit came from prime-time Russian talk show 60 Minutes, which claimed that the build-up of NATO forces meant that NATO was preparing for war with Russia. Despite clear messaging from NATO that it does not want a conflict with Russia, the summit was framed as escalatory, threatening a direct clash with Russia with Ukraine caught in between. No stranger to hyperbole, deputy chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned that ‘nuclear apocalypse’ was a possible scenario that could mark the end of the war. Then, the day after the summit concluded, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova went further, maintaining that the subtext of the summit had been for NATO to declare its intention to launch a major European war.

The idea that Russia is on an irreversible course of war with the West is not a new one, and has become a mainstream topic of discussion of late. But if Russia already considers itself at war with the West, and NATO believes that it has done everything to avoid escalation and direct confrontation with Russia, then there is significantly less common ground to work with. It might also be worth considering that a Russia which believes itself already at war may be willing to engage in riskier and more unpredictable behaviour, which makes de-escalation and understanding Moscow’s actual red lines much more of a challenge.

Where are the Red Lines?

It is unlikely to be a coincidence that around the summit, rhetoric from Russia on the use of nuclear weapons escalated. In the build-up to Vilnius, Putin maintained that Russia had moved nuclear weapons to Belarus, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) put out a series of (highly unlikely) conditions for their withdrawal, such as the removal of all US forces in Europe. There have also been other statements from Sergei Naryshkin, head of the SVR (foreign intelligence), that Ukraine is manufacturing a so-called ‘dirty bomb’, likely in an attempt to push a false-flag narrative. Pro-government tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda suggested that with the increase in NATO (non-nuclear) forces, Russia reserved the right to respond, including with the use of nuclear weapons.

Some of the choreography is important here. It is noteworthy that the MFA’s communication around nuclear posturing came not from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself, but from a lesser known and more junior official called Alexei Polishchuk, who leads a department on Commonwealth of Independent States – not an area of particular priority for Russia at the moment. Polishchuk has form – he has talked about Ukraine using nuclear weapons before – but it is unusual for his department to be leading on the rhetoric surrounding such a critically important issue.

While it would be unwise to ignore Russia’s signalling around the potential use of nuclear force, it does seem that the Kremlin has come to expect a response from the West whenever it is mentioned, as this returns to the agenda the urgency of opening emergency communication channels with Russia. It is possible that Russia views the West’s response as a potential weakness, or it could be attempting to probe NATO’s own willingness to use nuclear force. Or, it could be seeking to create the future basis for a practical security discussion; with Russia’s suspension of New START in February 2023, there are currently no arms control treaties underpinning nuclear security in Europe – a dangerous scenario that has prompted significant debate among the academic community in Russia, not all of it escalatory. Public sentiment is important here too – a sociological survey released on 13 July indicated that three-quarters of Russians are opposed to the country using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, even if – as the question was framed – it would win the war. The survey may have been commissioned to test the waters, and to determine the extent to which the public’s views are in line with some of the senior leadership’s comments of late.

All of this suggests that discussions about nuclear weapons and their movement to Belarus might represent more of a foreign policy tool than an actual willingness to escalate at a senior level. While it is difficult to determine where Moscow’s thresholds are, there are few issues that grab the West’s attention like the nuclear question, and Russia might have viewed this as an opportunity to insert itself back into the conversation.

What Do We Do with This?

Taking Russia’s foreign policy statements at face value is difficult. As ever, its purported aims represent a myriad of self-interests and often competing and contradictory goals. But if we assume that Russia does believe it is already at war with NATO, then there ought to be a more pressing discussion about what the West does with Russia from here.

NATO’s final communique mentions Russia numerous times as the most significant and direct threat to the world order and international security. But what was not addressed was whether there has been any collective improvement since the war began in the Alliance’s understanding and anticipation of how Moscow thinks – either regarding NATO, or about the conditions for nuclear warfare, or where its other red lines might be. If the answer is that there has not been any improvement, then there does not seem to be an agreed-upon sense of how that could change in the longer term, and the practical implications this would have for military spending or prioritisation of resources.

For a summit focused on security, there did not seem to be much strategic thinking on how to avoid groupthink about a highly dangerous adversary whose thresholds for escalation we do not fully understand.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of His Majesty’s Government, RUSI or any other institution.

Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to [email protected] and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.