In making its decision, Russia also withdrew safe passage guarantees for ships carrying grain and other foodstuffs navigating in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.
Over the past year, the Initiative has facilitated the export of more than 30 million tonnes of Ukrainian grain to global markets via three Black Sea ports, including Odesa.
The Black Sea Initiative was agreed by Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN in Istanbul last July, along with a parallel accord between the UN and Russia on grain and fertilizer exports, known as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
According to news reports, at least three people were killed during what was a third successive night of airstrikes on Wednesday into Thursday, targeting facilities in Ukrainian port cities.
At least 19 people were injured in Mykolaiv, a city close to the Black Sea, including a child, according to Ukrainian officials.
Head of communications for UN aid coordination office OCHA in Ukraine, Saviano Abreu, tweeted that the “horrific” attack on the city occurred right in the centre. Humanitarians are supporting families whose houses have been hit, and have provided emergency support including cash assistance.
Russian contradiction
In a statement released by UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric, UN chief António Guterres said the attacks “contradict” Russia’s commitments under the still active MoU, which states Russia “will facilitate the unimpeded export of food, sunflower oil and fertilizers from Ukrainian controlled Black Sea ports”.
“The Secretary-General also recalls that the destruction of civilian infrastructure may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law. These attacks are also having an impact well beyond Ukraine”, the statement continued.
Negative impact on prices
“We are already seeing the negative effect on global wheat and corn prices which hurts everyone, but especially vulnerable people in the Global South.”
Mr. Guterres said he would “not relent” in his bid to ensure Ukrainian and Russian food and fertilizer are available on international markets, linking this to ongoing efforts to combat global hunger and rising food prices worldwide.
Lifeline for world’s poorest
UN Resident Coordinator in Ukraine, Denise Brown, also condemned the attacks, saying she was horrified by the images coming from Odesa of damage and destruction.
“It is the second day in a row that this civilian port, a crucial lifeline for Ukraine and for the poorest people in the world who depend on Ukrainian grain, has been severely damaged in massive strikes.” she said in a statement.
“This is inhumane and against international humanitarian law,” she added, before calling for an end to the assaults.
New cyber resilience rules adopted on Wednesday will establish a uniform set of cybersecurity requirements for all digital products in the European Union.
The draft cyber resilience act approved by the Industry, Research and Energy Committee aims to ensure that products with digital features, e.g. phones or toys, are secure to use, resilient against cyber threats and provide enough information about their security properties.
MEPs propose more precise definitions, feasible timelines, and a fairer distribution of responsibilities. The draft rules put products into different lists based on their criticality and the level of cybersecurity risk they pose. MEPs suggest expanding this list with such product as identity management systems software, password managers, biometric readers, smart home assistants, smart watches and private security cameras. Products should also have security updates installed automatically and separately from functionality ones, MEPs add.
They also emphasise the importance of professional skills in the cybersecurity field, proposing education and training programmes, collaboration initiatives, and strategies for enhancing workforce mobility.
Quote
Lead MEP Nicola Danti (Renew, IT) said: “With ever-increasing interconnection, cybersecurity needs to become a priority for industry and consumers alike. Europe’s security in the digital domain is as strong as its weakest link. Thanks to the Cyber Resilience Act, hardware and software products will be more cyber secure, vulnerabilities will get fixed and cyber threats to our citizens will be minimised.”
Next steps
MEPs on the Industry Committee backed the draft cyber resilience act with 61 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions. They also voted to open negotiations with Council with 65 votes to 2, and 5 abstentions – a decision which will have to be greenlighted by the full House in a forthcoming plenary session.
Background
New technologies come with new risks, and the impact of cyber-attacks through digital products has increased dramatically in recent years. Consumers have fallen victim to security flaws linked to digital products such as baby monitors, robot-vacuum cleaners, Wi-Fi routers and alarm systems. For businesses, the importance of ensuring that digital products in the supply chain are secure has become pivotal, considering three in five vendors have already lost money due to product security gaps.
The UK is truly a digitised nation. In 2022, Statista figures showed that only 13% of people in the UK didn’t own any smart home devices. And 98% of the UK population has a mobile phone. All this proves we have devices everywhere: in our pockets, in our homes, and in our workplace. However, many devices work by constantly recording the world around them. And for many of us, that is unsettling.
For instance, you might be chatting to a friend about something, then pop online on your phone. All the adverts on your browser are about that thing you were just chatting about. It can be weirdly unsettling when you speak about something and an advert for it appears 10 minutes later.
The UK public has realised something is afoot. A survey in 2021 found that 66% were aware of their phones listening to them.
But why are phones listening? Is it a cause for concern? And what can you do to stop your device from quietly listening to you?
The main way your smart devices are listening is for their ‘wake words’ like ‘Hey Siri’ and ‘Alexa’. This helps them deliver functionality to you, kicking into action when needed. The likes of Siri will also send snippets of your conversations to Apple to help improve the service.
The other reason is for marketing purposes. Search engines and websites track your browser history and cookies to serve up more tailored adverts while you use the internet. They do this because more well-targeted ads are more likely to result in a sale. Some devices can also listen out for and use your voice to target these adverts.
Should I be worried?
Our phones don’t record us by mistake or illegally. If you have signed a user agreement with a tech company like Apple or Google, you will almost certainly have let them record you.
Now, whether that is a good or a bad thing depends on a few factors. Do you use these services? If not, then their recording could be an issue. Do you care about personalised ads? If not, then do you care about providing that data? And do you like sharing personal data with third parties in general? The eeriness of personalised content could be a factor here.
What can I do to improve my privacy?
If you don’t want your device to record you, there are several things you can do. First, you can add another layer of protection by using a virtual private network that will disguise your data. But wait, are VPNs legal in the UK? Well, thankfully, they are. And as a result, they can be used to protect against things like location tracking and data monitoring.
Next, visit the relevant settings in your device and turn off all settings related to your phone listening in. It can take a few minutes, but this is the best way to stop your phone from eavesdropping.
Do you care about phones listening in on your conversations? Were you aware of the practice to begin with?
During a lengthy Twitter Spaces audio chat, Musk discussed his vision for xAI, touching on topics such as the evolution of Earth and the vulnerability of civilization. As a joke, he suggested that xAI’s mission could be described by a single sentence “what the hell is really going on?”
The billionaire and Tesla CEO established xAI after criticizing other companies like OpenAI and Google for developing AI technology without adequately considering the risks to humanity.
Musk expressed that xAI would focus on building a “good AGI” (artificial general intelligence), which refers to AI capable of problem-solving similar to humans.
In the Twitter Spaces session, which experienced a delayed start due to algorithm adjustments, Musk mentioned that xAI would collaborate closely with his other companies, Twitter and Tesla.
He revealed some technical details, for example, that public tweets would be used to train xAI’s AI models, and that there could be a potential collaboration with Tesla on developing AI software. Elon Musk emphasized the mutual benefit of such an ecosystem, as it could accelerate Tesla’s progress in self-driving capabilities.
Established by the General Assembly in 1966, the Prize was awarded for the first time in 1968 on what is now Human Rights Day, 10 December, and it is awarded every five years for achievements in the field of human rights.
Previous recipients have included Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela, Dr. Denis Mukwege, Eleanor Roosevelt, Malala Yusafzai, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
This year’s winners were the Human Rights Center “Viasna”, based in Belarus, Julienne Lusenge from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Amman Center for Human Rights Studies from Jordan, Julio Pereyra from Uruguay and the Global Coalition of civil society organizations, Indigenous Peoples, social movements and local communities.
The Committee is chaired by the President of the General Assembly, and its members include the President of the Economic and Social Council, the President of the Human Rights Council, the Chair of the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Chair of the Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) provided support to the special committee.
“The winners’ dedication speaks to the universal nature of human rights at a critical time,” said Mr. Kőrösi.
The award ceremony for the 2023 Prize will take place at UN Headquarters in New York in December 2023, as part of activities to commemorate Human Rights Day.
Defending human rights
The members of the Special Committee conveyed their admiration for all civil society actors who with their work contribute tothe promotion, protection, and advancement of human rights.
They also acknowledged the important role played by human rights defenders and activists, praising them for their courage and dedication while strongly condemning any attempts to “silence and intimidate” them.
They expressed solidarity with those who are detained in retaliation for their work in defending human rights and pursuing the implementation of all the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, marking it’s 75th birthday this year.
Under the policy, all women and girls are mandated to fill out a detailed form providing personal information, reasons and previous history of traveling without a male guardian. Those who refuse to complete or submit the form are denied exit.
“Not only is this policy discriminatory, but it also restricts the freedom of movement of women and girls, including students who leave the country to study abroad,” the experts said in a statement.
The experts voiced their deep concern about the negative impact of the discriminatory procedure on the fundamental rights and freedoms of women and girls “in contradiction with Libya’s international and national obligations on non-discrimination, equality and the right to privacy.”
They were also concerned about reported attempts by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (ISA) to intimidate human rights defenders, including women, who have spoken out against these policies.
Appeal to authorities
The experts urged the authorities to withdraw this discriminatory requirement, and to prevent all intimidation, harassment and attacks against women and human rights defenders who have protested against the policy.
“The restriction marks a further erosion of the rights of women and girls in Libya and sends the wrong signal,” they said. “Women’s equality and dignity must be ensured.”
The experts who issued the statement were appointed by the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
They are not UN staff and are not paid for their work.
One of the most resounding absences from the discussion in Vilnius was what to do about Russia. Although Ukraine’s membership (or lack thereof), Sweden’s accession and debates around F-16s all loomed large, when it came to practicalities around the most pressing threat to European security, there were few strategic viewpoints presented beyond deterrence or total disengagement.
The starkest discussion of Russia came not from the final communique but at the NATO Public Forum – which this author attended – which was held on the side-lines of the summit. In a panel discussion, UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace noted that it would be a mistake to dismiss statements from Russia’s senior leadership entirely as propaganda. While tempting to cast them as irrelevancies, public statements do give clues about Russia’s political barometer, and a sense as to how the Russian leadership sees the world. Wallace was referring to a now-notorious essay that President Vladimir Putin wrote in July 2021 about Ukraine, which revealed his belief that Ukraine was not a country independent of Russia. Although this essay was not an inevitable precursor to the subsequent invasion, Wallace did suggest that a closer reading of official statements signalled how Ukraine was being discussed at the highest political levels in Russia.
This discussion was part of a point about the potential for nuclear escalation in Ukraine, but revealed more broadly that there are still many things we don’t know about Russian decision-making on warfare – in particular where Moscow’s red lines or thresholds for escalation might be, or a real sense of how the Kremlin is interpreting the West’s actions. For this, it is worth examining views and actions from Moscow in response to the summit.
One of the most alarming responses to the summit came from prime-time Russian talk show 60 Minutes, which claimed that the build-up of NATO forces meant that NATO was preparing for war with Russia. Despite clear messaging from NATO that it does not want a conflict with Russia, the summit was framed as escalatory, threatening a direct clash with Russia with Ukraine caught in between. No stranger to hyperbole, deputy chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned that ‘nuclear apocalypse’ was a possible scenario that could mark the end of the war. Then, the day after the summit concluded, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova went further, maintaining that the subtext of the summit had been for NATO to declare its intention to launch a major European war.
The idea that Russia is on an irreversible course of war with the West is not a new one, and has become a mainstream topic of discussion of late. But if Russia already considers itself at war with the West, and NATO believes that it has done everything to avoid escalation and direct confrontation with Russia, then there is significantly less common ground to work with. It might also be worth considering that a Russia which believes itself already at war may be willing to engage in riskier and more unpredictable behaviour, which makes de-escalation and understanding Moscow’s actual red lines much more of a challenge.
Where are the Red Lines?
It is unlikely to be a coincidence that around the summit, rhetoric from Russia on the use of nuclear weapons escalated. In the build-up to Vilnius, Putin maintained that Russia had moved nuclear weapons to Belarus, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) put out a series of (highly unlikely) conditions for their withdrawal, such as the removal of all US forces in Europe. There have also been other statements from Sergei Naryshkin, head of the SVR (foreign intelligence), that Ukraine is manufacturing a so-called ‘dirty bomb’, likely in an attempt to push a false-flag narrative. Pro-government tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravdasuggested that with the increase in NATO (non-nuclear) forces, Russia reserved the right to respond, including with the use of nuclear weapons.
Some of the choreography is important here. It is noteworthy that the MFA’s communication around nuclear posturing came not from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself, but from a lesser known and more junior official called Alexei Polishchuk, who leads a department on Commonwealth of Independent States – not an area of particular priority for Russia at the moment. Polishchuk has form – he has talked about Ukraine using nuclear weapons before – but it is unusual for his department to be leading on the rhetoric surrounding such a critically important issue.
While it would be unwise to ignore Russia’s signalling around the potential use of nuclear force, it does seem that the Kremlin has come to expect a response from the West whenever it is mentioned, as this returns to the agenda the urgency of opening emergency communication channels with Russia. It is possible that Russia views the West’s response as a potential weakness, or it could be attempting to probe NATO’s own willingness to use nuclear force. Or, it could be seeking to create the future basis for a practical security discussion; with Russia’s suspension of New START in February 2023, there are currently no arms control treaties underpinning nuclear security in Europe – a dangerous scenario that has prompted significant debate among the academic community in Russia, not all of it escalatory. Public sentiment is important here too – a sociological survey released on 13 July indicated that three-quarters of Russians are opposed to the country using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, even if – as the question was framed – it would win the war. The survey may have been commissioned to test the waters, and to determine the extent to which the public’s views are in line with some of the senior leadership’s comments of late.
All of this suggests that discussions about nuclear weapons and their movement to Belarus might represent more of a foreign policy tool than an actual willingness to escalate at a senior level. While it is difficult to determine where Moscow’s thresholds are, there are few issues that grab the West’s attention like the nuclear question, and Russia might have viewed this as an opportunity to insert itself back into the conversation.
What Do We Do with This?
Taking Russia’s foreign policy statements at face value is difficult. As ever, its purported aims represent a myriad of self-interests and often competing and contradictory goals. But if we assume that Russia does believe it is already at war with NATO, then there ought to be a more pressing discussion about what the West does with Russia from here.
NATO’s final communique mentions Russia numerous times as the most significant and direct threat to the world order and international security. But what was not addressed was whether there has been any collective improvement since the war began in the Alliance’s understanding and anticipation of how Moscow thinks – either regarding NATO, or about the conditions for nuclear warfare, or where its other red lines might be. If the answer is that there has not been any improvement, then there does not seem to be an agreed-upon sense of how that could change in the longer term, and the practical implications this would have for military spending or prioritisation of resources.
For a summit focused on security, there did not seem to be much strategic thinking on how to avoid groupthink about a highly dangerous adversary whose thresholds for escalation we do not fully understand.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of His Majesty’s Government, RUSI or any other institution.
Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to [email protected] and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.
The reform of the electricity market, to make it more stable, affordable and sustainable, received the support of the Energy Committee on Wednesday.
In their amendments to the draft legislation, MEPs propose to further strengthen consumer protection against volatile prices. Consumers should have the right to fixed-price contracts, dynamic price contracts, as well as more key information on the options they sign up to, banning suppliers from being able to unilaterally change the terms of a contract. The aim is to ensure that all consumers, as well as small businesses, would benefit from long-term, affordable and stable prices and to mitigate the impact of sudden price shocks.
MEPs also advocate that EU countries prohibit suppliers from cutting the electricity supply of vulnerable customers, including during disputes between suppliers and customers, and prevent suppliers from requiring these customers to use prepayment systems.
Special contracts and flexibility
The Energy Committee backs wider use of so-called “Contracts for Difference” (CFDs) to encourage energy investments and suggest leaving the door open for equivalent support schemes after approval by the Commission. In a CFD, a public authority compensates the energy producer if market prices fall too steeply, but collects payments from them if prices are too high.
MEPs also highlight the importance of Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) in providing consumers with stable prices and renewable energy providers with reliable revenues. The European Commission is tasked with setting up a marketplace for PPAs by the end of 2024.
MEPs adjusted the criteria for declaring an electricity price crisis, to make sure there are concrete measures to better protect citizens and companies.
The committee also advocates in favour of “non-fossil flexibility” (the ability of the power grid to adjust to changes in supply and demand without relying on fossil fuels) and flexibility on the demand side, for instance via the use of home battery systems. This can help balance the electricity grid, reduce price fluctuations, and empower consumers to adapt their energy consumption to prices and their needs.
Quote
“With this agreement, Parliament puts citizens at the centre of the design of the electricity market, prohibiting companies from cutting the power of vulnerable and at-risk consumers, promoting the right to share energy, reducing price spikes and promoting affordable prices for citizens and companies”, said lead MEP Nicolás González Casares (S&D, ES). “We turned CfDs into the reference system for encouraging the electricity sector to transition towards a renewable-based zero-emission system. A system that will improve make companies more competitive through clean electricity at competitive and stable prices”, he added.
Next steps
The electricity market reform was backed by 55 MEPs on the Industry, Research and Energy Committee, 15 voted against and 2 abstained. They also voted to open negotiations with Council by 47 votes to 20 against, and 5 abstentions – a decision which will have to be greenlighted by the full House in a forthcoming plenary session.
Background
Energy prices have been rising since mid-2021, initially in the context of the post-COVID-19 economic recovery. However, energy prices rose steeply due to gas supply problems following the launch of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022, which unleashed an energy crisis. High gas prices had an immediate effect on electricity prices, as they are linked together under the merit order system, where the most expensive (usually fossil fuel-based) energy source sets the overall electricity price.
“The lives of those in need should never be reduced to the tactics of geopolitical games,” Csaba Kőrösi, President of the 77th session of the General Assembly, said.
“Humanitarian action must always be guided by the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. As such, effective humanitarian assistance can never be held hostage by any political interest,” he added.
The veto is a special voting power of the Permanent Member States at the Council, whereby if any one of the five permanent members — China, France, Russia, the UK and the US — cast a negative vote, the resolution or decision automatically fails.
On 11 July, a Security Council resolution on the renewal of a cross-border aid delivery mechanism from Türkiye into northern Syria, failed after Russia vetoed the draft. Thirteen of the 15 Council members voted in favor and China abstained.
Also on 11 July, a second resolution for a six-month extension of the mechanism also failed to adopt as it lacked the required number of affirmative votes. The resolution was submitted by Russia and supported by China. Three Member States (France, UK and US) voted against and 10 abstained.
The failure to extend the mechanism virtually halted all aid convoys, leaving over 4.1 million people, mostly women and children, cut off from essential supplies.
The Bab al-Hawa crossing had been the backbone for relief operations in the region since 2014, handling over 85 per cent of aid deliveries.
Prioritize needs
Assembly President Csaba Kőrösi urged members of the Security Council to prioritize the needs of the affected population.
“To the Security Council, I call on you to be alive to the realities and oriented towards genuine solutions; to urgently prioritize long-term cooperation over division; and the humanitarian imperative over brinksmanship,” he said.
“Together, we have the power to make a meaningful difference. The people of Syria are counting on us to deliver,” Mr. Kőrösi concluded.
About Falun Gong // July 20 marks the anniversary of one of the bloodiest, and yet widely unacknowledged assaults on religious freedom in the contemporary world, medieval in its violence. The terror continues and obligates national governments and civil society to defend its victims and sanction its perpetrators.
In 1999, the Chinese Communist regime began repression and persecution of Falun Gong (also called Falun Dafa). Falun Gog is a new religious movement, established by Li Hongzhi in 1992 in China. It is nonpolitical and total pacifist and teaches both a variety of traditional Chinese gymnastics and a spirituality rooted in the “Three Teachings,” a Chinese religion including Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, with some New Age variations.
Falun Gong was originally tolerated and even praised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a healthy practice that was good for citizens, but two elements eventually aroused concern among CCP authorities. As much as the regime tried to present it as a purely secular practice, its spiritual dimension could not be denied or removed. What is more, the movement rapidly grew in size.
Considering Falun Gong a threat to its monopoly on authority, the CCP banned it in 1999, including it in the list of “xie jiao,” meaning “heterodox teachings.” The traditional term has been by Chinese political rulers to stigmatize groups and individuals they disliked. The CCP revived the expression, using it in the same manner term “cult” is used in some Western milieus, and started using it as a pretext to severely persecute Falun Gong practitioners and other groups.
The Falun Dafa Infocenter reports that the total number of believers documented to have died due to persecution now surpasses 5,000, with the youngest being a 17-year-old model student in Heilongjiang in August 1999, Chen Ying, and the eldest an 82-year-old retired professor, An Fuzi, a Korean, who died in Jilin Province Women’s Prison on May 22, 2023 after two years in detention.
The Center also documents that from January to June 2023, there were 3,133 documented cases of arrests and harassment, a 15.7 per cent jump from the same period in 2022. No one should also forget that Falun Gong was for decades the preferred victim of organ harvesting, the forcible extraction of vital parts from the bodies of prisoners of conscience, some of whom are still alive, to feed the lucrative Chinese black market for transplants. Today, this practice continues and is extended also to Uyghurs and Tibetans, and possibly others; there are fears that the regime’s massive DNA profiling may serve organ harvesting programs.
In 2018 and 2019, crimes perpetrated by the CCP against Falun Gong were thoroughly documented by the London-based “China Tribunal,” chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice, the former lead prosecutor at the trial of Slobodan Milošević in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
This year, approaching the anniversary of the beginning of their persecution, Falun Gong practitioners living in 44 countries compiled a list of perpetrators and submitted it to their respective governments, urging them to hold these individuals accountable. They ask their governments to bar these criminals and their family members from entry in those 44 countries and to freeze their overseas assets. Minghui.org, a volunteer organization working as the central communication hub for the Falun Gong community worldwide, underlines that “[o]fficials from the U.S. State Department informed several years ago that the materials provided by Falun Gong practitioners are authentic and credible, presented in a professional manner, and can be used as a model for other groups.”
Victims and survivors among the Falun Gong appealing to governments and international organizations to take action against individuals responsible for crimes against them. To hold them accountable will can ease pressure against Falun Gong, and help prevent members of other religious minorities from suffering similar abuses.
The list of the 44 countries, available on Minghui.org, includes all the “Five Eyes” alliance members (an international intelligence operation for security), many nations in Asia, America, and Europe, and all the 27 countries of the European Union: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand; Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Romania, Czech Republic, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta; Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Israel, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Dominica and Argentina.
The list of persecutors involves officials from various regions. Among them are:
• Fan Lubing: Director of the Prison Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, former Secretary of the Party Committee of the Central Judicial Police Academy (National Lawyer Academy), former director of the Research Office of the Ministry of Justice (director of the Judicial Research Institute) and president of the “China Judicial” magazine.
• Li Rulin: President of China Institute of Integrity and Legal System, former Deputy Chief Procurator of the Supreme Procuratorate, former member of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Political Department of the Supreme Procuratorate, former Director of the Labor Re-education Administration of the Ministry of Justice.
• Liu Jiayi: Member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Director of the Proposal Committee, former Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee.
• Ye Hanbing: Vice Governor of Sichuan Province, Director and Party Secretary of the Provincial Public Security Department, Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, former Deputy Director of the Zhejiang Provincial Public Security Department, former Deputy Secretary of the Hangzhou Municipal Legal Committee, Party Secretary and Director of the Hangzhou Public Security Bureau And Inspector General.
• Li Chenglin: Deputy Governor of Shanxi Province, Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the Provincial Public Security Department, Former Secretary of the Party Leadership Group, Chief Prosecutor of the Liaoning Provincial Procuratorate, Member of the Political and Legal Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, Former Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the Higher Court of Jilin Province, associate dean.
• You Quanrong: Secretary of the Party Leadership Group, Vice President, Acting President, and President of the High Court of Hubei Province;
• Zhang Yi: Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Chief Prosecutor of the Hainan Provincial Procuratorate, Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, Former Party Secretary and Director of the Jilin Provincial Judicial Department, Former First Political Commissar of the Jilin Provincial Prison Administration Bureau, Former Executive Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the Ministry of Justice He is also Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and former Deputy Director of the Legal Affairs Department of the Ministry of Justice.
• Tan Zunhua: First-level inspector of Heilongjiang Prison Administration Bureau, former member of the Party Committee of the Heilongjiang Provincial Department of Justice, deputy secretary of the Party Committee and director of the Provincial Prison Administration Bureau.
• Yi Jianmin: Member of the Party Committee of the Department of Justice of Heilongjiang Province, Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the Provincial Prison Administration Bureau.
• Li Yilong: Deputy Secretary of the Wuhan Municipal Party Committee, Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee, former member of the Standing Committee of the Wuhan Municipal Party Committee, Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the Municipal Party Committee, Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the Municipal Public Security Bureau, former Deputy Director of the Public Security Department of Hubei Province, director of the Political Department, former member of the Standing Committee of the Ezhou Municipal Committee of Hubei Province , Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the Municipal Party Committee, and Director of the Municipal Public Security Bureau.
• Xue Changyi: Member of the Party Leadership Group, Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Member of the Procuratorial Committee, Senior Prosecutor of the Henan Provincial Procuratorate, Former Chief Procurator of the Nanyang City Procuratorate of Henan Province.
• Li Qiang: Deputy Governor of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province, Secretary of the Party Committee and Chief Inspector of the State Public Security Bureau, Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the State Party Committee, and former Chief of the National Security Corps of the Sichuan Provincial Public Security Bureau.
• Dong Kaide: Executive Deputy Secretary of Shenyang Municipal Legal Committee, former Director of Shenyang Municipal Bureau of Justice and Director of Prison Administration.
• Tian Zhi: Director of Shenyang Dongling Prison, former director of Shenyang Zhangshi Drug Rehabilitation Center.
• Qin Keping: Warden and Political Commissar of Jiazhou Prison, Sichuan Province.
• Luo Jiangtao: Director of the Political Department of Jiazhou Prison, Sichuan Province, former head of the Education and Reform Section of Jiazhou Prison.
• Shao Ling: Chief of the Education and Reform Section of Jiazhou Prison, Sichuan Province
