In a groundbreaking move towards inclusivity, the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament has unanimously adopted a proposal for an EU Disability Card, aiming to facilitate the free movement of persons with disabilities within the European Union. The initiative also seeks to revamp the European Parking Card for individuals with disabilities, ensuring equal rights and conditions for cardholders when traveling or visiting other EU countries.
Persons with disabilities often face barriers when crossing borders within the EU due to varying recognition of their disability status. The proposed directive aims to streamline this process by introducing a standardized EU Disability Card and enhancing the European Parking Card, providing individuals with disabilities access to the same special conditions, including parking, regardless of the member state they are in.
Key Highlights:
1. Swift Issuance and Digital Options:
The EU Disability Card is proposed to be issued or renewed within 60 days, while the European Parking Card would be processed within 30 days, both at no cost.
A digital version of the parking card can be requested and obtained within 15 days, offering a convenient and efficient alternative.
2. Inclusive Accessibility:
Both cards will be available in physical and digital formats, ensuring accessibility for a broader range of users.
Rules and conditions for obtaining the cards will be made available in accessible formats, national and international sign languages, braille, and easily understandable language.
3. Recognition for Work, Study, and Erasmus+:
To facilitate access to benefits and social assistance, the proposal includes temporary protection for European Disability Card holders working or studying in another member state until their status is formally recognized.
This extends to individuals participating in EU mobility programs, such as Erasmus+.
4. Awareness and Information:
Member states and the Commission are urged to raise awareness about the European Disability Card and the European Parking Card, establishing a comprehensive website with information available in all EU languages and national and international sign languages.
5. Unanimous Political Support:
The Employment and Social Affairs Committee’s endorsement, with 39 votes in favor and no votes against or abstentions, reflects a united commitment to fostering freedom of movement for persons with disabilities within the EU.
Lucia Ďuriš Nicholsonová, the rapporteur for this legislation, emphasized the significance of this milestone, stating,
“With the adoption of this crucial piece of legislation, persons with disabilities are a step closer to having freedom of movement within the EU.”
Lucia Ďuriš Nicholsonová
The proposal will move to the January plenary session for further endorsement. Once approved, negotiations with the Council will commence, aiming to bring this legislation to fruition and provide tangible benefits for persons with disabilities at the earliest opportunity.
By the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church
The Orthodox Church, as the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church, in her profound ecclesiastical self-consciousness, believes unflinchingly that she occupies a central place in the matter of the promotion of Christian unity in the world today.
The Orthodox Church founds the unity of the Church on the fact of her establishment by our Lord Jesus Christ, and on the communion in the Holy Trinity and in the sacraments. This unity is expressed through the apostolic succession and the patristic tradition and is lived out in the Church up to the present day. The Orthodox Church has the mission and duty to transmit and preach all the truth contained in Holy Scripture and Holy Tradition, which also bestows upon the Church her catholic character.
The responsibility of the Orthodox Church for unity as well as her ecumenical mission were articulated by the Ecumenical Councils. These stressed most especially the indissoluble bond between true faith and sacramental communion.
The Orthodox Church, which prays unceasingly “for the union of all,” has always cultivated dialogue with those estranged from her, those both far and near. In particular, she has played a leading role in the contemporary search for ways and means to restore the unity of those who believe in Christ, and she has participated in the Ecumenical Movement from its outset, and has contributed to its formation and further development. Moreover, the Orthodox Church, thanks to the ecumenical and loving spirit which distinguishes her, praying as divinely commanded that all men may be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4), has always worked for the restoration of Christian unity. Hence, Orthodox participation in the movement to restore unity with other Christians in the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church is in no way foreign to the nature and history of the Orthodox Church, but rather represents a consistent expression of the apostolic faith and tradition in a new historical circumstances.
The contemporary bilateral theological dialogues of the Orthodox Church and her participation in the Ecumenical Movement rest on this self-consciousness of Orthodoxy and her ecumenical spirit, with the aim of seeking the unity of all Christians on the basis of the truth of the faith and tradition of the ancient Church of the Seven Ecumenical Councils.
In accordance with the ontological nature of the Church, her unity can never be perturbed. In spite of this, the Orthodox Church accepts the historical name of other non-Orthodox Christian Churches and Confessions that are not in communion with her, and believes that her relations with them should be based on the most speedy and objective clarification possible of the whole ecclesiological question, and most especially of their more general teachings on sacraments, grace, priesthood, and apostolic succession. Thus, she was favorably and positively disposed, both for theological and pastoral reasons, towards theological dialogue with other Christians on a bi-lateral and multi-lateral level, and towards more general participation in the Ecumenical Movement of recent times, in the conviction that through dialogue she gives a dynamic witness to the fullness of truth in Christ and to her spiritual treasures to those who are outside her, with the objective aim of smoothing the path leading to unity.
In this spirit, all the local Most Holy Orthodox Churches participate actively today in the official theological dialogues, and the majority of these Churches also participate in various national, regional and international inter-Christian organizations, in spite of the deep crisis that has arisen in the Ecumenical Movement. This manifold activity of the Orthodox Church springs from a sense of responsibility and from the conviction that mutual understanding and cooperation are of fundamental importance if we wish never to “put an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ (1 Cor 9:12).
Certainly, while the Orthodox Church dialogues with other Christians, she does not underestimate the difficulties inherent in this endeavor; she perceives these difficulties, however, on the path towards a common understanding of the tradition of the ancient Church and in hope that the Holy Spirit, Who “welds together the whole institution of the Church, (Sticheron at Vespers of Pentecost), will “make up that which is lacking” (Ordination Prayer). In this sense, the Orthodox Church in her relations with the rest of the Christian world, relies not only on the human efforts of those involved in dialogue, but especially on the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the grace of the Lord, who prayed “that…all may be one” (Jn 17:21).
The contemporary bilateral theological dialogues, announced by the Pan-Orthodox meetings, express the unanimous decision of all local most holy Orthodox Churches who are called to participate actively and continually in them, so that the unanimous witness of Orthodoxy to the glory of the Triune God may not be hindered. In the event that a certain local Church chooses not to assign a representative to a particular dialogue or one of its sessions, if this decision is not pan-Orthodox, the dialogue still continues. Prior to the start of the dialogue or of the session, the absence of any local Church ought to be discussed at all events by the Orthodox Committee of the dialogue to express the solidarity and unity of the Orthodox Church. The bi-lateral and multi-lateral theological dialogues need to be subject to periodical evaluations on a pan-Orthodox level.
The problems that arise during the theological discussions within Joint Theological Commissions are not always sufficient grounds for any local Orthodox Church unilaterally to recall its representatives or definitively withdraw from the dialogue. As a general rule, the withdrawal of a Church from a particular dialogue should be avoided; in those instances when this occurs, inter-Orthodox efforts to reestablish representational fullness in the Orthodox Theological Commission of the dialogue in question should be initiated. Should one or more local Orthodox Churches refuse to take part in the sessions of the Joint Theological Commission of a particular dialogue, citing serious ecclesiological, canonical, pastoral, or ethical reasons, this/these Church(es) shall notify the Ecumenical Patriarch and all the Orthodox Churches in writing, in accordance with pan-Orthodox practice. During a pan-Orthodox meeting the Ecumenical Patriarch shall seek unanimous consensus among the Orthodox Churches about possible courses of action, which may also include— should this be unanimously deemed necessary—a reassessment of the progress of the theological dialogue in question.
The methodology followed in the theological dialogues aims at both the resolution of the received theological differences or of possible new differentiations, and to seek the common elements of the Christian faith. This process requires that the entire Church is kept informed on the various developments of the dialogues. In the event that it is impossible to overcome a specific theological difference, the theological dialogue may continue, recording the disagreement identified and bringing it to the attention of all the local Orthodox Churches for their consideration on what ought to be done henceforth.
It is clear that in the theological dialogues the common goal of all is the ultimate restoration of unity in true faith and love. The existing theological and ecclesiological differences permit, however, a certain hierarchical ordering of the challenges lying in the way of meeting this pan-Orthodox objective. The distinctive problems of each bilateral dialogue require a differentiation in the methodology followed in it, but not a differentiation in the aim, since the aim is one in all the dialogues.
Nevertheless, it is essential if necessary for an attempt to be made to coordinate the work of the various Inter-Orthodox Theological Committees, bearing in mind that the existing unity of the Orthodox Church must also be revealed and manifested in this area of these dialogues.
The conclusion of any official theological dialogue occurs with the completion of the work of the relevant Joint Theological Commission. The Chairman of the Inter-Orthodox Commission then submits a report to the Ecumenical Patriarch, who, with the consent of the Primates of the local Orthodox Churches, declares the conclusion of the dialogue. No dialogue is considered complete before it is proclaimed through such a pan-Orthodox decision.
Upon the successful conclusion of the work of any theological dialogue, the pan-Orthodox decision about the restoration of ecclesiastical communion must, however, rest on the unanimity of all the local Orthodox Churches.
One of the principal bodies in the history of the Ecumenical Movement is the World Council of Churches (WCC). Certain Orthodox Churches were among the Council’s founding members and later, all the local Orthodox Churches became members. The WCC is a structured inter-Christian body, despite the fact that it does not include all non-Orthodox Christian Churches and Confessions. At the same time, there are other inter-Christian organizations and regional bodies, such as the Conference of European Churches, the Middle East Council of Churches and the African Council of Churches. These, along with the WCC, fulfill an important mission by promoting the unity of the Christian world. The Orthodox Churches of Georgia and Bulgaria withdrew from the WCC, the former in 1997, and the latter in 1998. They have their own particular opinion on the work of the World Council of Churches and hence do not participate in its activities and those of other inter-Christian organizations.
The local Orthodox Churches that are members of the WCC participate fully and equally in the WCC, contributing with all means at their disposal to the advancement of peaceful co-existence and co-operation in the major socio-political challenges. The Orthodox Church readily accepted the WCC’s decision to respond to her request concerning the establishment of the Special Commission on Orthodox Participation in the World Council of Churches, which was mandated by the Inter-Orthodox Conference held in Thessaloniki in 1998. The established criteria of the Special Commission, proposed by the Orthodox and accepted by the WCC, led to the formation of the Permanent Committee on Consensus and Collaboration. The criteria were approved and included in the Constitution and Rules of the World Council of Churches.
Remaining faithful to her ecclesiology, to the identity of her internal structure, and to the teaching of the ancient Church of the Seven Ecumenical Councils, the Orthodox Church’s participation in the WCC does not signify that she accepts the notion of the “equality of Confessions,” and in no way is she able to accept the unity of the Church as an inter-confessional compromise. In this spirit, the unity that is sought within the WCC cannot simply be the product of theological agreements, but must also be founded on the unity of faith, preserved in the sacraments and lived out in the Orthodox Church.
The Orthodox Churches that are members of the WCC regard as an indispensable condition of their participation in the WCC the foundational article of its Constitution, in accordance with which its members may only be those who believe in the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Savior in accordance with the Scriptures, and who confess the Triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in accordance with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. It is their deep conviction that the ecclesiological presuppositions of the 1950 Toronto Statement, On the Church, the Churches and the World Council of Churches, are of paramount importance for Orthodox participation in the Council. It is therefore very clear that the WCC does not by any means constitute a “super-Church.” The purpose of the World Council of Churches is not to negotiate unions between Churches, which can only be done by the Churches themselves acting on their own initiative, but to bring Churches into living contact with each other and to promote the study and discussion of the issues of Church unity. No Church is obliged to change her ecclesiology on her accession to the Council… Moreover, from the fact of its inclusion in the Council, it does not ensue that each Church is obliged to regard the other Churches as Churches in the true and full sense of the term. (Toronto Statement, § 2).
The prospects for conducting theological dialogues between the Orthodox Church and the rest of the Christian world are always determined on the basis of the canonical principles of Orthodox ecclesiology and the canonical criteria of the already established Church Tradition (Canon 7 of the Second Ecumenical Council and Canon 95 of the Quinisext Ecumenical Council).
The Orthodox Church wishes to support the work of the Commission on “Faith and Order” and follows its theological contribution with particular interest to this day. It views favorably the Commission’s theological documents, which were developed with the significant participation of Orthodox theologians and represent a praiseworthy step in the Ecumenical Movement for the rapprochement of Christians. Nonetheless, the Orthodox Church maintains reservations concerning paramount issues of faith and order, because the non-Orthodox Churches and Confessions have diverged from the true faith of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.
The Orthodox Church considers all efforts to break the unity of the Church, undertaken by individuals or groups under the pretext of maintaining or allegedly defending true Orthodoxy, as being worthy of condemnation. As evidenced throughout the life of the Orthodox Church, the preservation of the true Orthodox faith is ensured only through the conciliar system, which has always represented the highest authority in the Church on matters of faith and canonical decrees. (Canon 6 2nd Ecumenical Council)
The Orthodox Church has a common awareness of the necessity for conducting inter-Christian theological dialogue. It therefore believes that this dialogue should always be accompanied by witness to the world through acts expressing mutual understanding and love, which express the “ineffable joy” of the Gospel (1 Pt 1:8), eschewing every act of proselytism, uniatism, or other provocative act of inter-confessional competition. In this spirit, the Orthodox Church deems it important for all Christians, inspired by common fundamental principles of the Gospel, to attempt to offer with eagerness and solidarity a response to the thorny problems of the contemporary world, based on the prototype of the new man in Christ.
The Orthodox Church is aware that the movement to restore Christian unity is taking on new forms in order to respond to new circumstances and to address the new challenges of today’s world. The continued witness of the Orthodox Church to the divided Christian world on the basis of the apostolic tradition and faith is imperative.
We pray that all Christians may work together so that the day may soon come when the Lord will fulfill the hope of the Orthodox Churches and there will be “one flock and one shepherd” (Jn 10:16).
† Rastislav of Presov, the Czech Lands and Slovakia
Delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
† Leo of Karelia and All Finland
† Stephanos of Tallinn and All Estonia
† Elder Metropolitan John of Pergamon
† Elder Archbishop Demetrios of America
† Augustinos of Germany
† Irenaios of Crete
† Isaiah of Denver
† Alexios of Atlanta
† Iakovos of the Princes’ Islands
† Joseph of Proikonnisos
† Meliton of Philadelphia
† Emmanuel of France
† Nikitas of the Dardanelles
† Nicholas of Detroit
† Gerasimos of San Francisco
† Amphilochios of Kisamos and Selinos
† Amvrosios of Korea
† Maximos of Selyvria
† Amphilochios of Adrianopolis
† Kallistos of Diokleia
† Antony of Hierapolis, Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox in the USA
† Job of Telmessos
† Jean of Charioupolis, Head of the Patriarchal Exarchate for Orthodox Parishes of the Russian Tradition in Western Europe
† Gregory of Nyssa, Head of the Carpatho-Russian Orthodox in the USA
Delegation of the Patriarchate of Alexandria
† Gabriel of Leontopolis
† Makarios of Nairobi
† Jonah of Kampala
† Seraphim of Zimbabwe and Angola
† Alexandros of Nigeria
† Theophylaktos of Tripoli
† Sergios of Good Hope
† Athanasios of Cyrene
† Alexios of Carthage
† Ieronymos of Mwanza
† George of Guinea
† Nicholas of Hermopolis
† Dimitrios of Irinopolis
† Damaskinos of Johannesburg and Pretoria
† Narkissos of Accra
† Emmanouel of Ptolemaidos
† Gregorios of Cameroon
† Nicodemos of Memphis
† Meletios of Katanga
† Panteleimon of Brazzaville and Gabon
† Innokentios of Burudi and Rwanda
† Crysostomos of Mozambique
† Neofytos of Nyeri and Mount Kenya
Delegation of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem
† Benedict of Philadelphia
† Aristarchos of Constantine
† Theophylaktos of Jordan
† Nektarios of Anthidon
† Philoumenos of Pella
Delegation of the Church of Serbia
† Jovan of Ohrid and Skopje
† Amfilohije of Montenegro and the Littoral
† Porfirije of Zagreb and Ljubljana
† Vasilije of Sirmium
† Lukijan of Budim
† Longin of Nova Gracanica
† Irinej of Backa
† Hrizostom of Zvornik and Tuzla
† Justin of Zica
† Pahomije of Vranje
† Jovan of Sumadija
† Ignatije of Branicevo
† Fotije of Dalmatia
† Athanasios of Bihac and Petrovac
† Joanikije of Niksic and Budimlje
† Grigorije of Zahumlje and Hercegovina
† Milutin of Valjevo
† Maksim in Western America
† Irinej in Australia and New Zealand
† David of Krusevac
† Jovan of Slavonija
† Andrej in Austria and Switzerland
† Sergije of Frankfurt and in Germany
† Ilarion of Timok
Delegation of the Church of Romania
† Teofan of Iasi, Moldova and Bucovina
† Laurentiu of Sibiu and Transylvania
† Andrei of Vad, Feleac, Cluj, Alba, Crisana and Maramures
† Irineu of Craiova and Oltenia
† Ioan of Timisoara and Banat
† Iosif in Western and Southern Europe
† Serafim in Germany and Central Europe
† Nifon of Targoviste
† Irineu of Alba Iulia
† Ioachim of Roman and Bacau
† Casian of Lower Danube
† Timotei of Arad
† Nicolae in America
† Sofronie of Oradea
† Nicodim of Strehaia and Severin
† Visarion of Tulcea
† Petroniu of Salaj
† Siluan in Hungary
† Siluan in Italy
† Timotei in Spain and Portugal
† Macarie in Northern Europe
† Varlaam Ploiesteanul, Assistant Bishop to the Patriarch
† Emilian Lovisteanul, Assistant Bishop to the Archdiocese of Ramnic
† Ioan Casian of Vicina, Assistant Bishop to the Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of the Americas
Delegation of the Church of Cyprus
† Georgios of Paphos
† Chrysostomos of Kition
† Chrysostomos of Kyrenia
† Athanasios of Limassol
† Neophytos of Morphou
† Vasileios of Constantia and Ammochostos
† Nikiphoros of Kykkos and Tillyria
† Isaias of Tamassos and Oreini
† Barnabas of Tremithousa and Lefkara
† Christophoros of Karpasion
† Nektarios of Arsinoe
† Nikolaos of Amathus
† Epiphanios of Ledra
† Leontios of Chytron
† Porphyrios of Neapolis
† Gregory of Mesaoria
Delegation of the Church of Greece
† Prokopios of Philippi, Neapolis and Thassos
† Chrysostomos of Peristerion
† Germanos of Eleia
† Alexandros of Mantineia and Kynouria
† Ignatios of Arta
† Damaskinos of Didymoteixon, Orestias and Soufli
† Alexios of Nikaia
† Hierotheos of Nafpaktos and Aghios Vlasios
† Eusebios of Samos and Ikaria
† Seraphim of Kastoria
† Ignatios of Demetrias and Almyros
† Nicodemos of Kassandreia
† Ephraim of Hydra, Spetses and Aegina
† Theologos of Serres and Nigrita
† Makarios of Sidirokastron
† Anthimos of Alexandroupolis
† Barnabas of Neapolis and Stavroupolis
† Chrysostomos of Messenia
† Athenagoras of Ilion, Acharnon and Petroupoli
† Ioannis of Lagkada, Litis and Rentinis
† Gabriel of New Ionia and Philadelphia
† Chrysostomos of Nikopolis and Preveza
† Theoklitos of Ierissos, Mount Athos and Ardameri
Delegation of the Church of Poland
† Simon of Lodz and Poznan
† Abel of Lublin and Chelm
† Jacob of Bialystok and Gdansk
† George of Siemiatycze
† Paisios of Gorlice
Delegation of the Church of Albania
† Joan of Koritsa
† Demetrios of Argyrokastron
† Nikolla of Apollonia and Fier
† Andon of Elbasan
† Nathaniel of Amantia
† Asti of Bylis
Delegation of the Church of the Czech lands and Slovakia
† Michal of Prague
† Isaiah of Sumperk
Photo: Council’s logo
Note on the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church: Given the difficult political situation in the Middle East, the Synaxis of the Primates of January 2016 decided not to assemble the Council in Constantinople and finally decided to convoke the Holy and Great Council at the Orthodox Academy of Crete from 18 to 27 June 2016. The opening of the Council took place after the Divine Liturgy of the feast of Pentecost, and the closure – the Sunday of All Saints, according to the Orthodox calendar. The Synaxis of the Primates of January 2016 has approved the relevant texts as the six items on the agenda of the Council:The mission of the Orthodox Church in the contemporary world; The Orthodox diaspora; Autonomy and the manner of its proclamation; The sacrament of marriage and its impediments; The importance of fasting and its observance today; The relationship of the Orthodox Church with the rest of the Christian world.
An icon of St. Matrona of Moscow, which also depicts Soviet commander-in-chief Joseph Stalin, was placed in Tbilisi’s Holy Trinity Cathedral. The icon was placed a few months ago, but on the eve of the Nativity of Christ in the old style, it was moved to a more central place, where it attracts the attention of visitors. Georgian historian Giorgi Kandelaki posted photos of the icon on his Facebook page with the words: “Icon of Joseph Stalin, the initiator of the destruction of Georgia’s independence, the murderer of thousands of clergy and the creator of the Soviet totalitarian system, in the Holy Trinity Cathedral.” Another success for the Russian information war machine.”
His publication found a strong public response and the patriarchate had to comment on the case. The head of the press office of the patriarchate, Fr. Andrija Jagmaidze confirmed in a conversation with the Georgian publication CNews that Stalin is indeed depicted on one of the icons in the cathedral, but reminded that the icons sometimes have images of people who insulted or persecuted the Church. He gave as an example the persecutor of Christians Diocletian, who is depicted on the icon “St. George advises Diocletian”. According to the representative of the patriarchate, it is not the icon itself that is a provocation to the feelings of the faithful, but the drawing of attention to it on the eve of the holiday.
However, his words did not convince the outraged people, who rightly note that on this icon Stalin is not represented as a torturer, as is the case with the icon of St. George, but as a meek Christian standing humbly next to a saint. She wants to legitimize the myth of Stalin’s secret Christianity, which is particularly popular among supporters of the Soviet regime.
On January 10, the icon was covered with blue paint. Civil activist Nata Peradze published footage of the painted icon. This is the reason why dozens of supporters of one of the far-right Georgian movements with a pro-Putin orientation surrounded her home and attempted to lynch her, “finishing what the state does not do.” The police did not allow suicide. As RFE/RL’s Georgian Service reported, an angry mob swarmed the house of Georgian activist Nata Peradze on January 10 after she posted a video online showing blue paint splattered on an icon of St. Matrona of Moscow in Tbilisi’s Holy Trinity Cathedral that had recently sparked controversy because it carries an image of the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. It was initially unclear whether Peradze had defaced the icon, but as activists of the pro-Russia Alt-Info group gathered outside her home and loudly accused her of “insulting the icon,” she admitted she threw the paint.
Georgia’s Institute for the Study of the Soviet Past has called for the icon to be removed from the central Georgian temple. They remind that the icon was placed in the temple on the eve of the 103rd anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Georgia, “which began precisely on the initiative of Joseph Stalin”, and is “an insult to the memory of the victims of Soviet Russian totalitarianism”: “During Joseph Stalin’s rule in Georgia saw the execution of hundreds of clergy, most of them pastors and parishioners of the Georgian Orthodox Church, especially during the anti-Soviet uprising of 1924 and then during the Stalinist terror of 1937-1938. during Stalin’s rule, some 80,000 clergy and up to one million citizens were executed simply for their religious beliefs,” the organization said in a statement.
However, after the paint splatter incident, the icon was cleaned and placed in an even more central location in the temple, and media access to the temple was temporarily banned “without permission”.
Meanwhile, it is clear that the icon was donated to the church in Tbilisi by the leaders of the pro-Russian Alliance of Patriots party Irma Inashvili and David Tarkhan-Muravi. It aims to revive the cult of Stalin on church grounds, so that he is presented as a patron of the church and not as a persecutor. This goal is clearly recognized by the faithful who react sharply to this provocation, especially since in the recent church history of Georgia, its most popular contemporary saint Gabriel (Urgebadze) is known for his act of protest when during the Holy Week of 1965. publicly burns a portrait of Lenin with the words: “The Lord says: Do not make for yourself an idol or any image of that which is in heaven above, that is on the earth below, and that is in the water under the earth; do not bow down to them and do not serve them.’ Lenin’s portrait was carried at a demonstration on the eve of Easter, and neither the saint nor his contemporaries could have guessed that the time would come when the images of the persecutors of the Church of Christ would occupy a place of honor in the temple.
Former Olympic champion Laura Flessel and world champion Camille Lacour will take part in the Olympic torch relay for the 2024 Summer Games in Paris, organizers have announced.
About 11,000 people will carry the Olympic flame, and among them 3,000 will do so as part of the relay, two of whom are Flessel, a two-time gold medalist in fencing in 1996, and Lacour, the five-time world swimming champion.
Pascal Gentil, bronze medalist in taekwondo in 2000 and 2004, will also be a participant in the relay.
Olympic rowing champion from Greece Stefanos Ntouskos will be the first after the fire lighting ceremony in ancient Olympia.
The Olympic flame will be lit in Greece, the birthplace of the ancient Olympic Games, on April 16 in a traditional ceremony with an actress playing a high priestess lighting the torch using a parabolic mirror and the sun.
The High Priestess will pass the flame to Ntuskos, who won gold in the men’s skiff event at the 2021 Tokyo Games.
After an 11-day relay across mainland Greece and seven of its islands, with the help of 600 torchbearers, the flame will be handed over to the organizers of the Paris Games in Athens on April 26, with Olympic water polo silver medalist Ioannis Fountoulis as the final torchbearer.
The flame will travel aboard the three-masted ship Belém to the French port city of Marseille, where the sailing events of the Olympics will be held, for the start of the French leg of the relay.
The Olympics in Paris will be held from July 26 to August 11.
Turkish Flag seen from below, fluttering in the wind.
The President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, became a grandfather for the ninth time, CNN-Turk reported.
The ninth grandchild of the Turkish head of state is called Assam Özdemir.
The baby is the second child in the family of Sumeye (Erdogan’s daughter) and Selcuk Bayraktar, the social network Ex Bayraktar, who is the head of the Turkish defense company “Baykar”, reported on his profile.
On the 9th of January President Erdoğan visited together with his wife Emine Erdoğan their daughter and the newborn in the hospital.
The head of state has four grandchildren from the family of Esra and Berat Albayrak and three grandchildren from the family of Bilal and Reiyan Erdogan.
Where: Anna Politkovskaya press room and via Interactio
Key topics next week include:
Debate on the results of the December EU summit, the 1 February Special European Council and the situation in Hungary with Presidents Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen;
Debate on the programme for Belgium’s six-month Council Presidency with Prime Minister Alexander De Croo;
Improving product labelling and banning the use of misleading environmental claims: debate and final vote;
Humanitarian situation in Gaza and the need to reach a ceasefire: debate and vote;
Debate on keeping commitments and delivering EU military aid to Ukraine;
Music streaming platforms: vote on how to support artists and address injustices;
Economic governance: revamping the EU’s economic governance rules;
Commemoration ceremony honouring Jacques Delors.
Interpretation of the press briefing will be available in English and French.
You can follow it live from 11.00 on Friday in Parliament’s Anna Politkovskaya press room room or via Parliament’s webstreaming and EbS+.
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Giorgia Meloni, January 2023 - Author: Italian Government - Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Italia.
According to an article by Bloomberg, there have been reports of secretive negotiations between Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. It is said that Meloni has urged Orban to remove his opposition to the European Union’s aid for Ukraine.
This political strategy follows Orban’s decision in December 2023 to veto a significant €50 billion aid package intended for Ukraine, a country currently embroiled in conflict. As a result of this blockage, EU leaders are now calling for an emergency summit on February 1st to address the issue and explore solutions that could work around Hungary’s opposition.
Sources close to the matter, who have chosen to remain anonymous shared with Bloomberg that Meloni has proposed an agreement to Orban. The suggested deal involves Orban’s Fidesz party aligning with Meloni’s Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group which includes parties such as Italys Brothers of Italy Poland’s Law and Justice party and Sweden Democrats. This alliance could potentially strengthen ECR’s position in politics, especially considering the anticipated increase in representation from far-right parties, in the upcoming summer elections.
These discussions have occurred at levels but have not yet produced a definitive outcome. Orban, who is known for his pro-Russian views and tendency to echo Kremlin narratives has consistently voiced his criticism of the EU’s military assistance to Ukraine. He has frequently attempted to water down proposed sanctions against Russia or secure exemptions often using the threat of veto as leverage.
This situation arises amidst divisions within the EU on how best to support Ukraine amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. The outcome of these discussions and the subsequent emergency summit could significantly impact EU unity and its approach towards Russia and Ukraine.
The article, written by Euheniia Martyniuk and published on January 11 2024 highlights the diplomatic efforts taking place behind closed doors as European leaders navigate the delicate balance, between domestic politics and responding to international crises.
The Nizhny Novgorod sect named after Putin thundered at the beginning of the president’s second term in the mid-2000s. A certain Mother Photinia announced that in a past life she was the Apostle Paul, and began to pray with the adherents at the “myrrh-streaming” icon with his image. “Sobesednik” (“Interlocutor”) correspondent Olga Kuznetsova, reporting in June 2023 from the Church of Mother Photinia in the village of Bolshaya Yelnya, Nizhny Novgorod region, found out what is now happening in the monastery.
Tales of Mother Photinia
Mother said that you can’t kill anyone at all, not even plants. She had not heard of a law punishing the “killing” of rare mushrooms, but she would probably support it. And she also reminded me, just in case, that people are sinful and greedy. She recently built a path to her temple for everyone for 95 thousand rubles, set up a collection jar, and they gave her 105 rubles.
Mother spoke a lot about the reincarnation of souls, referring to the Bible, saying that John the Baptist was Elijah the Prophet in a past life. The Russian Orthodox Church does not recognize this, but various religious pseudo-Orthodox movements and sects often exaggerate this.
In general, reincarnation is Photinia’s trick. She believes that in a past life she was the abbess of the Diveyevo monastery, Maria (she signs herself “Mother Maria”), Princess Olga (Putin was then Prince Vladimir), and many others, but the most important thing is that she, in her words, is the embodiment of the feminine the divine principle, the Mother of God herself and Eve.
Instead of Putin, the cross is crying
Photinia herself took me to see the temple on the top floor. Its walls are also painted pink. “This is the color of love,” mother explained. There are a lot of fresh flowers and icons in it, and there are also old ones – they were donated by parishioners when the temple opened. There is no Putin icon among them; they say Photinia keeps the “image” somewhere in the distant bins. After the surge of interest in the Putin sect, they probably had conversations with her, and now she doesn’t mention the president’s name in vain.
The temple needs miracles in order for people and money to flock, and now instead of the myrrh-streaming image of Vladimir Vladimirovich, the cross is crying with peace, while the old icon Mother of God of Kazan is crying “blood” (red stains are visible, according the correspondent Kuznetsova).
“I carry out all the rituals: I baptize, and I perform the wedding, and I perform the funeral service,” Photinia said. “I don’t conduct unction; the channel for the Lord’s unction has been closed for two years now.”
But Photinia conducts rites of exorcism, driving out demons. Recently I “kicked the demon out” of a girl who suffered from gluttony. “You have to be very pure, because you take the essence upon yourself,” she noted.
It was not Putin who launched the special operation, but the Heaven
Photinia was in a great mood and started talking. It began with the fact that people today live in sin, “are proud of knowledge that is of no use to us at all, they travel to different countries” instead of developing spiritually, for example, reading spiritual literature of its own production. Photinia publishes a magazine, Temple of Light, which is distributed free of charge by her supporters.
Mother said that we must “love, be wise, have compassion for others, not divide the world into strangers and ours, we are all brothers and sisters,” and moved on to the more specific topic of the special operation, which she does not particularly approve of.
– But wasn’t it Putin, whom you yourself call the Apostle Paul, who announced it?
It was interesting how she would get out, but Svetlana Robertovna did not blink an eye.
– One person can never do anything; there is a group managing the country. If we are talking about world conflicts, the Patriarch of Russia is sure to take part in this, and now there is also the Duma. “It’s not the president who makes decisions,” my mother said and told me the story of the Apostle Paul, who used to be a very bad man, a pagan Saul, who reached the extreme point of darkness, saw the light and believed in Christ.
– Now Putin is Saul, and he needs to cross this line (between light and darkness – Ed.). “He doesn’t want any [word prohibited by the Russian laws] now; it has dragged on, people are dying, there is suffering. But he didn’t untie it, this is heaven. It’s just time to take the souls of people,” Photinia concluded and stated that we have the power we deserve.
She says she hasn’t heard about Navalny and those who disagree, but just in case she prays for everyone, probably for foreign agents too. Holy woman…
– What to do if a person was mobilized for this, in your words, murder? – I couldn’t stand it.
Mother came up with this too: they say, you can’t desert, it’s “cowardice” and “a form of pride,” but you have to go and pray. One of her children, who did not want to go, was called up, but he has been in reserve with his regiment for a long time.
The beginning
In the village of Bolshaya Elnya, Nizhny Novgorod region, in a private three-story house with a turret, the sect “Mother Photinia the Light-Bringer” is actively operating. The sect gained wide popularity by declaring Vladimir Putin a saint and his icon as a myrrh-streaming icon. Mother Photinia calls herself the reincarnation of “Christ-Eve.”
Queen of Sheba d’Arc
The real name of “Mother Photinia” is Svetlana Robertovna Frolova. Until 1996, she worked as the director of the trade and purchasing base of the Gorky Railway, and in 1996 she was sentenced to one and a half years in prison for fraud. After leaving prison, Svetlana Frolova took up healing and soon acquired a mansion in the center of Nizhny Novgorod. According to one version, the mansion was purchased with income from healing; according to another version, money remained from earlier times.
Soon Frolova expanded her range of healing services and declared herself a priest and the reincarnation of “Eve-Christ.”
Back in 2005, Photinia wrote to Putin with a call for spiritual perfection and to Patriarch Alexy with a request to ordain her to the priesthood.
There was no answer, and Photinia declared herself a priest. Soon she senses new spirits within her:
“Before becoming Photinia and Eve, Svetlana Frolova was the Queen of Sheba, Queen Helena, who found the tree of the Holy Cross, Joan of Arc, an Indian guru who communicated with the merchant Afanasy Nikitin, Abbess Maria of the Diveyevo Monastery at the beginning of the twentieth century and, finally, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya,” noted religious scholar Roman Lunkin, who spoke in detail with Photinia in 2005.
Revenue percentage
“Unfortunately, the sect enjoys a certain popularity and is clearly concerned about expanding this popularity. It is known that the creation of a pseudo-religious movement is a very profitable business, only slightly inferior in profitability to trafficking in drugs and pornography, organizing prostitution and the like,” Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin comments on the activities of the sect in a comment to PRAVMIR.
For several years, Photinia distributed a periodical in which articles were signed by the Heavenly Father and Seraphim of Sarov.
At the “worship” they sang “May there always be sunshine” and sat on rugs (borrowed from Islam). Eyewitnesses reported that worshipers at these meetings were put into a trance.
Gradually, Photinia synthesized all religions, calling for “asceticism from Orthodoxy, mercy from Catholicism, morality from Islam, and from Buddhism – Buddha himself and reincarnation”.
The sect was not in poverty: according to the testimony of village residents, Mother Photinia invited people to her community, promising that the trustees would solve financial difficulties. As the Nizhny Novgorod Diocesan Gazette reported, “according to the local police department, Svetlana Robertovna Frolova regularly submits requests for financial assistance to various entrepreneurs and organizations, signing herself as “Orthodox community” or “true Orthodox Christians.”
Bob Marley, Barack Obama, Putin
In addition to attracting people to the community, Photinia is active in publishing: about 40 of her books, published in Moscow, Rostov-on-Don, and Ukraine, can be found in online stores. By the way, sometimes her creations are found in Orthodox bookstores. To expand the “subscriber base,” Putin was declared a saint, and his “icon” streamed myrrh.
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin believes that this is a very natural move for the sect: “Of course, this industry is fueled in a certain way. It is known that one of the best ways to promote a new religious movement is to associate it with famous names. Thus, Rastafarianism was revolved around the names of Bob Marley and the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I, in Kenya there is a pseudo-Catholic sect that declared Bark Obama a saint, and here they exploit the name of Putin. There is nothing original in this approach.”
Press secretary of V.V. Putin, Dmitry Peskov told the media that Putin “winces at the cult of devotion fueled by Frolova. Of course, he is the most popular person in this country and has his own fan club, but it is not a cult.”
The Nizhny Novgorod diocese has been conducting explanatory work among residents for many years: there have been official statements and publications in diocesan bulletins:
“It has been repeatedly reported in the media, in our diocesan newspaper, that Mrs. Fotinia is not Orthodox, and the activities she carries out can only be called sectarian. We hope that law enforcement agencies will pay attention to its activities, and the illegal existence of this religious group will be properly assessed,” said Archpriest Andrey Milkin, who was then the press secretary of the diocese, back in 2005.
Local residents demanded 10 years ago that Svetlana Frolova be evicted, but the head of the self-government, Evgeniy Polavin, did not see any legal grounds for this.
It is obvious that in the pre-election months the Photinia sect will significantly expand the number of adherents, especially since reports of myrrh streaming are replenished with an ever-growing list of “miracles”: “People come to the Nizhny Novgorod village, where the so-called. Mother Photinia, with requests for healing, longs for quick miracles. Exploiting people’s illnesses by extorting money from them is not a profitable activity,” said Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin.
Sources in Russian: Assistant Administrator of the Nizhny Novgorod Diocese Andrey Milkin: “Mrs. Photinia is not Orthodox, and the activities she carries out cannot be called anything other than sectarian.” http://www.nne.ru/news.php?id=1615; R. Lunkin. From witchcraft to the creation of a religious system. Keston Institute Research; http://www.keston.org.uk/_russianreview/edition0304/05Fotinya.html.
Following the European Year of Youth in 2022 the European Commission is actively working to ensure that young people have a say in the decision-making processes of the European Union. Today’s announcement is a step forward in prioritizing the perspectives and issues that matter to young Europeans in EU policymaking. With the 2024 European Parliament elections these efforts aim to engage and empower youth giving them influence that goes beyond casting their votes.
One of the groundbreaking initiatives being introduced is called the “youth check.” This mechanism has been designed to consider how EU policies impact young people during their development. By utilizing existing Better Regulation tools such as consultations and impact assessments this approach aims to make EU policies more responsive to people’s needs and aspirations. In addition, specific instruments targeting youth under the EU Youth Strategy for 2019-2027 will facilitate policy dialogues, and roundtables and create a platform for continuous exchange with youth organizations, researchers and EU institutions.
Addressing Concerns of Young People
The Commission is taking steps toward addressing crucial concerns related to health and well-being education, environmental sustainability and employment. All areas are vital for young Europeans. These actions demonstrate a commitment, towards meeting present needs while also looking ahead to future challenges.
The plans ahead involve working towards a European degree by 2024 updating the quality framework for traineeships and establishing a platform for global discussions with youth organizations through the Youth Dialogue Platform in EU external affairs.
European Youth Week 2024
A crucial part of the Commission’s strategy is the European Youth Week in 2024 scheduled to occur from April 12 to 19. This week-long event focuses on promoting participation and elections happening two months before the European Parliament elections. Its purpose is to celebrate and encourage youth involvement, engagement and active citizenship through activities across Europe bringing the EU closer to its younger population.
Expanding on Insights from the European Year of Youth
The actions announced today directly stem from insights gained during the 2022 European Year of Youth. With more than 13,000 activities organized by over 2,700 stakeholders including EU institutions, Member States and youth organizations themselves the Commission has identified over 130 policy initiatives aimed at young people. These actions are a response to calls made by stakeholders such as the European Parliament, Council members and important entities, like the European Youth Forum.
In conclusion, the Commission’s dedication to incorporating the perspectives and worries of Europeans into EU priorities and policies demonstrates their recognition of their value. As we near the 2024 European Parliament elections these efforts not only open doors for a more inclusive and receptive European Union but also emphasize the significance of youth engagement in shaping the future of our continent. It serves as a rallying cry, for people; your opinions are important and it is high time to ensure they are heard at the core of European policymaking.
Olaf Kosinsky, CC BY-SA 3.0 DE , via Wikimedia Commons
Former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has raised concerns about the recent detention of politicians from the Law and Justice party, Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik, labelling them as “victims of political revenge” and stating that “we have political prisoners in Poland since yesterday”. Morawiecki emphasized that the detention of individuals for political reasons was previously considered “impossible” since the fall of communism and compared the current situation to the communist regime.
Morawiecki accused Donald Tusk, a prominent political figure in Poland, of “beginning to dismantle democracy” and highlighted issues such as the lack of freedom of expression, the monopolization of information, and attacks on political opponents, which he believes are characteristic of regimes that deviate from democratic principles. He expressed concerns that the end of the Law and Justice party’s government could lead to “anarchy and injustice,” warning that the new regime could potentially infringe on the freedom of Polish households.
The remarks made by Morawiecki reflect a deepening political divide in Poland, with significant implications for the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law. The situation has drawn attention and criticism from various international organizations and political commentators, raising concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in the country.
The recent developments in Poland have sparked a debate about the future of democracy and the rule of law in the country, with implications that extend beyond its borders. The international community will be closely monitoring the situation and its potential impact on the broader European political landscape.
The concerns raised by Morawiecki and others highlight the need for a thorough and balanced assessment of the situation in Poland, taking into account the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The coming days and weeks are likely to see further developments and discussions on this critical issue, both within Poland and at the international level.
