In trying to understand Sudan, and the civil war that has killed up to 150,000 people in the last three years—a toll twice as bloody as Gaza—it is important from time to time to go back to first principles: no-one elected Abdel Fattah at-Burhan leader of Sudan. On the contrary, he overthrew a popular revolt—in order to restore the regime of his predecessor, Omar al-Bashir, and the ‘Islamist current’ that has controlled the Sudanese state for almost 60 years. And this war continues to prosecute that aim.
The accompanying graphic, inspired by the work of Sahel conflict analyst Rachel Allen (@sahelcorridor), drives that point home—and deserves attention from international diplomatic representatives in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States who, almost since the war began, have been trying fruitlessly to persuade the Sudanese Armed Forces to come to the table and negotiate a ceasefire and long-term peace and political settlement with its principal armed adversary, the Rapid Support Forces and an array of unarmed political and civic interests and alliances. But Burhan, the SAF and their Islamist cadres—including their regional warlords, armed militias and state apparatchiks re-treaded from the Bashir regime (all enmeshed with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood which has just been designated by the US State Department Specially Designated Global Terrorist and a Foreign Terrorist Organization) will have none of it. They have rejected overture after peace-talk overture.
Instead, they have wrapped themselves in the national flag; framed the conflict as a ‘war of dignity’; insisted—spuriously—that their transitional council should be recognised as the successor-in-title to Bashir’s government; claim—equally spuriously—that they have the support of ‘the Sudanese people’; asserted their ‘sovereign’ right to dictate the country’s political and constitutional future; and made clear that the Army will be the linchpin and guarantor of Sudan’s governance in the future.
Sudan’s chronic instability is a danger both east and west. Much attention is paid to Sudan and its geopolitical significance to the Red Sea and the differing interests of regional powers to its north and in the Gulf, and to its destabilising impacts on its immediate neighbours—less so on its connections to Islamist groups operating across the Sahel.
UN and specialist reporting since 2019 identifies a dedicated IS network in Sudan that has run businesses and front companies to move funds to Islamic State branches in West Africa and the Sahel, and to support fighter movements across North and East Africa. This is a shared ecosystem: Sudanese territory, business structures and militant milieus offer finance, facilitation and recruits to ISIS and Al‑Qaeda franchises that are now consolidating territorial control and rear bases across the Sahel and West Africa. The Islamists of Al Qaeda and Islamic State may differ from Burhan’s Sudanese cohort; from their enclaves across West Africa, they are trying to carve out ministates. Burhan already has his—a state captured decades ago by Islamism, and he is determined to hold on to it and any cost while the Sudanese people pay its terrible price.
