The Sahel is a territory in Africa that generally remains very distant and unknown to Bulgaria – a vast region on the Sahara border, where countries are known primarily for their extreme poverty and pandemic corruption.
In the last eight years, however, the territories of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad have become a place of enduring instability, violence and the spread of radical jihadism by al Qaeda and Islamic State groups.
In this sense, France intervened directly in the field in the most serious military intervention for the country in decades.
Last week, however, President Emmanuel Macron announced that he would end Operation Barhan early next year and reorganize the French military presence by drastically reducing its operational staff and freeing several of its military bases in the region.
This is a decision that will undoubtedly ease the state budget and shift most of the responsibility for the security of local governments, but at the same time it is a half-hearted recognition by Paris for the failure of its current strategy.
France actually intervened in the region in early 2013 following a call from the government in the Malian capital, Bamako, whose fall under the control of jihadist militias at the time was only a matter of weeks away. Operation Serval was launched, which dealt with the immediate threat, and subsequently, at the request of neighboring countries, the French remained. Thus, Serval, focused only on Mali, grew into Barkhan and covered the entire region.
However, the goal remains the same and is defined by the Minister of Defense in the then government of Francois Hollande and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs – Jean-Yves Le Drian.
“Our goal is to block the path of what I call a highway to all forms of illicit trafficking and prevent the region from becoming a base for peaceful action for jihadist groups between Libya and the Atlantic. This is of direct importance to our security.” said then Minister Le Drian.
The French force currently numbers about 5,100 people based in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, with headquarters in Chad. The corps is almost entirely anti-terrorist and includes special forces, armored vehicles, intelligence and the air force.
Two EU and UN missions in Mali, another EU mission in Niger, as well as between 1,000 and 2,000 Americans operating from Mali and a brand new drone base in Niger are still operating to support the ground.
However, the leading component remains France as a former colonial power with lasting cultural and historical ties in the region. And the problem is that despite all the efforts and resources, the French strategy does not bring the expected results and in no way manages to keep the jihadist groups, which are increasingly expanding their influence, capitalizing on the lack of statehood and weak governments.
Africa will become a growing priority for EU security policies
In general, the idea of ​​Paris involves keeping the jihadists, while at the same time building enough capacity in the countries so that they can cope with the challenge on their own.
In this sense, a French initiative created the G5 Sahel regional alliance in 2014 with the idea of ​​Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania to join forces in the field of defense and build a common military corps of 5,000 people.
However, seven years after its inception, the G5 Sahel continues to suffer from funding problems and depend entirely on donor assistance and development programs.
That is why France is further “internationalizing” its participation in the search for partners to share the financial burden, emphasizing the importance of the region for Europe‘s security. This has deepened co-operation with the UN and EU missions. Along this line, in early 2020 (after a period of two months in which jihadist attacks killed several hundred Malian and Nigerian soldiers), the so-called Takuba Task Force was formed.
It has the support of a total of 11 EU countries, including the United Kingdom, and takes the form of several joint French-Czech, French-Estonian and French-Swedish units on the ground, with Denmark and Sweden also contributing helicopters. Contingents are expected to send more Romania and Greece to the field.
In reality, what is expected to happen is for France to reduce its contingent by at least half, and the burden to be gradually shifted to Takuba’s forces until the G5 Sahel countries can take responsibility for their own security.
The problem, however, is that attempts by France and its partners in the United States and Europe to balance effectiveness with a relatively limited military presence that is not visible to foreigners who are sensitive to foreigners do not lead to the necessary success.
It’s just a really huge territory, divided into isolated zones, where people don’t even know what “statehood” means and understand the ruling elites as something distant and foreign, and the combination of poverty and climate change means that for entire communities the only possible livelihood trafficking in drugs, weapons, people and antiques remains. In general, everything illegal that could profitably reach Europe.
In this context of chaos and instability, ordinary people often remain easily influenced by radical ideas and understand the activities of criminal and jihadist subsistence networks as much closer in contrast to an unknown government in a capital hundreds of kilometers away. it is most likely spoken in a different language.
The governments themselves in this case also contribute to instability, ruled by corrupt elites fighting for power, control and distribution of resources, often accused of violating the human rights of their own citizens.
Instability has reached such levels that two military coups have taken place in Mali in the last year alone, and longtime Chadian President Idris Debbie has been assassinated in a battle with jihadists, and the country is now ruled by a transitional cabinet led by his son.
The biggest concern is that all this will spill over into neighboring countries such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, where jihadist activity has increased in recent years.
Add to this the problem of Islamic State and Boko Haram in nearby Nigeria and Cameroon, and there is a very real danger of establishing a huge region of lasting instability in West Africa.
An area particularly sensitive to France, which has a long history of colonial presence and strong ties to local communities.
In recent years, however, these relations have increasingly taken on a negative connotation, in part because of a lack of serious success (except for the elimination of several jihadist leaders) and pressure from local critics who see France’s intervention as neocolonialism.
On the other hand, there is a lack of domestic support in France itself, according to a poll conducted by the Institut français d’opinion publique earlier this year. According to him, only 49% of respondents have a positive attitude to Operation Barhan in a country that has historically still suffered the trauma of military humiliation in Vietnam and Algeria.
The results of the poll are indicative and their impact should not be underestimated, provided that next year there is a presidential election in France, and a deepening dissatisfaction among voters (mostly those of African descent) may play a bad joke on Macron in the vote. That is why the attempt to change the strategy is logical.
There are currently no scenarios of humiliating military defeat, but there is no way to draw a parallel with the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, where the most powerful military alliance in world history for two decades has not been able to cope with the Taliban and had to partner with a corrupt and ineffective political elite in Kabul.
In this sense, the failed campaign in the Sahel can rather be described as a French “Afghanistan”.
It is not yet very clear how the reduced French commitment and the intervention of more participation by Europe in the absence of statehood in countries besieged by jihadism will affect.
The Francophone states in the region are weak and are becoming weaker, like the government in Kabul, which is increasingly giving way to the advancing and revanchist Taliban.
Unlike the Taliban, however, the jihadists in the Sahel are an extremely complex network of many different organizations, which in most cases are only nominally under a common flag and may even be in conflict with each other.
It is this lack of coherence that can still give France and its partners a chance. Otherwise, nothing good awaits the Sahel. And Europe.
