More than three years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin maintains tight control over domestic narratives to be delivered to Russian society but also reinforces its legislative arsenal as a tool to silence dissenting voices.
To explore how Russians perceive and interpret the war, their country’s trajectory, and the West, Carnegie Europe held a fireside chat with Alexander Baunov, senior fellow and editor-in-chief at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, and Olga Oliker, program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. The event titled “Russia’s Internal Front: Perspectives Beyond the Kremlin Line” took place in the premises of Carnegie Europe in Brussels on 26 June.
“Russian society is far from monolithic,” Baunov said. Former regime insiders, opposition figures, and ordinary citizens express divergent perspectives that reveal a complex picture of the country’s mood, resilience, and direction.
“Western sanctions have not affected the Russians’ daily life. The country is sovereign and self-sufficient, there are no shortages in supermarkets, cultural life is as alive as before the war, and existing problems they could complain about are not related to the conflict. Patriotism of the people remains untouched in its essence but expresses itself in narratives which should not necessarily be equated with a support to Putin’s regime and his political choices,” Baunov also stressed.
His analysis of the perceptions of the Russian people about war, security, peace, sanctions, NATO, the Europeans, President Trump and the USA closely followed the findings of a recent survey carried out by The Levada Analytical Center (Levada-Center)
Public Opinion Research Amid Repression
Levada, an independent analytical institution, remains one of the few reliable sources regularly measuring public sentiment in Russia. Despite mounting pressure from the authorities, the center continues to use a range of data collection methods, including door-to-door surveys, online questionnaires, phone interviews, and focus groups. This methodology allows for representative findings backed by statistical analysis and time-series tracking. In the context of an autocratic and repressive regime, Levada’s portraying of Russian society on sensitive issues has its limits but the institution is known to be professional and credible in its perimeter of freedom.
The data from the Levada-Center research as of 2025 is available HERE.
Sanctions: More Symbolic Than Impactful
Interestingly, around two-thirds of respondents say that Western sanctions have not affected their daily lives. An overwhelming majority believe that sanctions are aimed at the country’s leadership rather than its people. Sanctions are often viewed more as acts of external hostility than as genuine pressure. Over half of the respondents even believe that sanctions could strengthen Russia by encouraging internal development. A significant portion of the population continues to support the Kremlin’s foreign policy direction, regardless of external pressure.
The West, the U.S., and the “Hope” in Trump
Russian attitudes toward the United States have shifted. While two-thirds of respondents still view U.S.–Russia relations as poor, public perception has improved somewhat amid ongoing diplomatic discussions. Against a backdrop of widespread disapproval of Joe Biden, Donald Trump is seen by many as a figure capable of restoring dialogue with Moscow. Nearly half of respondents believe that Trump’s election could lead to improved bilateral relations. More than half support expanding ties with the West, indicating that isolationism has not fully taken root among the broader population, despite official rhetoric.
War and Peace: Support for the Army, but Fatigue with the Conflict
The Russian public maintains a steady interest in the conflict in Ukraine, with about half of respondents following events closely. A majority support the actions of the Russian military and believe that the “special military operation” is proceeding successfully. However, more than half also express support for transitioning to peace talks, primarily to save lives.
Notably, about one-third of respondents favor continuing military operations, driven by a desire to “finish what was started.” Among the preferred conditions for a peace agreement, respondents most often cite prisoner exchanges, the protection of Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine, and the preservation of the status of the Russian Orthodox Church. Conversely, Ukraine’s potential NATO membership and the return of territories occupied by Russia are viewed as unacceptable concessions.
Domestic Mood: Cautious Optimism and Stable Support for the Authorities
As of February 2025, public sentiment in Russia has slightly improved compared to previous months. Most citizens, especially the young and politically loyal, assess the current situation in the country positively. Approval ratings for the government remain consistently high. If the State Duma elections had been held at that time, the ruling United Russia party would have received more than half of the vote. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and the Communist Party (KPRF) would each secure around 10%, while A Just Russia and New People would each garner about 5%.
Looking ahead to 2026, a majority of respondents are optimistic—particularly younger people. In contrast, older and opposition-minded citizens tend to express more pessimistic views about the country’s future.
Conclusion
Despite pervasive state propaganda, Russian society is neither homogenous nor entirely loyal. Public opinion research reveals a complex picture: widespread support for the authorities and military action coexists with war fatigue and a willingness to negotiate. Views on sanctions and the West are similarly mixed—Russians largely do not feel personally threatened, yet many express a desire to restore normal relations. These internal dynamics will be crucial in shaping how the Kremlin makes its next moves—both domestically and on the global stage.
