Twenty years ago, on September 11, 2001, there was a terrorist attack on the United States, which in response declared war on al-Qaeda
“and the Taliban and began an invasion of Afghanistan. 20 years later, this story ended with the withdrawal of the Western coalition and the actual victory of the Islamists. The fact that Afghanistan, despite poverty, is a tough nut to crack, including because it lies in the sphere of interests of different powers and regimes, the experience of Stalin shows. He prepared three times to conquer this country, but he could not carry out his plans.
In Soviet schools, students were told that agrarian and pastoralist Afghanistan was the first country in the world to recognize Soviet Russia, but they preferred not to go into the details of this story. The fact is that diplomatic relations with the Lenin government on March 27, 1919 were established by Amanullah Khan because the Bolsheviks themselves became the first to recognize him as the master of Kabul – a month earlier, at the end of February. The previous emir, Habibullah Khan, ruled the country for 18 years, but was killed on February 20, 1919, then his brother Nasrullah ascended the throne for only one week and was sent to prison on charges of fratricide by his nephew, Amanullah Khan, the third son of Habibullah. … A year later, Nasrullah was killed in custody.
The Bolsheviks saw Afghanistan as a possible road along which the world revolution would go to India.
The Bolsheviks supported the new emir, Amanullah, not so much for the sake of getting out of international isolation as against the British Empire. Until 1919, Afghanistan was actually a protectorate of Britain, which, under the treaty, paid a kind of subsidies to the Afghan budget for Kabul’s abandonment of its own foreign policy. But Amanullah declared the complete independence of his country and even started a symbolic war with yesterday’s patrons, having achieved de facto recognition from the British in August 1919. On February 21, 1921, a friendship treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Afghanistan, under which Moscow paid Kabul a millionth subsidy annually.
The Bolsheviks viewed the distant mountainous country as a possible road along which the world revolution would go to India, and immediately after the diplomats shook hands, the special services began work. One of the Soviet agents was the Turk Dzhemal Pasha – an accomplice in the extermination of Armenians and atrocities against the Arabs during the First World War. On November 1, 1921, he met with Stalin, then the head of the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities, and said that he was ready to organize financing and supply of weapons to potential rebels in the northwest of then British India. Dzhugashvili approved the initiative, about which he wrote to Trotsky: “… In the face of the Muslim tribes, which constitute the majority in the Indus Valley and in the Punjab region, among which Dzhemal enjoys great influence, we have a certain base from which to seriously damage England if the latter strikes in the spring or in the summer of 1922. In addition, if we give Jemal the opportunity to have in Afghanistan at least a brigade (well-cobbled together) with our and Turkish instructors (formally subordinate to Amanullah Khan), thus, we will create a real base for anti-British influence in Afghanistan, which is also very important for us and without which the second task (direct impact on the insurgency in India) is impossible. ” instructors, and soon Dzhemal Pasha in Tbilisi was killed by an Armenian avenger.
In 1923, Amunullah Khan granted his subjects a constitution. Those, however, did not appreciate this step. The introduction of duties on imported goods from British India hit the pockets of the peasants, especially in the border zone – consumer prices rose. In addition, Amanullah raised taxes and began to centralize their collection, which displeased the local nobility. Farmers were also irritated by the introduction of military service.
In the early spring of 1924, an uprising began in southern Afghanistan. For help in the fight against his own people, the constitutional monarch turned to a large northern neighbor, and in the fall, planes and 11 red aviators arrived in Kabul, and then began not only aerial reconnaissance, but also bombing the positions of the Pashtun rebels. Soviet specialists also began to create their own Afghan Air Force. In addition, the USSR generously supplied small arms at a lower cost, ammunition and radio stations.
The chief of the Kabul police, for a monthly fee of 600 rupees, pledged to arrest all British secret agents
The military intelligence and the Comintern sharply stepped up their activities. According to the testimony of Georgy Agabekov, who since April 1924 served in Kabul in the USSR plenipotentiary mission, the conditions for the operations of the special services have become hothouse: “I worked hard on my own recruiting people to work under the GPU. After the arrest of Abdul-Majid Khan (a gendarme colonel who was sent to jail for not wanting to fight the rebels. – A. G.) I contacted his cousin, who served in the Kabul police , and received through him all the information obtained by the Afghan police agents.Raja Protap (an Indian emigrant close to the emir. – AG) introduced me to Mustofi (head of the tax department) of the Kabul province, through whom I received government information. From him, I received information about Muslim India, with whose leaders he, on behalf of Amanullah Khan, maintained close contact.
… I got to know the chief of the Kabul police … For a monthly fee of 600 rupees, he pledged, according to my instructions, to arrest all British secret agents. Naturally, I used this condition in full. Anyone we suspected of British espionage was arrested by us through this chief of police. “
In 1925, the USSR increased the supply of weapons and ammunition. On top of the contracts, 4.5 thousand rifles, 50 machine guns, cartridges for them, as well as a radio station were transferred free of charge. The uprising was defeated. Then twenty Afghans were sent to study in Soviet flight schools, and Soviet specialists – 36 people – became the backbone of the Afghan Air Force.
After the suppression of the rebellion, Amanullah Khan changed the title of emir to a more majestic one – padish (in the West, and in Russia, they began to call him more simply – the king of Afghanistan). The fighters for the happiness of workers and peasants were little embarrassed by this, and, supplying the monarch with weapons and ammunition, they received him with pomp in May 1928 in Moscow, Leningrad and Minsk.
Fifty fighters and two hundred camels scattered to the sides of the fetid cloud
The Soviet side was accumulating experience in the fight against Muslim resistance, because in the territory of Central Asia all the 1920s there was a struggle against the Mujahideen, whom the Bolsheviks called Basmachi (raiders). Irkutsk researcher Sergei Panin revealed a document of the OGPU, which says that in the operation against the detachment of the field commander Dzhunaid on the night of June 1, 1928, the red aviation struck mustard bombs (RGASPI. F. 62. Op. 2. D. 1367. L. 104 ).
Fifty fighters and two hundred camels scattered away from the fetid cloud, and then gathered again and left for Persia. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, as noted by researcher Yuri Tikhonov, the embezzlement of courtiers, officers and officials reached unprecedented proportions even by local standards, and in the fall of 1928, desperate subjects took up arms again. It erupted simultaneously both in the east, among the Pashtuns, and in the north, in the places of residence of the Tajiks. At the borders of the USSR, the uprising against Amanullah was led by a non-commissioned officer, a commoner Khabibulla Kalakani (aka Khabibulla Bachai-i Sakao – “Khabibullah Son of Vodonos”), a supporter of conservative Islam.
Soviet aviators in the Afghan service in November again dropped bombs on the villages of the Pashtun partisans, but this time it backfired, and the uprising grew, although at the request of Padishah Amanullah, the Soviet side in December increased the supply of high-explosive and fragmentation bombs. Through the buildup of military aid, things went towards the establishment of a Soviet protectorate in Afghanistan. On November 27, Amanullah asked the Soviet representative to urgently deliver chemical bombs …
Sell 1,000 rifles, 20 machine guns, 1,000 chemical artillery shells to the Afghan government
The minutes of the Politburo meeting of December 13, 1928 (Special No. 53) contains the only known decree in the history of this body on the export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): “7. About Afghanistan (Comrade Voroshilov): Allow the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs to sell to the Afghan government in accordance with the established procedure 1,000 rifles with an appropriate number of cartridges, 20 machine guns, 1,000 chemical artillery shells and one radio station so that, in view of the constrained position of the Afghan government, it is possible to make it easier to accept wool, cotton as payment for these weapons, karakul, etc. “.
On reflection, weapons of mass destruction were still not sent, Amanullah’s position became more and more critical, and he, soberly assessing the mood of his country, abdicated the throne in favor of his brother on the night of January 13-14, 1929 and left for Kandahar. But this did not save the throne of the royal family. A day later, Kabul was occupied by the detachments of the Tajik Bachai-i Sakao, who declared himself Emir Khabibullah, although the rebels of Pashtunistan, not recognizing him, began a fight with him, and Amanullah did not lay down his arms.
For the first time, Stalin firmly decided to conquer Afghanistan, by military force returning the padishah to the throne, because, as the Barnaul researcher Vladimir Boyko notes, in this case he had to become more than dependent on the bayonets of the Red Army soldiers and advisers from the OGPU. On March 20, the Politburo issued a decree on organizing the invasion. The general management of the operation was carried out by Stalin’s friend, Klim Voroshilov, and on the spot the command was entrusted to the former military attaché in Kabul Vitaly Primakov, who received the pseudonym Ragib-bey and completed his training by April 14.
According to Agabekov’s recollections, the attack began in the early morning without a declaration of war: “As eyewitnesses reported, Soviet airplanes rose from the border town of Termez early in the morning and, having flown over Amu Darya, began circling over the Afghan border point of Patta-Gissar. to gaze at the airplanes, but machine-gun fire from airplanes all the soldiers of the post were shot. ” The bombardment turned the border checkpoint into smoking ruins and made it possible for the invaders on boats and barges to cross the Amu Darya without hindrance.
The interventionist forces consisted of a cavalry detachment – over a thousand Red Army soldiers and Afghan emigrants dressed in Afghan uniforms or local clothes. The latter were nominally headed by the Ambassador of Afghanistan, about whose activities in the border regions of the USSR one of the Soviet intelligence officers Nikolai Frigut in his report spoke unflatteringly: who did not observe any rules of conspiracy. ” The unit, equipped with radio communications, was also armed with machine guns and guns.
With skirmishes, Primakov’s detachment reached the main city of the northern part of the country – Mazar-i-Sharif in a week. Agabekov testified that at that time he was there: “It was beginning to dawn. Suddenly the silence of the night was announced by an artillery salvo and then a machine-gun rattle began … they heard a loud “hurray.” … Our guns pushed their guns point-blank to the city gates and smashed them to smithereens in one volley … The city was occupied by a detachment. “
However, as researcher Pavel Aptekar notes, success almost became a trap. Primakov reported: “The operation was conceived as the actions of a small cavalry detachment, which in the process of combat work will acquire formations, but from the first days it had to face the hostility of the population.” A day later, the city was besieged by the troops of Khabibulla, the squadron sent to help from Tajikistan with losses was driven back to the USSR, and airplanes began to transfer weapons and ammunition to Mazar-i-Sharif. The new government was strengthened by demonstrative executions: on May 1, International Workers Day, six of Amanullah’s most active opponents were publicly shot in the city. Primakov asked to send chemical weapons and – to quote his report – “a squadron of cutthroats.” Gas grenades were not sent to him, but the red aircraft began to bomb the besiegers, and another four hundred Red Army soldiers armed with guns and machine guns came out to help from the USSR. This part managed to unite with the besieged and lift the blockade. The combined detachment headed south towards the capital.
People fell as if they were mowed down. Out of 3000, no more than a thousand were saved … Nobody removed the corpses.
Agabekov recalled that a reconnaissance specialist in Mazar-i-Sharif, who appeared under the name “Matveyev,” in a conversation with him described the further advance of the red cavalry: “Especially terrible pictures were observed after the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif, when the detachment moved to Tash-Kurgan and beyond … From Mazar we set out on the morning after his capture and two days later occupied Tash-Kurgan without any fight. Thanks to this tactic, our offensive in Kabul became known only on the seventh day after the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif. From there, a 3,000 detachment headed by the Minister of War Seyid-Huseyn was urgently sent against us. We met them already behind Tash-Kurgan, not far from Geybak. Letting the Afghans go to the distance of machine-gun fire, we immediately opened a hurricane of fire … People fell as if they were mowed down. Half an hour later, the detachment of Seid-Husein rushed back and ran into a mountain gorge. Then we began to crush them with artillery fire. Out of 3000, no more than a thousand were saved … Nobody removed the corpses of those killed. When we returned by the same road ten days later, the corpses were still lying half-decayed. … Our guys know how to shoot, and we would have reached Kabul a week if Amanullah held out in Kandahar … “But the padishah, after his troops were defeated, fled abroad on May 23, so the” restorers of constitutional order “at the end May – early June returned to the USSR, where three hundred of them received the Order of the Red Banner, and the rest – valuable gifts. The losses amounted to 120 people killed and wounded, operational reports from the Soviet side report the deaths of thousands of Afghans. A year later, the Soviet cavalry brigade again invaded Afghanistan – albeit in the border area – with the aim of destroying the mujahideen emigrants who had fought in the USSR before, and refugees from collectivization. The operational report testifies to the success: “The villages of Ak-Tepe were burnt and destroyed, Ali-Abad was completely destroyed with the exception of the part of the village inhabited by Afghans, all the villages and wagons in the valley of the Kunduz-Darya river were destroyed for 35 km … Up to 17 thousand cartridges were blown up, up to 40 rifles were taken, all emigre bread was burned, cattle were partially stolen and destroyed … Our losses – one Red Army soldier drowned while crossing and one platoon commander and one Red Army soldier were wounded. ” commander of the Central Asian Military District, and in 1937 he was sent to the Gulag in the Kolyma for 15 years.
