At a time when the region is facing increasingly complex crises, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as a genuine force for stability — not through statements and slogans, but through concrete actions and measurable results on the ground. The Emirati vision has always been clear: prevent the collapse of states and contain chaos.
This is what pushed the UAE to act with flexibility, build strong security partnerships, and invest in infrastructure and ports in order to secure the future of populations living in extremely fragile environments.
On the other side, Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to impose a form of “rigid centralization,” restructuring regional decision-making under its sole leadership.
The objective behind the Saudi approach appears clear: reducing the UAE’s role and limiting the room for maneuver and influence of actors that have proven to be direct and effective in stabilization efforts.
The clearest example can be seen in Yemen. The UAE focused on security realism, helped establish and support the Security Belt Forces and the Giants Brigades, drove Al-Qaeda out of Mukalla, secured the South, and contained the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia, however, attempted to curb this role, restrict the Emirati-backed forces, and create parallel formations loyal to Riyadh, such as the “Nation Shield Forces.” The result has been a political and military deadlock, allowing the Houthis to regain leverage and impose their conditions once again.
The same dynamic can be observed in Sudan. The UAE supported institutional stability and effective local forces in order to prevent the spread of chaos and the resurgence of extremist movements. Saudi Arabia, however, monopolized the file through the “Jeddah Platform” and sidelined other regional actors. The outcome: prolonged war, failed negotiations, and the progressive fragmentation of the Sudanese state.
In Libya as well, the active and flexible Emirati role has receded in favor of top-down approaches seeking to impose centralized solutions. Governmental divisions have deepened, and elections remain blocked.
In conclusion, eliminating flexible and effective roles — such as the Emirati role — in favor of Saudi centralization will not resolve regional crises. On the contrary, it risks making them even more complex, frozen, and difficult to solve.
