The Muslim Brotherhood, whether being designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States, or facing scrutiny and restrictions in France and Austria, is under the spotlight; concern is mounting over its growing influence and ambition. Whether creating a launchpad in the Horn of Africa, or growing deep roots in local French life, governments and security services are sounding the alarm. But to tackle the Brotherhood, it is essential to recognise that they operate quite differently from one continent to another.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s core aim is to reshape individuals, society, and state so they are governed in accordance with Islamic Sharia law, ultimately envisioning a unified Islamic order or caliphate. Yet the way the Brotherhood goes about achieving this aim varies according to the territory they hope to shape. In Europe, where Islam is very much a minority religion, they mainly operate as a diffuse socio‑religious and lobbying network working through NGOs, mosque federations, youth and student groups, as well as charity and real‑estate structures. Whereas in Sudan, where Islam is already foundational in national life and culture, it has historically functioned as a mass Islamist movement embedded in the ruling party, security services and today in the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Within Europe the Brotherhood is not a formal political party; instead it works through a decentralised web of associations coordinated by umbrella bodies such as the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe and the European Council of Muslims in Brussels and linked entities like the European Council for Fatwa and Research, youth and student federations (e.g. FEMYSO), and charity and finance vehicles such as Europe Trust. Its Sudanese branch and allies have taken classic party form, most notably through the Islamic movement that crystallised in Hassan al‑Turabi’s networks and then the National Congress Party (NCP), which under Omar al‑Bashir effectively fused party, state and movement.
In terms of the Brotherhood’s relationship to the state, inEurope it generally positions itself as a civil‑society interlocutor with the state, seeking recognition as a representative of Muslim communities, access to consultation forums, and influence over policy on religious rights, education and foreign policy, while formally staying within democratic and legal frameworks. In Sudan it has historically acted as an embedded Islamist current in government, shaping constitutions, legislation and security policy, especially during Bashir’s rule (1989–2019) when Brotherhood‑aligned Islamists penetrated the civil service, intelligence services and judiciary, and drove the Islamisation of law and public space.
How does the Brotherhood’s use of coercive power differ across territories? InEurope, the security services describe an “extensive and sophisticated” but largely covert network focused on ideological, financial and institutional influence; it does not openly control armed wings and operates legally, though intelligence reports reflect state concerns about entryism, foreign funding and long‑term societal engineering rather than immediate violence. In Sudan, Brotherhood‑aligned Islamists have directly shaped and sometimes integrated with coercive organs: under Bashir they were central to building an Islamist security state, and in the current conflict they are widely seen as an ideological and organisational backbone of parts of the Sudanese Armed Forces and associated militias, contributing to militarisation and sectarian mobilisation.
In terms of their public profile,inEurope the strategy is long‑term “soft” influence—building community institutions, controlling key mosques and Islamic schools, running student and women’s organisations, and leveraging anti‑discrimination and religious‑freedom discourses to gain legitimacy and funding, often while downplaying explicit Islamist political goals in public. In Sudan the movement has at times been openly ideological, advocating comprehensive application of Sharia and Islamist governance, and using revolutionary and then state power (including coups, alliance with military officers, and legal Islamisation) to recast Sudan’s political and social order.
Within Europe, state responses to the Islamist threat vary. France and Austria have tightened laws, closed associations and monitored funding, while the UK and Belgium often distinguish between violent extremism and non‑violent political Islam, leaving more room for Brotherhood‑linked groups to operate. In Sudan, after Bashir’s fall, Brotherhood‑aligned networks lost formal power but remain very influential inside the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the security and business spheres, and many analysts see the dismantling of this entrenched role as a precondition for a genuine civilian transition and durable peace. Certainly the United States intended as much when it designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation this year. On the other hand, this Brotherhood-SAF fusional relationship is not without its strains and fractures, as shown by speculation that General Burhan himself might have played a role behind the scenes in the Brotherhood designation.
There are signs that the international community is increasingly recognising the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is not yet clear that their understanding is deep enough of the connections between the penetration of civic life in Europe and the determined foothold that the Brotherhood has in the strategically important Red Sea location of Sudan. There remains an urgent need for further analysis of how the Brotherhood’s use of soft power in Europe and hard power (including even access to the Sudanese Armed Forces’ chemical weapons) in the Horn of Africa link together, and what that combined threat amounts to, especially within the context of the Iran conflict.
