By Professor Nikolai Nikanorovich Glubokovsky
In this case, the generally accepted affinity between pneumaticity and wisdom inevitably leads to an equal judgment of the latter. What do the closest qualifications offer on this issue? They are abundantly collected in the detailed description (VII, 22 ff.) of the all-wise artist of all things and are apparently intended to be absolutely comprehensive. Here Sophia is presented as the true teacher of humanity in everything hidden and clear, and the basis for this is that she possesses a spiritual nature (VII, 23:… ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα κτλ.) with all its most important properties. The latter ensure her perfect fulfillment of the educational mission, however, under the condition of communication with her, when her spirit penetrates into all intelligent, pure, subtle spirits (VII, 23: … πνεῦμα … διὰ πάντων χωροῦν πνευμάτων νοερῶν καθαρῶν λεπτοτάτων). In this case, wisdom will be in a row with others, to whom her three own predicates are assimilated and even with intensification (cf. VII, 22: πν. νοερόν … λεπτόν. 23:… διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα). Therefore, the entire difference between them is more of a degree or quantitative nature than a qualitative or essential one. As for the second group, there can hardly be any doubt that it simply presupposes minds capable of and worthy of divine illumination. This is indisputable from the very mixture of pneumatic attributes, since within wisdom itself they mark certain qualities and do not at all indicate personalities. Otherwise, the extremely strange idea that personal sophia contains a multitude of individualities would emerge. And since this is utterly impossible and unnatural, then the “spirits” will be simple personifications of the intellectual and moral human distinctions mentioned (VII:27) with the expressiveness that wisdom, passing from generation to generation into holy souls (εῖς ψθχὰς ὁσίας), prepares friends of God and prophets, but is inaccessible to the evil soul (I:4). With this understanding, we must accept that—in its complete congeniality with personifications—wisdom itself does not transcend the boundaries of living poetic hypostasis. However, this does not resolve it into mere abstraction, since, by the very meaning of the rapprochement, it proves to be the inseparable and ever-active power of the all-wise God. For now, however, the personality is not found, and further enumeration does not provide it, for here in Sophia its insight is causally motivated by reference to the purest natural mobility (VII, 24: πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινηκώτερον σοφία), which is justified by natural purity as the purest divine effusion (VII, 25: ἀτμὶς γὰρ ἐστιν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως), which wisdom is in the dignity of the bright radiation of eternal light (VII, 26: ἀπαύγασμα γὰρ ἐστιν φωτὸς ἀιδίου). This sequential selection of images is linked by mutually subordinate γὰρ, and through them all its members converge to their starting point in the disclosure and justification of wisdom’s all-pervading pneumaticity, with which all its typical features necessarily and completely share, insofar as they characterize them. But by virtue of this pneumatic insight, wisdom in no way appears to us as a person, and therefore even less so by virtue of other predicates describing an already personified quality. And no matter how highly plastic this most vivid depiction, in which the author exhausts all color for the greatest possible animation of his figure, we nevertheless have no firm exegetical motivation to see a personality in it until it is convincingly argued that the object of this characterization is personal—in the “spirit” of wisdom. The second, however, leads to the opposite, which is why the first would be a corresponding personification, not directly attesting to the existence of its own hypostasis. This is reinforced by the final conclusion, in which wisdom, in its superiority, is contrasted with malice (VII, 30; σοφίας δὲ οὐκ ἀντισχύει κακία), and the latter is never proclaimed personal, even though it refers to a personal culprit in the devil.109 So far, we have not gone beyond personifications. What do the numerous other qualifications say? They define wisdom’s competence in knowledge and establish its actual salvific efficacy among people, based on historical examples. In terms of authority, her advantages are unshakable. She abides in the holy heavens before the throne of God’s glory (IX:10), sits upon the throne of God (IX:4), and is, as it were, the Lord’s companion (VIII:3). Given such intimacy, she is inseparable from the Almighty, actively participates in all His functions, and knows all things. She is with God, understands His works, and was present at the very creation of the world (IX:9). In this calling, wisdom is naturally initiated into all the secrets of the mind of God and in the divine plans conceived, it chooses the best for implementation (VIII, 4)110, serving as a mediator of fulfillment (IX, 1) in the cosmic arrangement (VII, 21), which incomparably exceeds all human art (VIII, 6).
All of this certainly safeguards the prerogatives under discussion, but only because wisdom is close to the Almighty. The entire thrust of pseudo-Solomon’s reasoning is directed toward protecting this continuity, which provides such exceptional insight. This tendency alone does not favor the hypothesis of dissolution, which is alien and, perhaps, hostile to the author’s specific intentions. And if we weigh all the particular predicates in all their intensity, then Sophia will emerge before us only as the wisdom of God and will merge with God in a complete individuality. Any attempt at separation will lead to a situation where, despite its divine advantages, it would displace the divinity itself. Thus, being the secret of divine reason, wisdom is αἰρετίς τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ (τοῦ θεοῦ: VIII, 4). This is by no means a simple consultation,111 but sophia assumes the lofty role of independently realizing divine projects, evaluating them according to their suitability.112 It is clear that, in a personal interpretation, the actively active divinity suppresses and obscures the ideally inventive, turning it into abstraction, when the one all-wise God remains. Consequently, if the tendency of the entire description does not harmonize with the division, then neither do the realistic details, which do not allow for a strictly literal understanding, confirm it. In them, we must see the poetic plasticity of a living depiction of the living power of God. This is evident from their clearly improper application to various objects. Thus, wisdom “has cohabitation with God” (VIII:3), but Solomon also “decided to accept her into cohabitation” (VIII:9); the latter, however, does not presuppose personality, and therefore the former does not clearly attest to it.
Therefore, this group cannot be seen as offering direct evidence for a distinct individuality precisely because of their sharp hypostatic nature, which almost inclines toward ditheism and the absorption of God in His wisdom. It goes without saying that for the anonymous writer’s Judeo-Biblical thinking, the exact opposite was dogmatically more credible.113 This also illuminates the references to historical discoveries. Here, wisdom was the divine savior of the chosen ones from the time of Adam’s fall (10:1 ff.), always manifesting benevolence in his righteous descendants, and especially protecting the people of God when she delivered them from oppression, confronted kings with miracles and signs, served as a protection by day and replaced the starry light by night, led them through the Red Sea, drowning their enemies and vomited them out of the abyss, and so on. The reader of the New Testament books involuntarily recalls corresponding concepts regarding the providential actions of the divine Son and, in this illumination, examines analogous speculations from the distant past. But this disrupts the natural gradualness of the revelation of God’s mysteries. Objective judgment must prevail here, recognizing the factual identity of the phenomenon and considering each stage of its revelation among people within a given historical perspective. From this perspective, the pseudo-Solomonic picture takes on a somewhat different character. Its most important figure is truly full of inexhaustible vitality, with all the prerogatives of divine individuality. Wisdom is imbued with divine grandeur and functions with the autonomous authority of the arbiter of the world’s destinies alongside God (cf. 10:5… καὶ [σοφία] ἐτήρησεν [τὸν δίκαιον] ἄμεμπτον θεῷ). Jehovah himself seems to fade before her, almost to the point of disappearing, because sophia replaces the Almighty in all His incomparability. Then we will see that with wisdom there is no longer room for God, and since this is absurd, it is clear that here before us is the Lord, wisely governing the universe and all its currents. This observation is also justified exegetically by textual evidence. The leadership of the Jews liberated from captivity is entirely vested in Wisdom, and by the hand of the holy prophet, she arranges their affairs for the attainment of the Promised Land (11:1 ff.) throughout the wondrous journey, covering them in the heat of the day and dispelling the darkness of the night (10:17). Naturally, her name is still expected in the narrative itself, yet it suddenly disappears entirely, and the Almighty is called the actual mover, for He waters them (11:8 ff.), punishes the wicked, pardons the repentant, and settles His chosen ones on their appointed lot, having destroyed the former inhabitants (12:6 ff.). During this period, in the narrative of pseudo-Solomon, we find the exact opposite: God completely abolishes Wisdom, which had dominated with no less singularity until then. This mutual exclusion in equal dignity and in the general sphere of implementation of the adopted plan irresistibly convinces us that we are dealing with one and the same subject.
And such was, of course, God, and for Him, wisdom would be merely a corresponding revelation, which is why its hypostasis turns out to be a literary personification in accordance with the author’s fundamental religious beliefs.
This result is consistent with previously obtained data and is justified by other similarities. Even the prominent depiction alludes to them, seemingly necessarily implying personal power. Here, it is important to emphasize that it is not only wisdom that appears with such traits in the book under analysis. We are referring to the initial episode of the glorious deliverance of the Jewish people in the slaughter of the firstborn of Egypt. At this time, “Thy almighty word (O God) descended from the heavens, from the royal thrones, into the midst of the perilous land, like a fearsome warrior. It carried a sharp sword—Thy unchanging command—and, standing, it filled all things with death; it touched the heavens and walked upon the earth” (XVII, 15, 16). This description is hardly inferior in plasticity to the accounts of wisdom, and with a condensed energy it boldly sketches a portrait of individualistic clarity. This “word” is divine and divine, though not fused with the Lord. On the other hand, it is not a simple personification of God’s will, for it was the bearer and executor of its terrifying determination. In all this, the precise parallelism with the data on sophia is undeniable. But few scholars understand the quoted passage to refer to a personal logos, and these rare commentators proceed from a pre-formulated conviction in the personality of wisdom and apply it to the “word” by its identity with the latter. 114 In the question of the nature of sophia itself, such argumentation is utterly inappropriate and fictitious. All that is certain is that the “word” is promoted in the role and realm where wisdom reigned supreme. Hence, it is absolutely true that this wisdom now appears under the form of “word,” since it completely absorbs it at this moment. Consequently, to comprehend the former, we must independently clarify what this “logos” itself is. It is called the savior of the Israelites wounded by serpents, for “not grass nor plaster healed them, but your word, O Lord, which heals all” (16:12: … άλλά ὁ σὸς, Κύριε, λόγος ὁ πάντα ἰώμενος). We believe no one will object that the closest understanding of this message is in the sense of a divine beckoning (cf. Ps. 16:20). And this immediate understanding of the reader is decisively reinforced by the very connection of the speech, where the cited commentary is supported by the fact that God “has the power of life and death, brings down to the gates of hell and raises up” (16:13). From this it necessarily and inevitably follows that in the present case, too, everything was arranged by His life-giving power, which, if isolated personally, would equally actively deprive all this energy from its source. Since this is impermissible, then the result would be a personification of the all-conquering and regenerating activity of God. This quality is even more directly evident in the third mention, that God created everything “by His word” (9:1: ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ σου). Here, the author found it difficult to accept a distinct personality, simply because, alongside “logos,” wisdom is also called the organizer of man (IX:2). It goes without saying that pseudo-Solomon could absolutely not accept two homogeneous creative agents, and they would be dual designations of a single creative principle, which was the Almighty (XI:18, etc.). In relation to Him, “word” would be similar to its position in people, for whom it is a spark in the movement of the heart (II:2). Applied to the creation of the world, this imagery was all the more legitimate, since it flawlessly expressed the biblical teaching on the creation of the world according to the wise command of God. Here, the only necessary premise is that “logos” characterizes only the latter,115 and, by its identity with it, wisdom serves as a revelation of this all-encompassing subject.116
At the conclusion of all the research, the previous thesis is formulated: in pseudo-Solomon, sophia does not possess the typical qualities of strict personalization and—along with the “spirit” and “word” that replace it—is more reminiscent of poetic individualization. 117 For this reason, we return to the starting point of our analysis with the exegetical result that, based on the classical list (VII, 22 ff.) of all the qualities of wisdom, one cannot categorically conclude that the anonymous author himself saw it as a person. Taken together with other observations, this gives rise to the conviction that it is doubtful that the Jewish writer would have admitted a special divine person. This conclusion is also defended by certain secondary considerations. There are two of them, and both are based on the ambiguity of the numerous predicates given in the book, in terms of their own nature. This, above all, gives rise to a vague notion of their true bearer. Wisdom is usually considered such, for all efforts of literary plasticity are devoted to it. Yet, the figure of the spirit stands out so prominently in the foreground of the entire painting that it can be considered the center and final point of the entire depiction. Indeed, some commentators find in the words under consideration “a clear reference to the New Testament doctrine of the Trinity,” but at the same time they note that the entire tone of the utterances is more appropriate to the Holy Spirit than to the Son. 118 We do not claim that this hypothesis is true, and we know that it is associated with the vagueness and even eccentricity of fundamental convictions regarding the subject being treated. 119 What is important for us is the fact that such diverse interpretations are conceivable regarding the object understood by pseudo-Solomon. If the latter had been distinct in the writer’s consciousness and depicted as a typical individual, then its special features would certainly have been minted in the literary reproduction with sufficient distinctiveness, inherent only to one specific individual, even if not fully comprehended. In any case, one cannot expect the author to fail to express that he is thinking of a certain personality, as long as it is before his gaze. Then there would be no room for disagreement about the essence of genuine contemplation, given the legitimacy of disparate opinions in evaluation. However, we encounter quite the opposite, and therefore we must assume that the mysterious anonymous author did not have a distinct personal image before him, since none is found in his description.
Moreover, it is perfectly natural that the vagueness of the concept is accompanied by confusion in the very qualifications. Herein lies the second remarkable feature of the essay under consideration. We are simply struck by the accumulation of a whole mass of predicates, and it is difficult to find even an approximate classification for them. Advocates of personal understanding offer a general distinction, supposedly “alongside the subjective-divine Wisdom” there is also a narrative “of another cosmic Wisdom, active and revealed in the created-objective world as a reason and power immanent to it.”120 Justifications for such confusion are also offered—in the very nature of the object, which, in relation to God, can be viewed from various aspects of its reflection, which implies the exegete’s obligation to strictly sort all attributes according to their merits.121 All these arguments fail to achieve their goal and, rather, distract from it. Let us agree that pseudo-Solomon testifies to a pre-eternal and created wisdom. It is indisputable that the scale for this division is the strictly chronological moment, inseparable from the consolidation of corresponding advantages. This does not in the least affect the question of personality, and the personality of created wisdom is equally plausible.
Consequently, the chronological-ontological perspective completely disqualified the introduction of predicates based on hypostatic properties, which is why their emergence would be an absolute incomprehensibility, rendering individuality dubious even for the entirety of qualifications. Personality, in turn, does not inherently contain chronological elements, and their introduction is not naturally prompted by discussion of the person as such, since it can be both beginningless and finite. For this reason, leaps from individualistic to chronological characteristics become unmotivated, in their inseparability from the weighing of merits themselves. All these considerations indicate that the hypothetical conflation of predicates is almost improbable, since there was no objective basis for their combination and the free transition from one to the other, since divinity did not raise questions about hypostaticity, and this did not directly imply chronological postulates. Therefore, in conceiving of the divine hypostasis, the author was deprived of any reason to depict it as impersonal and merge it with the created, for this would be an entirely different subject. Personality is not truly impersonal and cannot be described as such, otherwise we are forced to accept that it was never presented with a distinct personality. But if the vivid and unexpected transitions among disparate definitions are absolutely not justified in an objective sense, then there will be no firm ground for their corresponding understanding. Hence the inevitable and ineradicable instability of all constructions. For example, created-objective wisdom is presupposed in references to its mobility, penetration, and prophetic enlightenment (VIII:23, 24, 27). In this form, cosmic sophia, cutting ex abrupto into the primordial sphere, would in turn be supplanted by the latter and then reassert itself with the same vigor. It hardly needs saying that such an interweaving would be simply strange, creating a decisive confusion that the writer could not have permitted had he not been himself beset by confusion. Under these conditions, the commentator loses the objective criterion for impartial exegesis, and everything will depend on the subjective evaluation of the terms employed. Naturally, purely secondary tendencies play a significant role in this process, inclining even a single scholar to different views. We are led to believe that the three aforementioned attributes of wisdom assimilate the qualities of the Stoic nous in the dignity of immanent cosmic rationality. Elsewhere, on this point, it is categorically stated that “there are no serious grounds for seeing here an indication of a divine reason immanent in the world in the Stoic-pantheistic sense; it is more consistent with Old Testament views to understand here the presence of sophia not as substantial, but only as active, in the sense of the biblical teaching on the omnipresence of the Deity and the New Testament teaching on the presence of the Logos in the world (John 1:10).”123 Such vacillation in interpretation clearly illustrates the instability of the concept itself, which would be impossible given a more or less clear conviction of the personal typicality of wisdom. This necessarily suggests the conjecture of its impersonality, whereby it would be a property of God, wise in Himself and in all His manifestations. This understanding, being natural and normal, easily removes all riddles and dispels puzzling obscurities. A personal conception appears entirely natural if only the personal Jehovah is active everywhere, and all fragmented reflections, behind which the divine hypostasis necessarily shines, are reduced to Him. But at the same time, wisdom is not actually personal and is unlimited within the deity, while in the cosmic sphere it manifests in the forms of finite existence. 124 In this view, everything is harmoniously connected and logical, because it characterizes the general force by its source and bearer, by its qualities and dignity, by its activity and particular actions.
Along with the rejection of personalistic judgment—in the end—we also acquire a positive interpretation of the subject, as non-hypostatic for the religious contemplation of the Jewish author. This fundamentally protects opinions in favor of literary and poetic personification, which was appropriate and achieved particular vivacity through its attention to the person, who held the energy at all stages and in all respects. The entire body of the obtained data inevitably inclines to the summary conclusion that the textual grounds do not allow us to assert that pseudo-Solomon, the son of the Old Testament, proclaimed a hypostatic distinction in the deity and precisely separated wisdom from the Lord Almighty.125 The facts on this account are so solid and incontrovertible that, despite all efforts to separate, we must acknowledge “inaccuracies” that are irreconcilable with the isolation of wisdom from Jehovah,126 since she, being the organizer of everything (VII, 21 and cf. VIII, 6; VIII, 5), then turns out to be simply co-present with God at the Creation of the World (IX, 9).
Notes:
109. All this sufficiently eliminates the arguments of the opposite nature presented by Professor M. D. Muretov (in the “Orthodox Review” of 1882, II, p. 466).
110. For such an interpretation of the term αἰρετίς, see also C. Siegfried in A Dictionary of the Bible ed. by J. Hastings IV, p. 929 a. Cf. and note 112.
111. Thus, Professor M. D. Muretov in the “Orthodox Review” of 1882, II, p. 487.
112. Cf. S. L. W. Grimm in Handbuch zu den Apocryphen des A. T. VI, p. 169. See also on pp. 644, 809, 647, 812.
113. Dr. J. Hamburger, from a purely Jewish point of view of personalistic monotheism, categorically asserts in Real-Encyclopädie des Judentums III, 6 (Lpzg 1901), p. 46; III, 3 (ibid. 1896), p. 43, that here hypostasis allegedly disagrees with the Bible.
114. All this is evident from Prof. M. D. Muretova (The Teaching of Logos in Philo of Alexandria and John the Theologian, pp. 90–91), and W. E. Ball concludes that if in the book of Wisdom the “word” is a person, then the author borrowed from Philo (St. Paul and the Roman Law and other Studies, pp. 104–105), who is also sometimes credited with distinguishing sophia as a special principle (see above pp. 352, 981). Further combinations then arise. Seeing in pseudo-Solomon the identification of wisdom with the logos – with the hypostatic independence in the former (M. Friedländer, Geschichte der jüdischenApologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christenthums, Zürich 1903, pp. 62–63, 64), – these very concepts are also found in the Alexandrian theosophist (pp. 66 ff.), from which it is naturally assumed that, along with the Jewish anonymous saint, Paul also knew Philo, having borrowed from him the ideas about man as the temple of God (1 Cor. 3:16, 6:19, 20; Rom. 12:1: see p. 295), and about Abraham as the father of the faithful (Gal. 3:6-10; Rom. 9:7, 8, 4:16, 17; Eph. 2:19, 3:3, 5-7), and not only of fleshly descendants (p. 310 ff.); Some Jewish writers, however, derive the last apostolic thought directly from rabbinical Judaism (see † Rabbin Predicateur Elijah Benamozegh, Morale juive et morale chrétienne. Examen comparatif. Paris 1867. P. 292 suiv. and cf. 284). Of course, these conclusions are erroneous to the extent that the premises are false, and it is hardly subject to dispute that in any case it is not clear that the logos in Philo is a person (see also Pfarrer Agathon Harnoch, De Philonis Judaei λόγῳ inquisitio, Regiomonti 1879, p. 36 sqq.), although this point is the very center of Alexandrinism and of the specifically Philonic teaching (cf. Max Freudenthal, Die Erkenntnislehre Philos von Alexandria in “Berliner Studien für Philologie und Archäologie” XIII, 1, Berlin 1891, p. 3).
115. Therefore, one cannot even agree with the position of Ernest Havet, that “the logos of Wisdom (of Solomon) is only the memra of targuls” (Le Christianisme et ses origines IV, p. 399), because here “the external manifestation of Jehovah is designated, called in the Bible His glory (kabod), and later – His radiation” (schechinah). However, A. Edersheim also exaggerates the matter if, seeing here an echo of the ancient tradition (The Life and Timos of Jesus the Messiah I 2, p. 47 and in Fr. M. P. Thebes I, p. 59), he asserts that “the Memra is a hypostasis (cf. Book I, pp. 664, 75), although its permanent personal existence is not indicated” and it “is not identified with the Messiah” (I 2, p. 48 – I, p. 60). All this will be somewhat extreme, even if we admit the influence of Alexandrian Hellenism on the development of the idea of the Memra (L. Hackspil in “Revue biblique internationale” XI, 1 [1-er January 1902], p. 59. 63 suiv.), where the process has not yet reached the Philonic stage (p. 66).
116. It is not entirely clear if W. E. Ball concludes that wisdom is a personification (St. Paul and the Roman Law and Other Studies, p. 102), as is the word (p. 105), and yet they are not identical (pp. 103–104)…
117. Cf. also Historisch-kritische Einleitung in die heiligen Schriften des alten Testaments von Prof. Dr. J. H. Herbst, herausg. von Prof. Dr. B. Welte II, 3 (Freiburg im Breisgau 1844), pp. 166 ff. Prof. Albrecht Thota, Dio Genesis des Johannes-Evangeliums (Berlin 1882), pp. 29. Very Rev. Edward Hages Plumptre, Art. “Apocrypha” in A Dictionary of the Bible ed. by W. Smith I (London) 4863), p. 83 a. † Br. F. Westcott, Art. “The Wisdom of Solomon” ibid. III (London 11863), p. 1782 a¬A Concise Dictionary of the Bible (London 51880), p. 1013 b.
118. See Prälat D. th. etph. Karl v. Lechler, Die biblische Lehre vom heiligen Geiste (Gütersloh 1899), S. 57: “…steht nichts im Wege, die Wendungen (in Kap. 8, 22–31) alle auf die zweite oder auf die dritte Hypostase der Trinität zu beziehen. Sie passen mehrfach ebenso gut auf den heiligen Geist als auf den Sohn. Doch stimmt die besondere Färbung eines jeden dieser Aussprüche viel mehr mit dem, was die Schrift sonst vom heiligen Geiste sagt.” W. E. Ball also admits that “the author of the Book of Wisdom prepares the way for the doctrine of the personality of the Holy Ghost” (St. Paul and the Roman Law and Other Studies, p. 102).
119. See book I, pp. 721 ff., 215.
120. Prof. M. D. Muretov, The Doctrine of the Logos in Philo Alexander of Alexandria and John the Theologian, p. 89. Note that above (p. 87) the author mentions the “created-objective Wisdom of God, incarnate and revealed in the finite world.”
121. Prof. M. D. Muretov in “Orthodox Review” 1882, II, pp. 466-467.
122. Prof. M. D. Muretov, The Doctrine of Logos in Philo of Alexandria and John the Theologian, pp. 89-90.
123. Prof. M. D. Muretov in the “Orthodox Review” of 1882, II, p. 491.
124. From this point of view, it is true that for the immediate Old Testament consciousness, the “Angel of Jehovah” is “not a messenger of God, distinct from Him, but His revelation in human form” (Prof. G. Buchanan Cray, Art. “Angel” in Encyclopaedia Biblica ed. by Prof. T. K. Cheyne and J. S. Black I, col. 166).
Therefore, A. Edersheim, although he admits that in Judaism there was a distinction between the unapproachable God and the revealing God (The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah I2, p. 45 and according to the translation of Fr. M. P. Thebes I, p. 57) – with the acceptance of the pre-worldly existence of the Redeemer (I2, p. 175-1, p. 222), for whom the synagogue allegedly admitted a divine personality (I2, p. 179-1, p. 227) – but this scholar is also forced to state that “the idea of a divine personality and of the unity of two natures in the Messiah seems alien to the Jewish audience of Jesus of Nazareth, and initially even to His disciples” (I2, p. 171-1, p. 218). On the contrary, it is indisputable that strict Judaism was extremely hostile to any hint of the slightest isolation in the deity and was ready to condemn R. Akiba himself for this (see also Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Wascher, Due Agada der Tannaiten I: von Hilhei bis Akiba; zw. Auflage, Strassburg 1903, pp. 216–217). This is also the main reason for the Jewish intolerance of the “rejected books” (see our book I, p. 833 ff.), which were to be burned even if the name of God was found in them (see M. Friedländer, Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christenthums, Zürich 1903, p. 477), whether they are to be attributed to the Gnostic sectarians of the Jews (ibid., p. 470 f.) or Christians (W. Wascher, Due Agada der Tannaiten I2, p. 338.2) or directly to Christians, beginning with the Evangelists and the Gospels (Prof. Ludwig Blau, Art. “Gilyonim” in The Jewish Encyclopedia V, New York and London 1903, pp. 668–669), for these persons preached a kind of ditheism (M. Friedländer ibid., p. 482). In this sense, Jewish authors to this day defend the purely human character of the Redeemer in Jewish expectations (Kaufmann Kohler, Art. “Eschatology” in The Jewish Encyclopedia V, pp. 213 a-b) and assimilate supranaturalistic features under the influence of Parseeism (pp. 214a-b), which is why scholars accept a real pre-existence only for the messianic benefits (Paul Volz, Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba, Tübingen und Leipzig 1903, p. 126), and for the Messiah himself it is admitted that realistic concepts about him grew out of the saga of the primeval hero who freed the cosmos from demonic monsters (p. 218). From this perspective, it is possible that the Book of Enoch and other similar documents were deemed heretical and rejected by nomistic Judaism precisely for their inclination toward the idea of a personal, pre-worldly Messiah (Prof. C. v. Orelli, Art. “Messias” in Realencyklopädie von Prof. A. Hauck XII 3, Lpzg 1903, pp. 737:5–6), although the aforementioned apocrypha is also seen to have polemical undertones against Christianity (pp. 732:12–15).
126. Max Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie, p. 197.
Source in Russian: Glubokovsky N.N. “The Teaching of the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon on Divine Wisdom or Spirit in Comparison with the Apostolic Spirit” // Christian Reading. 1904, No. 5, p. 615-659.
